AMBASSADOR PUTS GENERAL KERFALLA ON NOTICE THAT HE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000180

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF, AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PINS AEMR PGOV PHUM GV
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PUTS GENERAL KERFALLA ON NOTICE THAT HE
WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE


Classified By: Ambassador Jackson McDonald. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) On February 14, the Ambassador, accompanied by DATT,
met with Chief of Staff of the Guinean Armed Forces General
Kerfalla Camara at Camp Samory Toure in downtown Conakry.


2. (C) The Ambassador strongly regretted that the general
strike had led to a state of siege instead of a peaceful
settlement through political dialogue. He noted that, under
the state of siege, General Kerfalla now had greater powers
but also greater responsibilities for the comportment of his
men and for the future of Guinea.


3. (C) The Ambassador warned General Kerfalla that he and
entire Guinean Armed Forces would be judged by how they
exercise their special powers during this time of crisis. He
urged Kerfalla to order his forces to use restraint. He said
there have already been reports of serious abuses. He said
individual freedoms have been suspended under the state of
siege, but that does not give the armed forces free rein to
intimidate or abuse the population. He reiterated that
General Kerfalla and his troops would be held accountable for
their actions, including grave violations of human rights.


4. (C) General Kerfalla replied that the armed forces had
been given a mission: stop the looting and rampant
destruction; reestablish order. He said he had no other
plans or ambitions beyond fulfilling this mission.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked General Kerfalla whether the
state of siege would be lifted before the end of the 12-day
period. Would it run its full term? Or would it be extended
beyond February 23?


6. (C) General Kerfalla replied that he did not want the
state of siege to last one day longer than necessary. He
said he had spoken earlier in the day with National Assembly
President Aboubacar Sompare to push for the resumption of
dialogue with the labor unions.


7. (C) The Ambassador agreed: the state of siege should be
lifted asap; dialogue must resume.


8. (C) General Kerfalla said the armed forces were
duty-bound to protect all/all Guineans, without exception.
He declared that the armed forces would complete their
mission; they would end lawlessness and destruction and
reestablish order in Guinea. That is our mission; we did not
ask for it, he concluded.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked General Kerfalla how he saw the
current crisis unfolding. Kerfalla repeated that he had
encouraged Sompare to resume dialogue with the labor unions
and others. The Ambassador said that, under the state of
siege, many leaders of the labor unions, opposition political
parties, and civil society feared arrest or worse. They
could not be expected to negotiate with the government if
they feared for their lives.


10. (C) The Ambassador said that if General Kerfalla really
wanted to promote dialogue, then he should state publicly
that these interlocutors had nothing to fear and that he
would personally guarantee their security.


11. (C) General Kerfalla replied that he would be willing to
arrange military escorts for union leaders and others to and
from the negotiation sessions to guarantee their safety.
(Note: Radio-Television Guinee subsequently broadcast an
invitation to unions and others to meet at 1400 hours today
at the Palais du Peuple with the Presidents of the National
Assembly, Supreme Court, and Economic and Social Council, as
well as religious leaders "under the auspices" of General
Kerfalla. Security was assured. We are encouraging the
union leaders to attend.)


12. (C) The Ambassador lobbied Kerfalla hard to remove
restrictions on the movement of diplomatic vehicles
(currently limited to ten hours a day from 0800 to 1800
hours). The Ambassador argued that, regardless of the state
of siege, the Republic of Guinea still had to meet its
international obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, including, inter alia, respecting
diplomatic immunities, protecting diplomatic missions, and
guaranteeing freedom of movement.


13. (C) General Kerfalla responded that his first
responsibility towards diplomats was to guarantee their
security. He said he could not do so after dark, because it
was impossible for his patrols to distinguish between

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diplomatic and non-diplomatic vehicles after nightfall. It
was thus imperative, he said, for diplomatic vehicles not be
on the road after 1800 hours.


14. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. Embassy works
around the clock, when necessary. It was essential that he
and his staff be able to go to and from the embassy at any
time, day or night. Kerfalla replied that he would provide a
military escort during curfew hours, if necessary. The
Ambassador said that wasn't good enough. He asked Kerfalla
to consider our request to lift restrictions on diplomatic
vehicles an active, outstanding issue with the goal of
removing these restrictions as soon as possible.


15. (C) The Ambassador asked General Kerfalla about the
cohesiveness of his forces, noting that in an earlier
conversation Kerfalla had acknowledged that it was not always
possible to know the intentions of officers and men within
the ranks. Kerfalla responded that there had been some
problems, but they have been "circumscribed."


16. (C) General Kerfalla authorized the KC-135 to land again
in Conakry on February 15 at 1600 hours.
MCDONALD