Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors to Expect Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SCA/INS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: n/a
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PUM PTER EAID CE
SUBJECT: Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors
to Expect Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka


1.(SBU) Summary: In a hard-hitting presentation to
donor ambassadors on January 25, as part of preparations
for the January 29-30 Development Forum in Galle, the
highly respected Executive Director of the Center for
Policy Alternatives, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, said the
Government of Sri Lanka is more interested in
consolidating a legislative majority than developing a
credible devolution proposal. Likewise the LTTE has
been significantly weakened by recent fighting and has
never in its history been willing to engage in peace
talks from a weak position. Saravanamuttu therefore
expects a period of protracted conflict. Saravanamuttu
also warned that whatever devolution proposal emerges
from the All Parties Process will be significantly
weaker than the initial "majority report" of the experts
panel. He chided the donors for allowing the GSL to
take us for a ride by promising peace and respect for
human rights while actually pursuing a military strategy
and a "creeping authoritarianism" that has worsened even
since the announcement of the Commission of Inquiry on
human rights. End Summary.

GSL Strategy:
--------------


2. (SBU) Saravanamuttu began by noting that neither the
GSL nor the LTTE has an interest in peace right now. He
said the GSL's objective is to consolidate its
legislative majority and weaken the opposition UNP
party. Before entering into peace talks, its priority
is to weaken the LTTE. However, Saravanamuttu does not
believe that the GSL attaches significant priority to
developing a credible devolution proposal and predicted
that whatever devolution proposal emerges from the All
Parties Process will be significantly weaker than the
initial "majority report" of the expert's panel. He
commented that the problem with the GSL's strategy to
weaken the LTTE is that the LTTE has never once
demonstrated any willingness to negotiate from a
position of weakness over the last 25 years and is
unlikely to do so now.

LTTE's Strategy Has Failed Miserably
--------------


3. (SBU) Saravanamuttu characterized the LTTE's
strategy as having failed miserably. It had failed to
gain any significant benefits for the Tamil people from
years of peace talks. It had suffered significant
losses on the battlefield in 2006 and its hope that the
international community would react to deteriorating
humanitarian conditions as a result of fighting by
taking stronger action against the GSL had also failed.
The cumulative effect of these failures was the gradual
erosion of the LTTE's support in the Tamil community.
Moreover, the LTTE losses in Vakarai and elsewhere in
the east marked a significant blow to LTTE efforts to
maintain the north and east as a putative Tamil
homeland. Militarily, Saravanamuttu believed the LTTE
would find it difficult to launch any significant
military counter-offensive in 2007 because of their
weakened capabilities and declining capacity to recruit
new cadres. The likely alternative would therefore be
for the LTTE to initiate more terrorist actions in the
south including against economic targets, both to show
it is still strong and to create an incentive for the
GSL to return to talks.

Bleak Outlook for 2007

COLOMBO 00000158 002 OF 002


--------------


4. (SBU) Saravanamuttu predicted that the outlook for
at least the early part of 2007 is for protracted
conflict. The GSL has an advantage in the balance of
forces. It has also successfully weakened all of the
media in 2006, but particularly the independent Tamil
media. As a result, few in the south are aware of the
devastating humanitarian impact that the conflict had in
2006, while most are aware of the military successes.
Not surprisingly, therefore, public opinion polls show
that a majority of the Sinhalese people believe a
military solution is possible.


5. (SBU) Saravanamuttu also ticked off the following
trends that he urged the donor community to be aware of
and attempt to counteract.

-- a "creeping authoritarianism" that has led to a
growing consolidation of power in the hands of the
President and his brothers;

-- emergency regulations are being used to further
curtail freedom of expression and other human rights;

-- an attitude by the GSL of "let?s see what we can get
away with" with the international community: in
Saravanamuttu?s view, the GSL does not take seriously
"critical statements and snubs" from the international
community because the donors have not thus far been
willing to take more punitive action. Even if the
western countries are willing to take such action, the
GSL knows it has other options such as the Chinese,
Pakistanis and Israelis who are willing to provide
offensive military equipment with no conditions
attached.

-- Saravanamuttu concluded by urging the donors not to
place too much faith in what the Commission of Inquiry
on human rights could accomplish. The Commission could
only make recommendations that the GSL would be free to
ignore. Moreover, significant human rights abuses had
occurred since the announcement of the Commission.


6. (SBU) Comment: Saravanamuttu is one of the most
respected analysts and thinkers in the Sri Lankan NGO
community. While we think the GSL will be more serious
about pursuing a devolution and peace strategy than
Saravanamuttu predicts, he may well be right. His
thinking also underlines the significant pressures that
NGO leaders like him who speak relatively freely are
under.