Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CONAKRY236
2007-02-24 12:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Conakry
Cable title:  

TFGV01: ENLISTING ECOWAS'S SUPPORT FOR A

Tags:  PINS PREL PGOV AMER GV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 241229Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0732
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J2/J5//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000236 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/17
TAGS: PINS PREL PGOV AMER GV
SUBJECT: TFGV01: ENLISTING ECOWAS'S SUPPORT FOR A
DIGNIFED EXIT FOR PRESIDENT CONTE

REFS: (A) Conakry 179

(B) Conakry 191
(C) Conakry 223

Classified by Ambassador Jackson McDonald. Reasons 1.4
(b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000236

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/17
TAGS: PINS PREL PGOV AMER GV
SUBJECT: TFGV01: ENLISTING ECOWAS'S SUPPORT FOR A
DIGNIFED EXIT FOR PRESIDENT CONTE

REFS: (A) Conakry 179

(B) Conakry 191
(C) Conakry 223

Classified by Ambassador Jackson McDonald. Reasons 1.4
(b)(d)


1. (U) On February 24, the ECOWAS special envoy for
Guinea, former Nigerian President Babingida, accompanied by
ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas and other delegation
members, received the U.S., French, German, and British
ambassadors, the EC head of delegation, and the U.N.
resident representative.


2. (U) Babingida and his delegation, who returned to
Conakry on February 22, had already met with Prime Minister
Eugene Camara, key ministers, political parties (both
majority and opposition),labor unions, and civil society.
They were scheduled to meet with Chief of Defense Staff
General Kerfalla Camara and other members of the military
command mid-day on February 24.


3. (C) The German ambassador, as current EU president,
started off with general overview of the current crisis.


4. (C) Next, the U.S. Ambassador provided our analysis of
the situation, using language similar to that in reftels.
He then emphasized the need to address the leadership
problem head on: President Conte is no longer up to the
job; he will go one way or another; the U.S. wants a
peaceful, civilian, constitutional transition.


6. (C) Based on the National Assembly's refusal the
previous day to extend the state of siege, the Ambassador
added to following: The Conte regime has been disavowed by
the people, most notably during the mass demonstration on
January 22. The Conte regime has now been disavowed by the
National Assembly in which the people's representatives,
including those from the majority party, voted unanimously
against President Conte's request to extend the state of
siege. This double disavowal highlights the Conte regime's
incapacity to govern effectively; it calls into question
the current regime's authority and legitimacy.


7. (C) The Ambassador said that President Conte and his
civilian and military entourage should draw the obvious
conclusion from this double disavowal -- Conte must go.
The Ambassador recalled that the U.S. has requested the
President of the National Assembly, the President of the
Supreme Court, and the military command to effectuate a
peaceful, dignified, constitutional exit for Conte, either
by convincing him to resign or by invoking Article 34.


8. (C) The Ambassador urged Babingida and the ECOWAS
delegation to endorse and facilitate Conte's smooth
departure. If not, the crisis in Guinea will only deepen,
and it risks destabilizing the subregion.


9. (C) The French ambassador concurred, stressing the need
to move urgently before Guinea succumbs to civil war,
especially since various actors are starting to play the
ethnic card -- a dangerous and irresponsible tactic.


10. (C) The U.S. Ambassador underscored the need for
urgent action for two additional reasons. First, we are
witnessing the last days of an authoritarian regime.
History has shown that diehard members of such regimes
often toughen their positions when their backs are against
the wall. They can behave irrationally and lash out
violently in last-ditch efforts to preserve their power.
Second, the Guinean people continue to simmer; the street
may boil over again in the days just ahead if the people do
not see real change and some hope for the future.


11. (C) In a brief one-on-one exchange with Babingida, who
was about to depart to meet with the military command, the
Ambassador reiterated that we have asked General Kerfalla
to facilitate a dignified way out for "his friend, his
comrade-in-arms, his commander-in-chief, President Conte."
The Ambassador asked Babingida to do likewise, based on his
longtime acquaintance with Conte. (Conte came to power in
1984, Babingida in 1985; they worked together to create
ECOMOG.) Babangida took note, saying he was stunned by
Conte's bad condition -- "He can't even stand up."


12. Comment: Following their intensive consultations,
Babingida and Chambas now have a good grasp of the nature
and extent of the crisis. They see the problem clearly,
including the leadership vacuum. It is uncertain, however,
how forward-leaning their recommendations will be: A new
prime minister? A new government of broad national

CONAKRY 00000236 002 OF 002


consensus? Conte's departure?

McDONALD