SRI LANKA: GSL ARM-TWISTING SUCCEEDS IN GETTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001562

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL ARM-TWISTING SUCCEEDS IN GETTING
BUDGET PASSED

REF: COLOMBO 1551

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The government came to its own rescue in a
must-win budget vote, using every means at its disposal to
ensure passage of its budget in the second reading.
President Rajapaksa was once again able to outmaneuver
opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. In the process,
Rajapaksa reportedly offered Wickremesinghe the prospect of
forming a new government under his leadership.
Wickremesinghe declined, saying he would prefer to become
Prime Minister following a new election. The sometimes
desperate tactics the government employed to achieve this
outcome betrayed its own internal contradictions and
resulting lack of stability. These included employing
Karuna's successor Pillayan, the head of a feared
paramilitary, as a cat's paw to intimidate eastern Tamil
National Alliance MPs by abducting one of their relatives and
issuing death threats against the MPs and their families.
The government is likely to face future challenges of this
magnitude, beginning with the third reading of the budget on
December 13. It has yet to solve the problem of restive
members of its coalition, who may desert it on a future
occasion. In Embassy's estimate, at some point an early
election will be required to clarify the popular support of
the various players and usher in a new government with
greater legitimacy. End summary.


2. (SBU) In the end, none of the pre-vote maneuvering had
much of an impact. The final vote broke along the
established lines in Parliament, with 118 supporting the
budget, 102 against (including the JVP),two abstentions
(including Wijedasa Rajapaksa, see para 5) and three absences.


3. (C) On the evening of November 16, it appeared that the
government was giving serious consideration of meeting some
of the JVP's demands (reftel). However, this later appeared
to be a feint to keep dissenting mebers of the President's
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) from defecting to the
opposition. Tourism Minister Milinda Moragoda (protect) told
Ambassador on November 18 that some in President's camp,
after feeling pressure from the UNP and minority parties were
tempted by the opportunity to reconstitute the former
alliance with hardline Sinhalese nationalists.


4. (C) However, SLFP moderates then appeared to gain the
upper hand. By November 18, the Colombo-based English
language press was reporting that the President had rejected
the JVP's four demands. In fact, the JVP seemed to want to
have its cake and eat it, too. The JVP seemed to be banking
on being able to cast a demagogic vote against the
government's budget -- but have the budget pass anyway,
thereby avoiding the need to fact a new election. The JVP
MPs announced that they still had not decided what to do two
hours before the vote, saying that their position would
depend on their assessment of the situation in Parliament at
the time.


5. (C) In a sequel to the defection to the opposition of
chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises
Wijedasa Rajapaksa, a "powerful minister" (probably Basil
Rajapaksa) leaked to the media that the government had ironed
out its differences with Wijedasa (reftel). (Note: this was
probably intentional disinformation, again to keep SLFP MPs
from thinking about defecting.) Later the same day,
opposition MPs began calling foreign diplomats to say that
Wijedasa was under house arrest. Sri Lankan media turned out
in force in front of his residence. It later became clear
that the speculation was unleashed by the visit of chief
government whip Jeyaraj Fernandopulle with a robust security
detail composed of Special Tactics Force (STF) policemen. It
is unclear whether the heavy security presence was also

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intended to intimidate Wijedasa; more likely it was intended
to impress wavering SLFP MPs.


6. (C) UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe told Ambassador on
November 18 that he was confident he had the votes to defeat
the budget - if not in today's vote, then in the third and
final reading of the budget on December 13. He noted that
three quarters of the JVP's Central Committee was deeply
unhappy with the GSL and JVP constituents will demand a vote
against it. Wickemesinghe believed that he had at least
eight more votes from the SLFP ranks, which would cross over
to the opposition provided the JVP voted against the budget.
However, Moragoda confided to us on November 19 that he had
commitments from three UNP MPs to join the government if
their votes were needed.


7. (C) President Rajapaksa, arriving late for the wake of
former President J.R. Jayawardene's widow on Novmber 17, took
a seat next to Wickremesinghe. Ranil confirmed to us media
reports that Rajapaksa told him that if the Government lost
today's vote, he would offer Wickremesinghe the chance to
form a new government, rather than dissolve Parliament and
call new elections. Wickremesinghe reported that he declined
the offer because he preferred to force a general election,
in which his UNP would likely pick up seats. Under Sri
Lanka's Constitution, a new Parliament would give him at
least a year to govern before the President could dismiss his
government and call new elections. The President responded
that in that case he would offer the JVP the chance to form a
government. Wickremesinghe dismissed that scenario as
improbable.


8. (C) In the lead-up to the vote, however, the government
resorted to desperate tactics in order to preserve its
majority. On November 18, police security for the homes of
Tamil National Alliance MPs in Batticaloa and Ampara
districts was withdrawn. Cadres of the "Karuna group," now
loyal to Karuna's former military chief, Pillayan, moved in,
abducting the son-in-law of one Tamil MP and breaking in the
front door of another (the family escaped out the back door).
Another TNA MP contacted Embassy and several other foreign
missions in Colombo to ask for help. Ambassador spoke
directly to Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, who denied
that security had been removed or that MPs had been
threatened. Security was reinstated at the residences about
an hour later, however.


9. (C) We spoke to a third TNA MP, who said that Pillayan
cadres came to her house after security was withdrawn,
telling her relatives that they would kill her and burn her
house unless she abstained from voting against the
government's budget. She reported getting a phone call from
Pillayan on November 19, four hours before the vote,
threatening her with death if she attempted to go to
Parliament to vote. Pillayan adeded that she should not
forget the message conveyed to her the day before. The TMVP,
the Karuna faction's political wing, put out a statement on
November 19 that it is in talks with the TNA to "jointly work
for the community." The TNA immediately and vehemently
denied this.


10. (C) Media reported on November 19 that two minority
constituents of the government, the Ceylon Workers' Congress
and the Up-Country People's Front, which represent Tamils "of
Indian origin," had announced they would vote in favor of the
budget. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress announced that it
would vote with the government this time, but that continued
support at the December 13 third reading would depend on its
demands being met. These included granting the full
portfolio of the Ministry of posts and Telecommunications to
its leader, Rauff Hakeem, restoring STF protective details to
the Muslim MPs, and satisfying the demands of Eastern Muslims
regarding their land rights, which are under threat from

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Pillayan cadres.


11. (C) COMMENT: It is revealing that the government,
under pressure, once again reverted to the techniques it has
employed against certain political opponents since the
beginning of the Rajapaksa government. It is clear that a
new relationship with Pillayan is intended to replace the one
security forces maintained with Karuna, now under arrest in
the UK for immigration violations. This casts doubt on the
GSL's intent to disarm the paramilitaries. The government
will be exposed to similar tests in coming weeks and months,
including the third reading of the budget in December. The
fact that the government again felt obliged to employ extreme
methods to enforce discipline is indicative of its internal
splits and ideological incompatibilities. It is likely that,
with the budget fight largely over, the government will again
seek to raid the UNP ranks in search of MPs who want to cross
over. In our view, this will be a sign of weakness, rather
than strength. The cost that the government is prepared to
bear to achieve its primary objective, its own preservation,
may simply be too high. At some point a new election will be
needed to clarify the true popular support of the various
parties in the parliament and usher in a government that
enjoys a fresh mandate and greater legitimacy.
BLAKE