SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDER CONSIDERS CLEARING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000140

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDER CONSIDERS CLEARING
TIGERS FROM THE EAST

REF: A. COLOMBO 134


B. COLOMBO 127

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Blake met with Army Commander
Major General Sarath Fonseka on January 23 following the Sri
Lanka Army's (SLA) victory in the eastern Tiger (LTTE) strong
hold of Vakarai (ref B). Fonseka estimated that the LTTE had
been significantly weakened by two and a half months of
combat in the east but that the LTTE might launch an
offensive in the north, toward Jaffna. The Ambassador urged
military restraint in support of the peace process and the
development of a culture of human rights accountability
within Sri Lanka's increasingly engaged military. Fonseka
projected that resettlement of civilians in Vakarai could
begin in a matter of weeks. End summary.

Victory at Vakarai
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador met with Army Commander Major General
Sarath Fonseka on January 23 following the Sri Lanka Army's
(SLA) victory in the eastern Tiger (LTTE) strong hold of
Vakarai (ref B). Fonseka estimated that the SLA had killed
over 500 Tiger cadres in two and a half months of combat and
that the LTTE had been significantly weakened in the east.
Air raids had killed several key LTTE commanders, such as
elite forces leader "Veeman." Tiger cadres left heavy
weapons, ammunition and vehicles as they fled Vakarai into
jungle areas. In the coming months the SLA would remove
several hundred LTTE cadres that remain in the Topagala
jungle near Trincomalee, he said.


3. (C) Ambassador noted the importance of resettling the
displaced persons from the Vakarai areas as soon as possible
and inquired what the Army's plans were. Fonseka agreed this
was important. He said the Army would need to undertake some
demining first, but suggested that resettlement would begin
in as little as two to three weeks. Ambassador asked if this
included the IDPs from ampur. Fonseka said it did, with the
exception f those from the villages immediately south of the
Trincomalee harbor, where the GSL intends to estalish a
Special Economic Zone.


4. (C) The Armycommander speculated that the LTTE might
launch n offensive in the north, toward Jaffna, Mannar or
Vavuniya. The Tigers would have to "sacrifice 100 cadres"
of "1500 to 2000" remaining island-wide in order to take
Jaffna: "The LTTE will want a reakthrough in the North, but
Prabhakaran will tink twice about it; he will not be able to
maintin control of Jaffna." The Army Commander did notrule
out a security forces campaign in the North, where
Prabhakaran "is preparing human shields" by stopping 350,000
civilians from leaving Kilinochchi and the rest of the
Tiger-controlled "Vanni."

"LTTE Under Pressure,
Exercise Restraint"
--------------


5. (C) Fonseka speculated that LTTE would continue to seek
VIP and economic targets in Colombo "to try to press the GSL
into peace talks. But the GSL is already talking about peace
talks," he said, smiling. Ambassador Blake reiterated the
United States support for the GSL's fight against terrorism
but stressed: "We hope that to the greatest extent possible
you will exercise restraint since our primary strategic
objection is to encourage a resumption of sustained peace
talks on the basis of a credible devolution proposal." The
Ambassador added: "The LTTE is under pressure. They know the
situation in Jaffna is getting better."

Military Offensive for Peace

COLOMBO 00000140 002 OF 002


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6. (C) Ambassador noted to Foreign Secretary Palitha Kahona
during a January 22 meeting (ref A) the military's recent
gains in Vakarai and elsewhere in the east (ref B) and
inquired whether the military campaign would continue to the
North. Kohona answered: "Military offensives should be seen
in the context of putting pressure on LTTE supporters to
understand that a victory on the battlefield is not possible.
There is no military solution nor any plan to pursue an
offensive in the north. It is far better to return to the
negotiating table." He added that the GSL was planning
livelihoods and development projects in the North and East in
order to win the hearts and minds of predominantly Tamil
civilians. The GSL remained very much committed, he said, to
the successful outcome of the All Party Representative
Committee process and a political solution to the conflict.

No Choice But to
Respect Human Rights
--------------


7. (C) Reiterating a message he shared with the Foreign
Secretary, the Ambassador stressed to Army General Fonseka

SIPDIS
that when members of the security forces commit human rights
abuses, "It is important that they be punished. It would be
helpful if you could tell us about these measures, even
privately. My government is concerned that it appears that
people are never punished." He added that abductions and
killings after curfew in Jaffna, which the public
understandably ties to the security forces or protected
paramilitaries, "erase the good will" of the government's
efforts to provide food and supplies to civilians.


8. (C) Fonseka replied, "Everyone is concerned with human
rights. The security forces have been warned and they know
they have no choice" but to comply with human rights
guidelines. The SLA "tries not to interfere in police
investigations. On a professional level, we have warned our
troops, but we can't take them to court for firing on
civilians" in the course of battle.


9. (C) COMMENT: Emboldened by yet another military victory,
the military and the Foreign Secretary believe they can use
war to entice the Tigers to accept a hypothetical political
solution not yet on offer from a consensus of southern
parties. It was encouraging that Fonseka and Kohona both
implied that the GSL would not undertake a military offensive
in the north now that Vakarai is over. General Fonseka and
Foreign Secretary Kohona seem to have heard our human rights
message and that of other members of the international
community, a message we hope that they will bear in mind as
they undoubtedly continue a military campaign against the
LTTE.
BLAKE