SRI LANKA: PROGRESS ON DEVOLUTION PROPOSAL STALLED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001322

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PROGRESS ON DEVOLUTION PROPOSAL STALLED
BY POLITICAL INFIGHTING

REF: A) COLOMBO 1168 B) COLOMBO 1127 C) COLOMBO 1103
(AND PREVIOUS) D) COLOMBO 1206

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The All-Party Representative Committee
(APRC) has made substantial progress on drafting its
devolution proposal, but remains stuck on some final key
issues. The President, under pressure from his Sinhalese
base to stick to the "unitary state" concept, has decided to
delay action on the proposal until after the November budget
battle. Moderate Tamil and Muslim leaders who support the
government believe that insistence on the "unitary state"
formulation will cast doubt on the President's willingness to
embrace a multi-ethnic state in which significant power will
be devolved to Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities.
Specifically, they fear that the new constitutional
arrangements would allow the central government to revoke
during emergencies whatever powers might be devolved to the
north and east, which is broadly unacceptable to Sri Lanka's
minorities. APRC Chairman Vitharana is trying to work
various formulas to allay Tamil suspicions while keeping the
Sinhalese nationalists on board. The United National Party
(UNP) remains deeply skeptical that the President will ever
allow a credible devolution proposal to surface, but will
support a solution that is at least as far-reaching as the
benchmark 2000 draft submitted by then-President Kumaratunga.
Embassy will continue to urge both major parties to reach a
consensus on devolution. However, pressing for immediate
action on a proposal before the Parliament's November budget
debate would probably only elicit a diluted plan that would
face immediate rejection by the UNP, moderate Tamils, the
Tamil Diaspora - and the LTTE. End summary.

DEVOLUTION COMMITTEE CHAIR FIGHTS ON
--------------


2. (C) APRC Chair Tissa Vitharana told Ambassador and Pol
Chief on September 24 that President Rajapaksa had decided to
put off action on devolution until after the budget debate in
November. The President is deeply worried about losing the
budget vote, which would force the formation of a new
government, likely under opposition leadership. The
alternative, dissolution of Parliament and new elections,
would probably also be favorable to the opposition UNP. As a
result, the President is currently unwilling to risk
provoking a negative reaction from Sinhalese nationalists -
including the monk-based JHU, the leftist JVP and MEP, and
the chauvinist wing of his own party - by backing a
devolution proposal the nationalists would see as too
generous to the Tamil minority.


3. (C) Vitharana explained that he and the President had
"just passed through an especially difficult period" after
the JHU had threatened to leave the government over the
devolution proposal (ref A). The JHU had insisted on
retaining the "unitary state" formulation. On the other
hand, after initially resisting the creation of an upper
house of Parliament, a Senate, the JHU had yielded on this
provided the Senate did not get the power to initiate
legislation.


4. (C) The President, Vitharana explained, had no interest
in trying to prevent devolution. However, with his own
political survival as his first priority, Rajapaksa simply
did not appreciate that the lack of progress on devolution
and the retention of the unitary state would create strong
doubts about his bona fides in the minds of Tamils and push
them again in the direction of supporting separatism -- i.e.,
the LTTE. Vitharana added that the Tamil National Alliance
was not really an LTTE proxy and was favorable to a federal

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solution for Sri Lanka. Since the LTTE lacked a true
political wing, to the extent that the TNA could influence
LTTE thinking, it could fill that gap.

MODERATE TAMILS CAN'T LIVE WITH "UNITARY STATE"
-------------- --


5. (SBU) Even those moderate Tamils and Muslims who support
the government part company with the President on the
question of the "unitary state." In an impassioned plea for
a "fair and just political solution within a united Sri
Lanka," Tamil United Liberation Front leader Anandasangaree
told the Hindu, a respected Indian daily, that an ambitious
proposal would "ensure the political defeat of the LTTE and
its bankrupt policies." However, a package of proposals that
included the unitary label would be a defeat for Tamil
moderates seeking a future within a united Sri Lanka: "A
unitary solution will shatter the confidence of the Tamil
people and the sense of fairness they expect from the Sri
Lankan State... It will give room for further agitation in
the future... The result would be a disruption of the
hard-earned peace and take the country back to square one,
into another cycle of violence."


6. (C) In a meeting with DCM and Pol Chief on September 13,
one of the primary drafters of Experts Committee "Majority
Report," Vigneswaran (strictly protect),told us moderate
Tamils believe the APRC has made good progress. However,
they are withholding judgment until they see what the
government does on the final issues: making the province the
unit of devolution and the unitary state issue. Vigneswaran
commented that for most Tamils, "unitary" in essence means
that the central government could cite an emergency situation
to take back powers it has devolved. Another crunch point is
the question of the Northeast merger. If the state remains
"unitary" and the North and East are not merged, even
moderate Tamils who normally support the President would have
a hard time backing the proposal.

