SRI LANKA: BUDGET VOTE A CLIFFHANGER AS JVP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001551

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: BUDGET VOTE A CLIFFHANGER AS JVP
DELIVERS ULTIMATUM TO PRESIDENT

REF: A) COLOMBO 1373 B) COLOMBO 1464 C) COLOMBO 1491

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The leader of the principal Sinhalese
nationalist party, the JVP, with 37 seats in Parliament, told
a rally of supporters on November 13 that the party would not
support the government on the crucial budget vote unless its
conditions were met. He demanded that the President agree to
terminate the Ceasefire Agreement with the Tamil Tigers,
dissolve the committee charged with preparing a political
solution to the conflict, pledge to bar future visits by
senior UN officials, and "protect the country's sovereignty."
The speech unleashed frenetic activity in Parliament as
government and opposition whips tried to line up wavering
votes, with a couple of MPs changing sides in the process. A
defeat of the budget would result in the dismissal of the
government, or possibly the suspension or dissolution of
parliament and new elections. Most observers believe that
only a JVP vote against the budget could bring the government
down. An abstention would likely leave the government in
comfortable control. End summary.


2. (SBU) The left-wing, Sinhalese nationalist JVP has placed
conditions on its support for the GSL in the crucial budget
vote due November 19. In a speech delivered to party
faithful on November 13, JVP leader Somawansa Amerasinghe
said the JVP would vote for the budget only if the government:
-- Abolishes the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE
(note: this only requires two weeks' notice to the Norwegian
MFA)
-- Pledges to refuse visits by any more senior UN envoys
-- Dissolves the All-Party Representative Committee that has
been working on a devolution proposal as the basis for a
political settlement of the conflict
-- Takes an "oath to protect the country's sovereignty." (no
further information).
In separate moves, the JVP is also pressing the government
publicly on the cost of living and corruption, going so far
as to threaten a general strike.

A "POLITICAL WAR"?
--------------


3. (C) Some observers tell us that JVP parliamentary floor
leader Wimal Weerawansa (ref a),who is close to the
Rajapaksa brothers, lost an internal JVP struggle to support
the government on the budget. In this version, the failure
of the government's most recent offensive against the LTTE at
the Forward Defense Line near Muhamalai on the Jaffna
peninsula forced the JVP to take a more strident tone.


4. (C) Defense journalist Iqbal Athas (strictly protect)
told Pol Chief that the recent thrust by the Sri Lankan Army
at Muhamalai on the Jaffna peninsula was a politically
motivated offensive. The idea was for seven battalions to
move on a broad front, grabbing a little territory from the
LTTE. This would then allow the government to claim that a
military solution was in sight and assure itself of the JVP's
support on the budget. The JVP could then tell its
supporters that continuing the war against the Tigers was
more important than their concerns about the budget,
corruption, and the cost of living. JVP parliamentary floor
leader Wimal Weerawansa, who is close to the Rajapaksa
brothers, was in touch with both Gothabaya and Basil on this
strategy.


5. (C) Athas noted that it didn't work out that way in
practice. The LTTE, using a favorite tactic, allowed one SLA
unit punch to penetrate, then closed in. Athas said many
soldiers were wounded by land mines, subsequently undergoing
amputations as a result. (Note: Embassy received reports the
morning of the attack of ambulances speeding from Ratmalana

COLOMBO 00001551 002 OF 003


military airbase near Colombo, presumably after these cases
were airlifted out of Jaffna.) The attack, Athas confided,
was a fiasco ) albeit on a smaller scale than a similar
ill-fated SLA offensive at Muhamalai on October 11, 2006. He
commented that many military officers are disillusioned with
the country's leadership and asking when this "political war"
is going to end.

SEESAW BATTLE FOR THE LAST FEW VOTES
--------------


6. (SBU) On November 14, the chairman of COPE (the
parliamentary investigative committee on corruption),
Wijeyadasa Rajapaksa, defected to the opposition. The COPE
chairman was known to be among the most restive SLFP members.
He said that he could only support the government if the
Cabinet were reduced from 107 to 30. He also demanded the
dismissal of Tourism Minister Milinda Moragoda and Public
Administration Minister Karu Jayasuriya, as well as Treasury
Secretary P.B. Jayasundera, all of whom, he said, were

SIPDIS
corrupt (ref b, c). The government struck back the following
day with the defection of UNP MP Mahinda Ratnatilleke. A bit
later, Acting Justice Minister Dilan Perera, known to be
close to former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, announced
his resignation from the SLFP Central Committee.


