SRI LANKA: TRINCOMALEE TAMILS WARY OF GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001165

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV EAID PTER PHUM PREF MOPS PREL KMCA CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TRINCOMALEE TAMILS WARY OF GOVERNMENT
DEVELOPMENT PLANS

REF: A.COLOMBO 001093 B. COLOMBO 00977 C. COLOMBO
001003

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O Blake, for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: DCM met with local government officials,
civil society leaders, and community members in the eastern
city of Trincomalee on August 10-12th to discuss the security
and humanitarian situation in the area and promote policies
that will foster peace and economic development. The
Government Agent, the highest civil authority in the
District, gave a positive assessment of the return of
internally displaced people (IDPs),plans for a new Special
Economic Zone, and newly relaxed security regulations.
Discussions with civil society representatives, vendors,
fishermen, and IDPs, however, revealed distrust of the
Government among the local Tamil community, casting doubt on
whether the government's top-down, Sinhalese-centric policy
making can help Trincomalee quickly recover from the impact
of the conflict. USAID projects in the region are aimed at
bringing communities together while providing a better
quality of life for Trincomalee residents. End Summary.

SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ZONES WILL DISPLACE TAMILS
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2. (SBU) In meetings with central and local government
representatives, DCM asked how the Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) and the High Security Zone (HSZ) (ref A and B) would
affect residents, including over 10,000 IDPs still hoping to
return home. The Government Agent, retired Major General
T.T.R. De Silva, told us that at the most, the Government's
plans will displace 1,000 families. However, Chairman of the
Trincomalee Urban Council S.G. Mugunthan estimated as many as
15,000 individuals, mostly Tamils, would be forced to move.

TAMIL MARGINALIZATION FEARED
--------------


3. (C) Civil society and local community members told us they
suspected that part of the Government's motivation in
establishing the SEZ was to fragment Tamil communities by
resettling them into Sinhalese-majority communities.
Mugunthan observed that parties close to the government would
acquire an advantage in local elections if Tamil communities
were marginalized (ref B). Father Rajendran, head of the
Center for Non-Violent Communication in Trincomalee, went
further, saying the Government was encouraging Sinhalese
"colonization" to "eliminate Tamils" while labeling it
economic development. He cited rumors that the Government is
planning to rename some predominantly Tamil towns with new
Sinhalese names. He also pointed to the proliferation of
Buddha statues as another example of Sinhalese cultural
hegemony. Several contacts noted a new Buddha statue erected
overnight, by unknown persons, in Trincomalee's predominately
Tamil town center. They considered this an affront to
Tamils. Surrounded by barbed wire, the Buddha stands in
contrast to USAID's adjacent construction site for a new bus
stand and shopping center designed to serve as a focal point
for social interaction and economic activity.

MAINTAINING SECURITY IN TRINCOMALEE
--------------


4. (C) Government Agent De Silva said security forces have
cleared most of the LTTE out of the Eastern Province but a
few "characters" were left behind to "cause trouble." He
likened the fight with the LTTE to a fire that has been put
out, but still has glowing embers. Nonetheless, he said,
things were much better now than they were a year ago. The
military has relaxed security restrictions, he said, and IDPs
are returning to resettle as a result. De Silva defended the
decision to build a fence around Trincomalee's new peripheral
road (ref A) as necessary to maintain control of ground the

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Army had gained at the expense of the LTTE.

KARUNA AND LOCAL ELECTIONS
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5. (C) DCM noted that the operation of paramilitaries in the
district would prevent planned local elections (ref B) from
being free and fair. De Silva countered that he had recently
met Karuna representatives in his office and they seemed like
"nice enough" people. However, others, such as Urban Council
Chairman Mugunthan and Father Rajendran, told us the Karuna
faction was still committing murders, abductions and
extortion, especially outside of Trincomalee town. Father
Rajendran said that people no longer report these activities
of the Karuna faction because police are unresponsive and the
International Committee of the Red Cross is unable to help.


6. (C) Father Rajendran speculated the government wanted to
hold local elections in the East as soon as possible to
consolidate its control of the area and to minimize the IDP
vote. He noted that a new law enabled IDPs to vote outside
of their normal residence. However, the requirement that all
voters have a National Identity Card would preclude many IDPs
from voting, he said. This would certainly be the case if
the Government rushed to organize elections before programs,
including those supported by USAID to facilitate issuance of
National Identity Cards can take hold. Father Rajendran
thought the best solution was to postpone elections until
most IDPs are resettled. He observed that the East had
waited 20 years for elections and thought it worth waiting a
little longer to ensure a high level of participation in a
free and fair election.

