Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO1071
2007-08-01 11:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT'S SOUTHERN POLITICAL BASE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001071 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT'S SOUTHERN POLITICAL BASE
ERODING


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore, for reasons 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001071

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT'S SOUTHERN POLITICAL BASE
ERODING


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore, for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Rajapaksa is losing support among
his political base in southern coastal towns to former
Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, whose recent alliance
with the United National Party (UNP) has re-energized the
opposition. In an effort to sway public opinion in his
favor, Rajapaksa is marshaling loyal members of Parliament to
trumpet the government's military successes against the Tamil
Tigers. END SUMMARY.

RAJAPAKSA FACING INCREASED OPPOSITION FROM FORMER ALLIES
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Several municipal councils in the heartland of
President Rajapaksa's political base have taken steps
recently to align themselves with Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(SLFP) breakaway leader (and former Rajapaksa political ally)
Mangala Samaraweera. In Matara, the municipal council
rejected the President's designated mayoral candidate and
publicly stated its support for Samaraweera. The President's
party also lost its majority on the Tangalle Urban Council
(only 10 kilometers from Rajapaksa's home) when three of five
SLFP members declared they were crossing over to the
opposition. In Hambantota and Tangalle, municipal councils
are waiting to strike down pro-Rajapaksa initiatives and
declare support for Mangala. The mayor in Galle, the largest
southern city, has felt compelled to defer action on several
issues, fearing that the municipal council will vote against
him in order to demonstrate its preference for Samaraweera
over Rajapaksa.


3. (C) The Sinhala nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP),once closely aligned with Rajapaksa, has also actively
sought to undermine the President's support in recent weeks.
On July 30 and 31, the JVP organized large demonstrations of
fishermen in Negombo, 25 kilometers North of Colombo, to
protest GSL fishing restrictions and the rising price of
fuel. Although the UNP and JVP are traditional political
enemies, the UNP rallied its supporters in the South to join
the JVP fishermen's demonstration. Samaraweera, who has long
cultivated close ties to the JVP, has provided the link that
allows the two other parties to coordinate efforts to oppose
Rajapaksa.

THE PRESIDENT ATTEMPTS TO MARSHAL SUPPORTERS
--------------


4. (C) In response to Mangala's growing popularity and
pressure from the opposition parties, President Rajapaksa has
dispatched loyal SLFP members of Parliament to campaign in
the South, heralding the government's military successes
against the SLFP. Embassy interlocutors have confided to us
that the President's message to his southern base is that the
administration "won in the East and will soon turn its sights
to the North."


5. (C) COMMENT: The President's traditional supporters are
angry about rising inflation and disappointed by mounting
evidence of political corruption. Embassy interlocutors tell
us that Rajapaksa is very concerned about the erosion of his
political base. The government's response so far has been
fairly measured, however. The administration had anticipated
that victory in the East would provide a boost to its
flagging support, with some predicting that Rajapaksa would
try to ride the momentum by calling snap Parliamentary
elections. However, the larger public seemed relatively
unimpressed by the victory in the East; any propaganda
benefit to the government has quickly dissipated. It appears

COLOMBO 00001071 002 OF 002


unlikely that merely turning up the volume in an attempt to
convince an increasingly skeptical public will be enough to
shore up the President's sagging fortunes in the heartland of
Sinhalese nationalism.
MOORE