Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COPENHAGEN167
2007-02-21 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Copenhagen
Cable title:  

DANISH PM ANNOUNCES IRAQ WITHDRAWAL, INCREASE IN

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR PGOV NATO IZ DA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3355
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHCP #0167 0521511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211511Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3225
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000167 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV NATO IZ DA
SUBJECT: DANISH PM ANNOUNCES IRAQ WITHDRAWAL, INCREASE IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: COPENHAGEN 63

Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 000167

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV NATO IZ DA
SUBJECT: DANISH PM ANNOUNCES IRAQ WITHDRAWAL, INCREASE IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: COPENHAGEN 63

Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, reasons 1.4b,d


1. (SBU) Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
announced February 21 that Denmark will radically scale down
its presence in Iraq in August 2007 and will then deploy
additional forces -- perhaps as many as the net 400 soldiers
to be pulled from Iraq -- to join the Danish battalion in
Afghanistan. Rasmussen stressed that the decision was based
on expectations that Iraqi forces will be able to assume full
responsibility for security this summer; in keeping with
long-standing Coalition policy, he said, British and Danish
forces will reduce their forces as the Iraqis take control.
The Prime Minister also emphasized that the decision had been
coordinated with Coalition partners -- mentioning his
conversations the previous day with President Bush and PM
Blair, as well as with Iraqi PM Maliki -- and that Denmark
will remain engaged in Iraq as part of the Coalition,
providing additional resources (four observation
helicopters),training support, ten new advisors to Iraqi
ministries and approximately $17 million in new refugee
assistance.


2. (C) The prime minister's announcement tracked closely with
the outline that Danish national security advisor Bo
Lidegaard provided the Ambassador and DCM earlier that day,
in which Lidegaard described a withdrawal of Denmark's
400-man mechanized battalion in Basrah at the end of the
current rotation in August. Lidegaard reported that the PM
will seek extension of the current parliamentary mandate at
least to the end of 2007 to cover remaining forces involved
in the NATO and Coalition training missions and support for
the four helicopters (some fifty to sixty soldiers). In his
address, PM Rasmussen indicated that his government has the
support of the Danish Peoples' Party (DF) for the mandate
extension, virtually assuring its passage, but expressed hope
that his plan will receive broader backing within the
parliament (initial reactions from the opposition suggest
that it will not). Lidegaard said the PM is cautious about
portraying the plan as a simple transfer of forces from Iraq
to Afghanistan. Because of the corrosive political rancor
over the Iraq deployment, the government wants to keep its
proposal to expand Danish troop numbers in Afghanistan
separate, in hopes of broader parliamentary support.


3. (C/NF) While indicating understanding for the Danish
decision, the Ambassador and DCM conveyed to Lidegaard our
disappointment with the way this decision had been reached,
with little advance notice. Such an approach is inconsistent
with the policy of "no surprises" the Danes have long
advocated and to which we have fully adhered. Lidegaard
apologized, explaining that the timing of the decision was
forced upon them by the British, and that PM Rasmussen was
determined that the news not leak and force him into a corner
(especially since the Danes could not be certain that the
British wouldn't reverse course at the last minute; as if to
drive that point home, Lidegaard took a call from his UK
counterpart during our meeting, in which Nigel Sheinwald
reportedly gave him the "final go"). Lidegaard noted that
the Danes are very dependent on the British in Iraq, just as
the Lithuanians, in turn, are dependent on the Danes for
their own Iraq deployment (Lidegaard said that Rasmussen was
at that moment speaking with the Lithuanian PM).


4. (C) Comment: Shifting Danish forces from Iraq to
Afghanistan may allow Rasmussen to extricate himself from the
unpopular Iraq deployment with some measure of honor, while
maintaining his credentials as an ally. Even if the
opposition doesn't give him any credit (arguing that Denmark
should withdraw entirely),the move should help neutralize
the Iraq issue here and give the government greater leeway to
pursue deployments elsewhere. There is broad backing here
for Danish and NATO engagement in Afghanistan, including from
the main center-left opposition parties. Our immediate focus
will be to nail down the Afghanistan deployment and encourage
the Danes to look at increasing their engagement in
Afghanistan even before forces are freed up in Iraq.
CAIN