STRATEGY TO LOCK IN NATIONALIST CONCESSIONS
--------------


7. (C) However, some of those most involved in the process,
including Vigneswaran, recognize that the current proposal
has much to recommend it. This is the furthest that
Sinhalese nationalists such as the JVP and JHU have ever been
willing to concede, he noted. Vigneswaran and some other
moderate Tamils and Muslims want to seize this moment to lock
in gains which the Sinhalese nationalists have accepted, with
the hope that the next government would revisit the
contentious points.


8. (C) Vigneswaran outlined for us a three-tiered strategy
in which Parliament would first pass a wide-ranging
devolution proposal based on the existing Thirteenth
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution (which created the
Provincial Councils). In the second stage, Parliament would
pass and submit to a popular referendum provisions creating a
Senate, and changing the amendment procedure itself to
eliminate the need for a referendum on future consitutional
changes. Vigneswaran hoped that the next government might
then be willing to drop the "unitary" character of the state
and the special place accorded in the Constitution for
Buddhism - neither of which could probably command a majority
in a referendum. Vigneswaran asked us for strict
confidentiality, noting that he had not shared these

SIPDIS
recommendations with the President or publicized them to date.

UNP: BET ON ANOTHER HORSE
--------------


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9. (C) United National Party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe has
repeatedly voiced deep skepticism of the President's
commitment to a political settlement of the conflict.
Neverthless, the UNP has told us it will support any credible
proposal that emerges from the APRC, even at this late stage
-- as long as it is at least as far-reaching as the plan
submitted to Parliament in 2000 by then-President Chandrika
Kumaratunga. Wickremesinghe told Ambassador on September 25
that he thought the APRC would remain on hold beyond the
budget debate until February or March 2008. He then expected
the GSL to resume a military-driven strategy. UNP MP Ravi
Karunanayake, who also attended the meeting, asked Ambassador
whether he believed in the APRC process. Ambassador
confirmed that he did, saying "for now, the APRC process is
the only horse we have." Karunanayake jokingly replied that
"the U.S. keeps flogging that horse." Ranil added, "You can
flog it all you want, but it isn't going anywhere," scoffing
that the President has nothing to gain by pushing for it
because he wouldn't be able to sell it to his political base.


10. (C) Embassy continues to engage the government and other
parties in the process on the importance of developing within
a reasonable time a credible devolution proposal that could
underpin a political solution to the conflict. At a ceremony
on September 19 to announce a USG donation via the World Food
Program of 17,500 metric tons of food, Ambassador stressed
that the U.S. does not support a military solution to the
conflict. The way forward, he reiterated, is in a negotiated
settlement which meets the aspirations of all communities.
He urged the country's political parties to work together in
the All Parties Representatives Committee (APRC) process to
reach agreement on a credible power sharing proposal. Media
coverage of the event juxtaposed the Ambassador's remarks
with a recent speech by Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa
calling for the complete defeat of the Tamil Tigers before a
political process begins. AMbassador made the same points on
Septemebr 21 in a panel discussion entitled "Sri Lanka: The
Way Forward" that featured several prominent political
analysts and civil society figures and also was covered by
the local media.


11. (C) COMMENT: The government's failure to meet its own
deadlines for a devolution proposal fuels skepticism about
its ability to deliver progress on a solution. However,
changes to the constitution that require a 2/3 majority and a
referendum are all but impossible in the current political
environment, and will have to wait at least until after the
November budget debate. Rajapaksa and his Sinhalese base
fear that the LTTE will flatly turn down the APRC proposals
as unacceptable and refuse to talk on that basis. Diaspora
Tamils, an important part of the LTTE support base, are
concerned about the human rights situation and the absence of
progress toward devolution. As long as they remain
skeptical, they will continue to find ways to support the
LTTE's separatist agenda. A minimal proposal that meets the
President's short-term political needs by catering to the
Sinhalese nationalists would certainly result in a
categorical rejection by moderate Sri Lankan Tamils and the
Tamil Diaspora. We therefore believe that any additional
time needed to reach an APRC proposal that will meet the
needs of moderate Tamils like Anandasangaree and Vigneswaran
could be well invested. The U.S. should also encourage the
government's support for a Track 2 initiative like One-Text
(ref D) as a way of reaching out to Tamils who can influence
LTTE thinking and help prepare the ground for talks, if and
when they resume.
BLAKE