SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS TIGERS WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000189

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE
AND F REID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS TIGERS WILL
REJECT GOVERNMENT BID TO TRADE EAST FOR NORTH

REF: COLOMBO 158

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar on January 31 to discuss the January 28-29 Sri
Lanka Development Forum and the ramifications of the
Government of Sri Lanka's (GSL) military victories in Vakarai
and elsewhere in the east. The Ambassadors shared concerns
over speculation that, following the security forces' defeat
of the LTTE in Vakarai this month, the GSL may argue that the
Ceasefire Agreement signed in 2002 -- which allowed the LTTE
a level of autonomy in areas they controlled east and north
-- is no longer valid. Furthermore, the GSL mistakenly
believes the Tigers will give up their claims on the east if
security forces do not pursue military gains in the north.
Brattskar will travel to Kilinochchi to meet with the LTTE's
senior political leadership on February 1-2, after which
Co-chair Ambassadors recommend that Washington convene a
Co-Chair conference call with capitals on February 7 or 8.
End summary.

"In Your Face" Donors' Forum
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and Brattskar agreed that at the January
28-29 Sri Lanka Development Forum in Galle, which both
attended, the donors -- particularly the United States, the
World Bank, and the Japanese -- had gotten their points
across to President Rajapaksa and his brothers, Defense
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Advisor Basil

SIPDIS
Rajapaksa regarding NGO access and the futility of a military
solution to the ethnic conflict.


3. (C) Despite these strong messages at the Development
Forum, Brattskar contended, "the GSL will do what they want
to do anyway. The GSL feels their military campaign is going
well, and that they either have the international community's
support (e.g. from China, Pakistan and others who provide
military support) or can ignore the more difficult positions
of the more critical members of the international community."
He pointed out that Gothabaya had given an interview to
Reuters on January 25 declaring the security forces would
"chase the Tigers" out of the north but two days later, at
the Development Forum "had to add that they're pursuing a
peaceful settlement, because they know that's what we want to
hear."

Trading Trincomalee for Kilinochchi
--------------


4. (C) In a conversation with President Rajapaksa at the
Development Forum, Ambassador told Brattskar that the
President compared the Sri Lankan conflict with that of
Nepal, saying: "Just as the Nepalese insisted on disarming
the Maoists, we must disarm the LTTE. We can't negotiate
with armed terrorists." Ambassador pointed out to the
President that the disarming of the Maoists was taking place
in the context of a wider political settlement, which had not
yet taken place in Sri Lanka. Brattskar (strictly protect
this part) paraphrased a separate conversation he had with
Basil Rajapaksa confidentially at the forum: "Basil told me
to convey to the LTTE that if they get out of the east, the
security forces won't go for the north. The GSL thinks it
has a back channel message (from the LTTE) that the LTTE will
accept this." Brattskar indicated the Tiger leadership would
not entertain this proposal.

Legitimizing Karuna
--------------


5. (C) Brattskar will travel to Kilinochchi to meet with the
LTTE's senior political leadership on February 1-2. In
addition to the GSL's proposal to trade the east for the

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north, Brattskar said the LTTE would be "likely to dismiss"
this week's cross-over of 19 United National Party (UNP)
Members of Parliament to President Rajapaksa's government and
the majority this would give the President to present a
devolution proposal acceptable to the southern parties. He
lamented indications he was now hearing from GSL insiders
that the GSL may be able to negotiate with other Tamil
actors, such as the Karuna group or the Eelam People's
Democratic Party (EPDP) "if the LTTE doesn't like" the GSL's
proposals. Such a situation "would be quite frightening,"
Brattskar commented.


6. (C) Brattskar continued: "I also worry that the GSL will
try to legitimize Karuna in the east. I met him many times
before his split from Prabhakaran. He is extremely
intelligent, very ambitious, and absolutely ruthless. It is
short sided of the GSL to build him up. He is an easterner
and therefore can't replace Prabhakaran. In supporting
Karuna, the GSL risks creating what the Indians created in
Prabhakaran."

CFA Death Anniversary?
--------------


7. (C) Ambassadors Blake and Brattskar shared concerns that
the GSL might declare the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement null and
void on February 22, the fifth anniversary of its signing, in
response to pressure from the nationalist monk-led Jathika
Hela Urumaya (JHU) party. Such a move would allow the GSL to
remove the Norwegians as facilitators of the peace process,
possibly exclude the LTTE from negotiations and legitimize
their military gains in the east .

Recommended Co-Chair Conference Call
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassadors agreed to meet on the afternoon of
February 2 following Brattskar's return from his meeting with
the Tiger leadership in Kilinochchi. The two Ambassadors
also agreed it would be useful to recommend that Washington
convene another Co-Chair conference call with capitals and
Colombo Embassies on February 7 or 8 to discuss our strategy
now that the GSL has mostly secured the East militarily and
is looking now to establish facts on the ground, such as a
proposed coal power plant from India in Sampur, to
permanently reduce the Tamil balance in the east. Co-Chairs
could also compare notes on the GSL's likely next steps on
the military front, and the GSL's delay in developing a
devolution proposal.


9. (C) Comment: The situation is very fluid in Colombo in
the aftermath of the Cabinet re-shuffle. As the GSL
contemplates next steps, we believe it would be useful for
the Co-Chairs to compare notes and agree on a common strategy
to: 1) discourage military moves north; 2) oppose any moves
by the GSL to alter permanently the ethnic balance of the
East; 3) encourage rapid resettlement of IDPs and refugees
from India to the east; and 4) encourage more rapid progress
toward a credible devolution plan.
BLAKE