TFGV01: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL ASEC AEMR GV
SUBJECT: TFGV01: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY AND SUPREME COURT TO REMOVE CONTE THROUGH ARTICLE
34

REF: CONAKRY 179

Classified By: Ambassador Jackson McDonald, Reason 1.4(b, d)

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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1. (C) On February 16, the Ambassador lobbied hard for
President of the National Assembly Aboubacar Sompare and
President of the Supreme Court Lamine Sidime to deal head on
with Guinea's leadership vacuum by invoking Article 34 of the
constitution to remove President Lansana Conte, who is
objectively no longer able to govern the country.


2. (C) National Assembly President Sompare, who would become
interim President of the Republic, agreed that conditions
warranted the use of Article 34. He is worried, however,
about the reaction of the military, which must be brought on
board in advance, he said. He also doubted that Supreme
Court President Sidime would go along, as required by the
constitution.


3. (C) Supreme Court President Sidime "took note" of the
Ambassador's advice but insisted that the answer lies,
instead, in political dialogue leading to a new prime
minister and a government of broad national consensus.
Sidime is blind to the real problem. He is a weak but
pretentious man totally beholden to President Conte. End
Summary.

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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SOMPARE 80% WILLING
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4. (U) The Ambassador first met one-on-one with National
Assembly President Aboubacar Sompare at the latter's office
at the Palais du Peuple.


5. (C) The Ambassador repeated in extenso the same arguments
used with Prime Minister Eugene Camara on February 14 (see
reftel para. 4 to end). In short, President Conte is no
longer up to the job; Guinea is leaderless; no government has
been able to transform Guinea's great potential wealth into a
minimally decent standard of living for the people; the
crisis has become untenable; the people will not accept
deprivation anymore and have taken to the streets; the
country is under an official "state of siege; it is teetering
on the edge; now is the time for bold action.


6. (C) The Ambassador said that the objective facts now
warrant -- and have warranted for some time already -- the
use of Article 34 of the constitution to declare the
President of the Republic incapable of exercising his duties.
Since Article 34 has not been implemented, the problem has
festered; the people have rebelled against the government;
and President Conte has invoked another constitutional
provision to declare a state of siege, thereby conferring
broad, exceptional powers on the military.


7. (C) The Ambassador argued that the state of siege might
restore some public order for a brief period but it would
undermine Guinea's fragile civilian institutions and would
not/not resolve the underlying problem, i.e., President Conte
is no longer up to the job and must be replaced.


8. (C) The Ambassador said that one way or another,
President Conte will go: either by death, resignation,
Article 34, or a coup d'etat. He said the U.S. strongly
prefers that Conte be given a peaceful, dignified,
constitutional way out. He appealed to Sompare to rise to
the occasion and to invoke Article 34. If not, he warned,
today's wave of popular discontent will grow into an
insurrection of tsunami proportions, or, some colonel,
captain, or "Sergeant Doe" will take over the country.


9. (C) The Ambassador said it was time for Sompare to reach
deep down to find the political will and personal courage to
invoke Article 34 for the good of Guinea. He said Sompare
and Guinea could count on the support of the U.S., most of
its neighbors in West Africa, and much of the international
community. Most importantly, Sompare could count on the
support of the majority of the Guinean people who are
demanding change, who want Conte out, who want better
governance, and who want hope for the future.


10. (C) Sompare agreed with the Ambassador's description of
the situation and recognized that, objectively, President
Conte is no longer up to the job. Sompare said that he has
not invoked Article 34 for two reasons: he is concerned

CONAKRY 00000191 002 OF 004


about the reaction of the army, and he has doubts that
Supreme Court President Sidime will go along, as required by
the constitution.


11. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that these were real
problems. Sompare said the army will have to be "in on this"
before it can happen.


12. (C) The Ambassador recognized that the military is used
to preferential treatment by a president who is also a
general. He said that a Guinean colonel once told him that
the military is afraid that they will be "thrown in the
garbage" if there is a civilian president. Moreover,
President Conte, who was raised in the military and remains
intensely loyal to his "military family," also favors a
military successor. Thus, it is necessary to find ways to
reassure the military that Guinea will always need a strong,
professional, well-paid, well-equipped army, even under a
civilian president.


13. (C) The Ambassador said he was willing to consider
raising the matter with General Kerfalla Camara, Chief of
Defense Staff. Sompare commented that it would be necessary
to convince the whole general staff. The Ambassador took the
point.


14. (C) The Ambassador added, however, that the real problem
was not that the armed forces are afraid of receiving fewer
resources. Instead, senior officers are afraid that, under a
civilian president, they will not be able to perpetuate their
highly lucrative sweetheart deals on the side. Sompare
agreed that many senior officers were motivated more by greed
than by duty.

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A POSSIBLE SCENARIO
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15. (C) Since Sompare did not reject out of hand the idea of
invoking Article 34, the Ambassador outlined a possible
scenario: President Conte is declared incapable of
fulfilling his constitutional duties as head of state and
head of government; Sompare, as President of the National
Assembly, becomes interim President of the Republic, as
provided by Article 34; Sompare immediately (simultaneously)
confirms the recent presidential decree delegating
substantial executive powers to a prime minister/head of
government; Sompare and the prime minister, who must be a
genuinely consensual figure, work expeditiously to form a
transitional government of broad national consensus to
administer the country until a presidential election is held,
after which a permanent government could be formed.


