Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO1168
2007-08-27 09:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: NATIONALISTS THREATEN TO END SUPPORT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001168 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NATIONALISTS THREATEN TO END SUPPORT
FOR GOVERNMENT OVER DEVOLUTION

REF: A) COLOMBO 1127 B) COLOMBO 1103 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NATIONALISTS THREATEN TO END SUPPORT
FOR GOVERNMENT OVER DEVOLUTION

REF: A) COLOMBO 1127 B) COLOMBO 1103 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vikmuthi
Peramuna (JVP) has threatened to withdraw its support from
outside for the government if the All-Party Representative
Committee consensus in favor of meaningful devolution to the
provinces is allowed to stand. The JVP insists on retaining
the "unitary" character of the Sri Lankan state. President
Rajapaksa faces a real possibility of losing his majority in
parliament during in November if the JVP makes good on its
threat and joins the opposition United National Party and its
allies in voting against the budget. Under Sri Lanka's
constitution, this would force the President to form a new
government, possibly under the leadership of the opposition,
or to call for new elections. As a result, the President
appears to be playing for time, and may defer meaningful
action on the APRC proposals until after the budget passes.
In our assessment, the expected attempt by the opposition to
bring down the government during the November budget debate
will further strain relations between the two major parties,
making the two-thirds majority required for constitutional
changes to implement devolution all the more difficult to
achieve. End summary.


2. (C) On August 23, in a front-page interview in the daily
Island, JVP parliamentary leader Wimal Weerawansa warned his
party would vote against the budget in November if the
government approved a devolution proposal that deviated from
the "unitary state." Embassy contacts within the JVP
confirmed that the party was serious about ending its present
support for the government from outside the coalition if its
demands are not met. They added that the JVP was looking for
an appropriate moment to withdraw support -- and probably
would exercise that option if it suspected an early election

was in the offing. The JVP had previously warned the
government over foot-dragging on combating corruption. It
has also said it would not continue to vote to extend the
emergency regulations if ordinary citizens became victims of
harassment by the security forces.


3. (C) Former Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK and
India Mangala Moonesinghe, who is close to many GSL leaders,
told Ambassador that the government was concerned about the
JVP's threat. As a result, he thought the President might
well put the APRC process on hold until after the budget
passes in early November.


4. (SBU) Under the Sri Lankan Constitution, failure by
Parliament to endorse the government's statement of policy in
January, or to pass the appropriations bill in October, or
the budget in November, triggers provisions that require
formation of a new government. At the President's option, if
a new majority is available, he can charge either the
incumbent or a new prime minister with forming a new Cabinet.
However, if the sitting parliament has served for at least
one year, he may also dissolve parliament and hold new
elections. A new Parliament must then convene within 90 days.


5. (C) Even if the JVP were to stop supporting the
government, there should be a narrow majority to pass the
appropriations and budget bills. The main parties not allied
with the government at present are the principal opposition
United National Party (UNP) and the Tamil National Alliance
(TNA). However, together with the JVP and a couple of minor
players, the opposition is within striking distance of
toppling the government. Further, the coalition parties are
a heterogeneous group held together more by a common interest
in wielding power than by any policy coherence. There are
several minor Tamil and Muslim parties in the coalition which
are known to be restive. According to the Colombo rumor
mill, some of these are only waiting for a signal from

COLOMBO 00001168 002 OF 003


Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe to desert the
government. The ideal time to do this would be during the
budget debate.


6. (C) Further, there are a number of members of the
President's Sri Lanka Freedom Party, including sitting
ministers, who are chafing at the de facto subordination of
the Cabinet to the President's powerful brothers, Defense
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa or Senior Advisor Basil

SIPDIS
Rajapaksa. The President's base has shown signs of crumbling
in his Southern strongholds under pressure from the SLFP
splinter group of former Foreign Minister Mangala
Samaraweera. Overt or obvious behind-the-scenes
encouragement for Samaraweera's new alliance with the UNP
from former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently
returned to Sri Lanka, might push more SLFP MPs into crossing
over into opposition. In other words, the calculus in the
present Parliament becomes difficult for the President if he
cannot count on the JVP voting for the budget. This is what
lends the JVP's threat credibility and forces the president
to deal with that situation.


7. (C) It is not clear who the winners and losers of a new
election would be. According to some observers, the
government's private polls show that the current majority
would not be returned in the event of a general election.
This would open the door for a new government under
leadership of the UNP. Most reckon that the JVP, in the
absence of the pre-electoral alliance with the SLFP benefited
both parties in the 2004 general election, would also fare
badly. It therefore seems that it is not in either in the
President's or the JVP's interest to push the brinkmanship
over the devolution proposal to the limit.


8. (C) All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) chair Tissa
Vitharana told Ambassador on August 24 that the APRC had held
positive and productive discussions on August 13 and 21, but
the Committee had referred certain difficult issues to a
"consensus of leaders." (This appears to mean the leadership
of their parties, chaired by President Rajapaksa.) Multiple
sources told us that such a meeting took place on August 23,
with participation by nearly all parties -- with the
exception of the UNP, JVP and TNA. The Buddhist monk-based
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the tiny, left-wing MEP used
the occasion to attack APRC chair Vitharana's leadership of
the group. President Rajapaksa stoutly defended Vitharana,
reportedly saying that Vitharana's regular APRC progress
reports to the international community were essential to the
GSL strategy. He then instructed the group to resume its
deliberations.


9. (C) According to Vitharana, the President reiterated his
support for the APRC consensus that the unit of devolution
should be the province, effectively ending the discussion
about this issue. Vitharana also told us that while the
President clearly was concerned about the JVP's threat, "it
did not appear to be weighing on his mind." However,
Rajapaksa reportedly failed to resolve the pivotal question
of the nature of the state (whether to characterize it as
"unitary") and also declined to set a deadline for the APRC
completing its work. The MEP representative on the APRC told
us he thought the work would take perhaps another month, but
did not see it continuing into the critical time in late
October and early November for passing the budget. However,
the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress representative thought that the
President was playing for time, intentionally seeking a delay
to avoid setting up a confrontation with the JVP before the
budget passes.


10. (C) COMMENT: The core issue the President must grapple
with, and resolve, is whether to cater to the nationalist
ideology about a "unitary state" by offering a pallid version
of devolution that could not serve as a basis for national

COLOMBO 00001168 003 OF 003


reconciliation. There is no sign yet that he has decided how
to handle this. The continued back-and-forth on questions
that have already been clearly defined, and are ripe for
decision, only shows exactly how difficult it is for any
leader, including Rajapaksa, to cobble together a "southern
consensus" on power-sharing with the regions. This is the
central problem which has eluded Sri Lanka's leaders for
decades. However, the conditions for progress on devolution
may not be any better in November, when the JVP will be no
more likely to drop its opposition to any meaningful
devolution plan than it is now. The UNP will almost
certainly try to use the budget as a lever to topple
Rajapaksa's government. In the overheated atmosphere
following an attempt to bring down the government -- whether
or not successful -- it will be even more difficult to
assemble the two-thirds majority required for constitutional
changes, for which both the major parties (SLFP and UNP)
would have to be on board. Still, the UNP is on record as
saying it would support a reasonable proposal if the
government puts one forward by the end of August. The
President's desire to showcase his devolution plan during his
speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26 gives us a
brief window of opportunity to press all parties to come to
closure.
BLAKE