SRI LANKA: DEVOLUTION PROPOSAL ON TRACK, BUT WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000109

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEVOLUTION PROPOSAL ON TRACK, BUT WILL
TAKE MORE TIME

REF: A) 2006 COLOMBO 2094 B) 2006 COLOMBO 2046

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Tissa Vitharana, Chair of the All-Party
Representative Committee (APRC),has culled common elements
from several devolution proposals and offered a compromise
document for discussion within the committee. In a January
17 meeting with the Ambassador, Vitharana explained that he
based his proposal on the province as the unit of devolution
and vests executive powers in a prime minister. He reported
that President Rajapaksa has accepted the plan as a basis for
discussion - contrary to media reports. Political parties
have until January 19 to offer comments, after which the APRC
will begin deliberations on Vitharana's proposal. He hopes
to draw in the Marxist, Sinhalese nationalist JVP, which has
boycotted the last two APRC meetings. Vitharana expects the
consultation process to last another two months, much longer
than the timetable President Rajapaksa has called for. While
the measured and thoughtful Vitharana has made every effort
to accommodate a range of views, Sinhalese chauvinists will
likely attempt to scuttle the process. The outcome of the
current partisan bickering between the SLFP and UNP over
possible UNP crossovers to the Government will have a major
impact on how serious a devolution proposal emerges. End
summary.

DEALING WITH THE JVP SPOILERS
--------------


2. (C) All-Party Representative Committee Chair Tissa
Vitharana told Ambassador on January 17 that he thought the
Sinhalese nationalist JVP and similar parties had
"unreasonably" rejected the majority view on a devolution
proposal signed by eleven of an expert panel's seventeen
members. Vitharana noted that while the experts had
considered a range of options, the JVP and had focused solely
on a proposal to reinstitute the merger of the Northern and
Eastern provinces that the Supreme Court had ruled invalid.


3. (C) Segments of the media sympathetic to the JVP's
extreme positions had then unleashed a propaganda campaign
against the authors of the majority report, alleging
incorrectly a conspiracy steered by foreign NGOs against Sri
Lanka's national interests. The lack of public and
government support for the expert panel majority ("caving
into JVP pressure") had led him to reconsider the wisdom of
simply endorsing the majority report, Vitharana said. He
discussed the way forward with President Rajapaksa, who
agreed that he should synthesize the various views and submit
his own proposal for constitutional reform and devolution.

CAREFUL SYNTHESIS OF A RANGE OF PROPOSALS
--------------


4. (C) Vitharana said he had taken into account five months
of work by the All-Party representative Committee (APRC),
including the outputs of twenty-three meetings of the group,
and also asked the members for written feedback. He had
obtained a consensus of the entire group for his draft.
However, when he announced the result the following day,
several members, for their own political reasons, disavowed
it. Among the greatest critics of the draft, he added, were
members of his own party, the LSSP (note: a tiny left-wing
group associated with the government, but without much clout.)


5. (C) Vitharana explained that his proposed reform would
restore the supremacy of Parliament, vest real executive
power in a directly elected Prime Minister, and cast the
President in an above-the fray "head of state" role.
However, none of this would take effect until the current
President's term expired. He noted that Rajapaksa would be
free to run for Prime Minister if he so chose. Further, he
said he had discussed the plan with Rajapaksa who concurred

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with it ) reports in the media to the contrary.

NORTHEAST THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE
--------------


6. (C) Vitharana said he had given the political parties
until about January 19 to make comments, then would discuss
the constitutional proposals with them article by article.
In the end, he wanted to avoid votes by achieving the
broadest possible consensus. However, he noted this would
probably not be possible on the most contentious issues, such
as the question of the merger or non-merger of the northeast.
He thought it best to leave this unresolved, since it would
certainly have to be the subject of any settlement
negotiations with the LTTE. In any case, differences within
the APRC on this were "frankly irreconcilable."


7. (C) Vitharana said he hoped to get the JVP and its allies
to return to the APRC, although they had boycotted the last
two meetings. Ambassador observed that while it was
important for the JVP to feel that its views had a voice, its
absence from the proceedings would also make Vitharana's task
of achieving consensus easier. Vitharana chuckled.

PROVINCES AS THE UNIT OF DEVOLUTION
--------------


8. (C) Vitharana explained that while some parties had come
to the discussions with the view that the "unit of
devolution" should be the district or even the local level,
after further analysis all had agreed this was not workable,
and that the focus of devolution would have to be the
province. However, there should be some power reserved for
the local level as well. Vitharana said he and his
colleagues had been favorably impressed by what they had
learned about India's panchayat system, but wanted to adapt
it to the Sri Lankan context. The Jana Sabha ) a kind of
New England-style town meeting ) was also important to make
decisions about which local projects to fund, and to monitor
and audit expenditures.

ANOTHER TWO MONTHS UNTIL PROPOSAL READY
--------------


9. (C) The process of consultation with the parties was too
important to short-circuit it, Vitharana said. He thought it
would take roughly another two months to finalize a
devolution proposal. Ambassador noted that this would be
several weeks later than the government's optimistic scenario
that a proposal could be ready by the end of January.
However, a broadly based consensus was essential so that the
next government negotiating team could go into talks with the
LTTE with solid guidance and a proper mandate.


10. (C) COMMENT: Vitharana is a thoughtful, careful moderator
of the national discussion about constitutional reform and
devolution. Still, elements of the government continue to
play to the Sinhalese nationalist bleachers by trashing any
efforts by the majority to reach out to the disaffected
Tamils and other minorities. The government will have to
make a strategic decision soon about whether to pander to
these tendencies, or to recommit itself to a peace strategy.
The ongoing muddle (septel) over whether to accept UNP
crossovers into the government introduces a further element
of instability. Still, the UNP dissidents, if they enter the
government, will not sign on to an agenda of seeking to
defeat the LTTE militarily.
BLAKE