16. (C) Sompare himself remarked that a transitional
government should include members of the opposition political
parties, labor unions, and civil society. The Ambassador
concurred, adding that these groups should be given some
important ministries in order to involve them deeply in the
affairs of state, to make them partly responsible for
administering the country, and to make them accountable for
their performance.


17. (C) Warming the idea, Sompare recommended that the
Ambassador also meet with Supreme Court President Sidime,
without whose assent Article 34 is impossible to implement.


18. (C) The Ambassador said he planned to meet with Sidime as
soon as possible. Sompare said he expected Sidime and
President of the Economic and Social Council Michel Kamano to
arrive any minute for a pre-arranged meeting about how to
restart the political dialogue with the labor unions,
political parties, civil society, religious leaders, etc.

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SUPREME COURT PRESIDENT SIDIME: THE WEAKEST LINK
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19. (C) Supreme Court President Lamine Sidime and Economic
and Social Council President Michel Kamano soon arrived at
Sompare's office.


20. (C) The Ambassador then repeated at length the same
arguments he had made to Sompare. He said it was time to
face reality. Objectively, President Conte is no longer up
to the job. There is a leadership vacuum at the very top.
This dysfunctional state of affairs has been allowed to
continue for so long that it is now endangering Guinea,s
very existence as a bulwark of stability in West Africa.
Guinea is already experiencing unprecedented civil strife;
the crisis will worsen unless bold steps are taken now to

CONAKRY 00000191 003 OF 004


stop it.


21. (C) He said it was time -- perhaps even past time -- for
Sompare and Sidime to fulfill their constitutional duties by
invoking Article 34, which represents the best way to remove
President Conte in a peaceful, civilian, constitutional
manner.


22. (C) Sidime replied that he would "take note" of the
Ambassador's advice but that the government was now trying to
restart the political dialogue in order to resolve the
crisis. He asked the Ambassador to help convince the labor
unions to end the strike.


23. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. supports political
dialogue. He said the U.S. Embassy had worked hard and
successfully to convince the union leaders to participate in
the previous day's meeting aimed at resuming the political
dialogue. He said he personally had requested General
Kerfalla to guarantee the safety of the participants in the
political dialogue.


24. (C) The Ambassador stressed, however, that the labor
unions are not the problem. The general strike reflects much
broader popular discontent. Even if the unions announced an
end to the strike today, it is unlikely that the population
would follow. The unions do not control the people, and the
people want change.


25. (C) Comment: Sidime, like many senior government
officials, seemed obsessed with the labor unions and
oblivious to the real nature of the crisis. End comment.


26. (C) The Ambassador argued that political dialogue and
Article 34 are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they
are complementary. He said that political dialogue would be
required to produce a consensual prime minister and a
broad-based transitional government, both of which would be
necessary during the period from Conte's removal under
Article 34 until a new president could be elected.


27. (C) Sidime seemed unconvinced, unwilling or both.


28. (C) Economic and Social Council President Michel Kamano
predicted that if Article 34 were invoked, there would be a
coup d'etat.


29. (C) The Ambassador replied that one could not rule out
that eventuality, but that if Article 34 was not invoked,
there would also be a coup d'etat, a mass insurrection, or
some other form of violent upheaval that would depose
President Conte through extra-constitutional means.
Moreover, he warned, Conte would not be the only person
removed.


30. (C) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador reiterated
that the time has come for Sompare and Sidime to fulfill
their constitutional responsibilities. He said that the fate
of Guinea was, to a very large extent, in their hands.


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COMMENT
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31. (C) We have now explicitly urged both Sompare and Sidime
to address Guinea's leadership problem head on. We have
emphasized that half measures and partial solutions will no
longer suffice. We have made clear that Conte is the problem
and that he must go. We have argued that Conte should be
removed constitutionally. We have warned that if Conte is
not removed constitutionally, then he will almost certainly
be removed through violent, extra-constitutional means that
will sweep away Conte and many others, including perhaps
Sompare and Sidime themselves.


32. (C) National Assembly President Sompare is concerned
about the reaction of the military. He could be risking his
life by invoking Article 34. He will only invoke Article 34
if the military has been brought on board beforehand and if
he thinks Sidime will go along.


33. (C) Supreme Court President Sidime is a weak but
pretentious man. He is subservient to President Conte. (For
example, he validated Conte's crooked election in 1993.)
Without Conte, Sidime is nothing. Moreover, he, too,
probably fears the reaction of the military. If somehow
General Kerfalla and the military command can be convinced
that it is in Guinea's interest to facilitate Conte's exit
through Article 34, and that their private financial

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interests will not be trampled, then they could prevail on
Sidime to concur. Sidime, who comes from a lower caste,
would ultimately comply under such pressure.


34. (C) In sum, Sompare and Sidime will not use Article 34
unless the military is on board in advance.
MCDONALD