MURDER OF THE CHIEF SECRETARY
--------------


7. (C) No one we spoke with seemed to know who was
responsible for the July 16 murder of Chief Secretary H.M.
Herath Abeyweera (ref C). De Silva could not confirm that
the LTTE had assassinated Abeyweera, but said it was clear
the killers had help from inside the Chief Secretary's
office. Mugunthan also would not speculate on who would have
wanted the Chief Secretary dead, but noted that the Tamil
community, which considered the Chief Secretary a friend,
doubted that the perpetrators were from the LTTE.

LIVELIHOOD OF IDPS AND RETURNEES
--------------


8. (C) Government Agent De Silva said IDPs were returning to
live in temporary and permanent shelters and the government,
with the help of the World Food Program, was providing them
with six months of food rations. He encouraged the DCM to
speak with returnees because the success of resettlement
could be measured by "the smiles on the faces of the
returnees." However, Tamil IDPs in Trincomalee town and
recently resettled returnees in Eachchilampattai, Trincomalee
District, were not smiling. One IDP told the Charge "I hate
the government for torturing the Tamil people." As a result,
he said, he was beginning to think the LTTE was right to
fight the Government.


9. (C) About 300 IDPs from the Sampur East or the Muttur East
HSZ were living at a Hindu Cultural Center in Trincomalee
town. It was the lowest number of IDPs the Center has had
recently, but most had been there more than a year. Country
Director for the American Refugee Committee (ARC) John
Holveck said Government Agent De Silva refused to recognize
them as IDPs, refused to distribute food rations, and
actively discouraged the ARC from helping them. One IDP
remarked that even though the LTTE had severely restricted
their freedom, life was better under Tiger control because he
was able to pursue his livelihood. He did not want to accept
the Government's offer to resettle in other areas, which he

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said did not have the necessary resources for farming. He
added that the Government had never asked his community what
it needed.


10. (C) A group of returnees resettled in a fishing village
outside of Verugal in Eachchilampattai also told DCM they
feel less secure now than they did when they were living in
IDP camps or LTTE-controlled territories. They did not trust
the security forces, who hindered them in pursuing their
livelihoods. Most returnees found that their boats and tools
had disappeared. Military restrictions made fishing
difficult. Women in the village told us the government
provided them with 29 kilos of rice on July 24, which they
finished in 18 days. They did not know when they would
receive more food. Returnees were suspicious of the security
force's reasons for questioning, documenting, and
photographing some returnees. Greg Norton, an Associate
Protection Officer with UNHCR, said services to the returnees
will likely improve, but the returnees were not receiving
adequate information from local authorities on rations and
fishing restrictions. He confirmed that security forces were
using Karuna members as "spotters" at nearby Verugal
crossing, noting it was unclear what the information would be
used for.

TOP-DOWN APPROACH FRUSTRATES CITIZENS
--------------


11. (C) Urban Council Chairman Mugunthan told us that
government funding was scarce, but noted residents were even
more frustrated by the government's top-down approach. For
example, he said, the Government had not consulted with the
Urban Council about the SEZ or the decision to tear down a
Council building to construct a market. The next day, at the
groundbreaking for a new market co-funded by USAID designed
to revitalize the economic and social fabric of Trincomalee
town, Mungunthan delivered a stirring speech about the need
for grassroots empowerment and greater freedoms. On behalf
of the locally elected members of the Trincomalee Urban
Council, he thanked USAID for its support. The Government
Agent made his disdain for Mugunthan clear: whispering in the
ear of our USAID contractor, he said, "When you lie with dogs
you get fleas."


12. (C) COMMENT: The lack of consultation in Trincomalee with
community members, language barriers, and the tendency toward
top-down decision-making reinforce the minority communities'
distrust and resentment of the central government and will
work against the GSL as it seeks to gain their confidence.
The government's near-complete control of the East, however,
entails significant opportunities, as well as the risks.
Trincomalee District, now largely cleared of the LTTE, has
enormous potential to heal and prosper economically. Signs
that stability is beginning to return to the region are
numerous. The U.S. and other donors will need to seize this
moment to help the government get its plans for the East's
recovery and development right. Septel will outline our
USAID Mission's proposals for projects, embedded in the
larger effort spearheaded by the UN and multilateral
financial institutions, to ensure that the government's
resettlement, recovery and development programs will take
account of local needs and desires and maximize the
opportunities for local input and participation.
BLAKE