7. (C) Several discontented SLFP MPs were reportedly
considering abstaining or voting against the budget,
including Nirupama Rajapaksa (an estranged niece of the
President),Pavithra Wanniarachchi, and Arjuna Ranatunga.
There were reports from insiders suggesting that some
wavering MPs were being offered huge financial inducements
either to vote for or against the government.


8. (C) The decisions of several minor parties will have an
impact on the outcome. The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress and
its leader, Rauff Hakeem, who joined the government
reluctantly several months back, will meet November 16 to
decide their strategy. The two parties representing
"Up-Country" Tamils are currently in the government. Of the
two, the Up-Country People's Front seems the more likely to
vote with the opposition. Party leader Chandrasekeran and
his deputy Radhakrishnan told Pol Chief on November 15 that
they felt they had accomplished little by serving in the
government, which was dismissive of Tamil's grievances. They
noted that Tamil sentiment is overwhelmingly hostile to the
current government. Their current positions as ministers had
not even enabled them to protect their constituents from
arbitrary arrest, they noted.


9. (C) However, the opposition's maneuvering seems unlikely
to succeed unless the JVP can be persuaded to vote against
the government. If the party abstains, the government will
still enjoy a plurality of about 45 seats - too many for the
UNP and its allies to overcome. United National Party
foreign affairs spokesman Ravi Karunanayake told us on
November 15 that he believed the JVP would now have to vote
against the budget. He observed that it was hard to see how
the JVP could backtrack from the exposed position its leader
had taken. Karunanayake conceded that a JVP abstention would
leave the opposition well short of toppling the government,
however.

JVP AT THE CROSSROADS
--------------


10. (C) Most observers are skeptical that the JVP will push
this strategy to the limit, since it is widely expected to
lose more than half its seats in the event of a new
parliamentary election. The party is known to be split on
supporting the government. A few members around Weerawansa,
despite their strident rhetoric, will want the current
government to continue in power. Others, who have been

COLOMBO 00001551 003 OF 003


having quiet discussions with the UNP and former Foreign
Minister Mangala Samaraweera, may think they will be better
off facing an early election soon, rather than be confronted
with a similar situation in a few months or a year from now.


11. (C) If it becomes clear that the JVP actually does
intend to vote against the budget, the numbers get very
difficult for the government, and there may be a sudden
evaporation of its support. Several minor parties may desert
President Rajapaksa. They could be joined by several
dissatisfied SLFP ministers, who resent Presidential Advisor
Basil Rajapaksa's interference in their portfolios. One
option the government may seize if it feels it is at risk of
losing control would be to "prorogue" parliament --
essentially ending the current session prematurely and
suspending the body for up to 60 days. Should the government
again fail in the new session to pass a budget, new elections
would be required.


12. (C) COMMENT: Simple arithmetic suggests that the
opposition is only six or seven votes away from toppling the
government. However, the current situation is extremely
fluid and the outcome difficult to predict. The JVP, which
holds the key, clearly stands at a crossroads. The
government can hardly accede to all or most of the JVP's four
conditions without appearing to succumb to blackmail. In a
way, the government has already met the JVP's most important
demand by pursuing the war against the LTTE aggressively. If
the JVP votes against the budget, paving the way for the
government'sfall, it leaves itself open to recriminations
that it indirectly helped the LTTE. On the other hand, if
the government survives and were to achieve a final victory
over the Tigers, the JVP would have to worry that much of its
support would gravitate to the President's SLFP in a future
election. The most obvious solution to the JVP's dilemma
would be to make its point about corruption and inflation by
abstaining on the budget, at the same time preventing the
opposition from taking power. If that is what occurs during
the November 19 budget vote, then we will probably see only
minor changes in alignments in Parliament and a fairly rapid
return to business as usual.
BLAKE