SRI LANKA: OPPOSITION LEADER SAYS PROGRESS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: OPPOSITION LEADER SAYS PROGRESS ON
PEACE POSSIBLE DESPITE BREAKDOWN OF MOU


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Ranil Wickremesinghe,
leader of the major opposition United National Party (UNP),
on February 5, soon after 18 UNP parliamentarians joined the
government to accept ministerial posts (ref). Wickremesinghe
said he would not attempt to expel the "crossovers" from the
UNP and would leave an "open door" in case any in his party
wanted to return. He said the MoU between the UNP and the
governing Sri Lanka Freedom Party is defunct because the
president reneged on its terms by offering ministries to UNP
defectors. He reiterated this in an address to parliament on
February 6. Nevertheless, Wickremesinghe said, the UNP may
still continue to engage in the All-Party Conference (APC) to
resolve the ethnic conflict. Wickremesinghe reported that
when he met with Indian leadership on a recent trip to New
Delhi, they said they are urging the Sri Lankan government to
accelerate work on a plan for devolution -- a position with
which he agreed. He added the UNP would support the
government in parliament on any devolution proposal
consistent with the UNP-SLFP annex to the MoU on the
conflict, including provisions for a national referendum on
the final agreement. End summary.

PARTY LEADER CONFIDENT
UNP WILL REMAIN STRONG, INTACT...
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador met with the principal opposition
United National Party (UNP) leader Ranil Wickremesinghe on
February 5, shortly after 18 UNP members crossed over to the
government to accept ministerial posts. Wickremesinghe said
the party will take "disciplinary measures" against the
crossovers, but would not attempt to expel them from the UNP.
The new ministers will not be permitted to sit on UNP
decision-making committees, but may nominally remain members
of the party, Wickremesinghe said. He added that he wants to
leave an "open door" if anyone wishes to return fully to the
UNP, assessing that some crossovers were not happy with their
decision to join government ranks.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked Wickremesinghe about the future
of the UNP, noting that if seven more UNP members joined the
government, the UNP number in parliament would fall below
that of the Marxist, Sinhalese chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP). The JVP would then likely make a bid for the
title of chief opposition party. Wickremesinghe said, "We'll
see what happens," and expressed confidence the UNP would
remain the largest opposition party. He denied press reports
that six more UNP members would soon cross over to the
government and assured the Ambassador he could staunch the
bleeding in his party. He reported that he had agreed to
implement some of the reforms the crossover group had been
requesting.

... THOUGH PARTY RIFTS CONTINUE
--------------


4. (C) Despite Wickremesinghe's confidence his party will
recover, many in the UNP remain skeptical about his
leadership. In a separate discussion with the Ambassador on
February 5, Sajith Premadasa, son of the assassinated UNP
President Ranasinghe Premadasa and himself a UNP MP since
2000, said dissatisfaction with Wickremesinghe ran deep in
the UNP. According to Premadasa, many of those who had not
crossed over nevertheless felt that Wickremesinghe had used
the MoU with Rajapaksa for his own, party-internal purposes.
He had negotiated away several potential advantages,
including offering blanket support for the government on the
budget -- thereby abdicating the role of active opposition --
while receiving little in return. Premadasa noted that Ranil
had not, for example, extracted any concessions on power
sharing or ministerial posts, on improved observance of human

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rights, or on bringing the government into compliance with
the 17th amendment, which provides for a number of checks on
executive power. Instead, Wickremesinghe had negotiated with
the government on his own with the transparent aim of
preventing UNP crossovers.

PROGRESS ON PEACE
STILL POSSIBLE
--------------


5. (C) Wickremesinghe posited that President Rajapakasa is
"not serious about peace" and predicted further government
military moves in the north. He accused the president of
alienating many within his own SLFP, as well as the majority
of the UNP and most within the JVP. He believed that the
president would aim for a series of military victories, then
call early parliamentary elections to cement his anticipated
popularity gains.


6. (C) Wickremesinghe reported that on a recent trip to New
Delhi, the Indian leadership told him they were pressing the
Sri Lankan government to produce a devolution proposal by
then end of February. Wickremesinghe said the UNP working
group would decide whether to continue working with the
All-Party Congress (APC) on the ethnic conflict. In any
case, he assured Ambassador, the UNP will support the
government in parliament on any devolution proposal that is
consistent with the tenets of the Tokyo Declaration and the
annex to the SLFP-UNP MoU covering the conflict, and permits
a national referendum on the final agreement.


7. (U) In a speech to parliament February 6, Wickremesinghe
blamed the president for undermining the MoU between the SLFP
and UNP by accepting crossovers, and he said this act
rendered the MoU void. He regretted the missed chance at
cooperation between the two major parties, saying, "A golden
opportunity to change the course of history, and indeed our
country's destiny, has been lost." Nevertheless, he told
Parliament, the UNP will support the government if it
produces a devolution proposal to resolve the ethnic conflict
in line with UNP recommendations to the APC.


8. (C) COMMENT: Wickremesinghe's control over the UNP appears
increasingly uncertain. Even his loyalists are upset that
his negotiations with the government forced UNP support for
the budget, and in the end, failed to prevent UNP defections
to the government. His conjectures about the president's
plans are likely tinged with anger that Rajapaksa, once
again, has outmaneuvered him. Despite the rifts within the
UNP, Wickremesinghe is almost certainly correct that most in
his party will support a viable devolution proposal. His own
comments to the parliament indicate as much. The question
remains, however, whether the opposition retains enough clout
to insist on amendments if the government's devolution
proposal turns out to be too watered-down to form the basis
for negotiations. We will continue to urge the UNP to engage
in the all-party process and to cooperate across the
political divide on a negotiated settlement to the ethnic
conflict.
BLAKE