SRI LANKA: MUSLIM PARTY LEADER ACCUSES GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000115

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MUSLIM PARTY LEADER ACCUSES GOVERNMENT
OF USING STRONG-ARM TACTICS

REF: COLOMBO 102 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader Rauff Hakim
complained to Ambassador on January 19 that the President's
brother and senior political advisor Basil Rajapaksa had
employed strong-arm tactics to induce members of his party to
join the government. Hakim said, however, that he was
standing by the conditions he had placed on the SLMC taking
ministerial portfolios. He agreed that the MoU between the
governing SLFP and the opposition UNP was crucial to
developing a devolution proposal that could reinvigorate the
peace process. However, he observed that the government side
showed little interest in talking about peace negotiations at
present. Instead, the President and his men seemed intent on
consolidating their power, using means that Hakim found "ugly
and unpleasant." Hakim indicated that the Rajapaksas had met
some resistance to their strategy and thought the timetable
for announcing crossovers had slipped until about January 29.
He hoped that the UNP factions would find a way to reunite,
but feared that the would-be crossovers had "burned their
boats." End summary.


2. (C) In a meeting Ambassador had requested to discuss the
internal political situation, Hakim confirmed reports we had
from other sources that Basil Rajapaksa had resorted to
strong-arm tactics in attempting to recruit crossovers to
bolster the government ranks. Hakim said that while he found
all the maneuvering going on "amusing," one of his MPs had
experienced "harrowing intimidation" at the hands of Basil.
The SLMC had asked the government side to address some of
their concerns - including sustaining the peace process -
through an MoU with his party, as the price of the SLMC
joining the government. Basil, however, had balked at an MoU
and said that the SLFP was only interested in getting to the
number needed for a workable majority in parliament. In
particular, he rejected the SLMC request for an amendment to
the local election law, which the government had used in the
last round to the disadvantage of the SLMC. Basil blustered
that the SLFP would simply move in and take over the SLMC's
turf. "Your leader will then be left behind on his own, if
he doesn't want to join us."


3. (C) Hakim said he found this "ugly and unpleasant." He
found the tactics on the part of the ruling party
"unprecedented" in Sri Lanka. He reported telling Basil that
his group was willing to meet with the President to see what
might come out of such an encounter - but would not agree in
advance to join the government side. The SLMC would need to
be able to explain to its base why it was allying itself with
the ruling party and had to find "a more dignified way of
joining the government." In particular, the SLMC could not
facilitate a purely military approach to ending the ethnic
conflict. However, he noted that some of the MPs from other
parties who were anxious to cross over were clearly focused
on obtaining ministerial posts and perks.


4. (C) Hakim said that the government was having trouble
recruiting enough MPs from other parties to reach a majority.
He had heard that Basil's timetable for getting to this
result had slid by about a week, until January 29.
Meanwhile, he said, "the good governance of the country is
suffering every day." Hakim also reported that he met with
SLFP MPs who had seen the President earlier in the day who
reported that the President was now thinking about holding a
snap election in March or April. (Note: this would be a
serious disincentive to crossovers, who would have to contest
the election just after switching parties.)


5. (C) Hakim shared our view that the MoU was the most
promising avenue for developing a serious peace proposal. He
said he hoped for a reconciliation between UNP leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe and the UNP dissidents, but thought that "most

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of these people had burned their boats." He also thought
that about 15-20 MPs from the President's party loyal to
former President Kamaratunga were highly dissatisfied with
the Rajapaksas' leadership, and were preparing to turn the
tables by deserting the President if a new election were
called.


6. (C) COMMENT: The tide may be turning against Basil
Rajapaksa's strategy of wooing over opposition MPs. If most
of the SLMC parliamentarians decline to cross over, and the
numbers of the UNP deputies willing to join the government
also declined, then the Rajapaksas will have a hard time
finding the numbers they need to govern comfortably. Hakim
may end up losing a couple of his members to the government
side - in addition to the four who had defected previously -
but he did not sound like someone who was ready to throw in
the towel. If anything, Basil's rough treatment of the SLMC
deputies seemed to have stiffened Hakim's resolve to stand on
principle. Much will depend now on whether Ranil
Wickremesinghe can rise to the occasion by making peace with
his dissidents.
BLAKE