Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO1020
2007-07-20 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
MAIN OPPOSITION AND RULING PARTY SPLINTER GROUP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001020
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: MAIN OPPOSITION AND RULING PARTY SPLINTER GROUP
SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT
REF: COLOMBO 883
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore, for reasons 1.4(b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001020
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: MAIN OPPOSITION AND RULING PARTY SPLINTER GROUP
SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT
REF: COLOMBO 883
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore, for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (C) Summary. On July 19, the leading opposition United
National Party and the recently-formed Sri Lanka Freedom
Party/Mahajana (SLFP/M) wing (ref) signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The agreement stipulates that the two
groups will jointly contest future elections. It outlines
their key policies and how they intend to share power should
they win. Key elements include constitutional reforms, a
limit on the size of the cabinet, a solution to the ethnic
conflict, and a long-term national economic plan. Embassy
contacts tell us that additional members of parliament are
interested in joining the new UNP-SLFP/M alliance. In fact,
unless the formation can attract more partners, its chances
of unseating the Government are slim. Nonetheless, the
President and his administration are sure to keep a close eye
on this new opposition force. End summary.
2. (C) On July 19, the leading opposition United National
Party and the recently formed Sri Lanka Freedom
Party/Mahajana (SLFP/M) wing (ref) signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The groups have agreed to link up to
contest any future elections, outlining their key policies
and how they intend to share power if they win. Opposition
Leader and UNP head Ranil Wickremesinghe and SLFP/M leader
Mangala Samaraweera spoke after the signing and invited other
like-minded parties and individuals to join their alliance.
Samaraweera said he was confident that the new coalition
would come to power before February of next year.
3. (C) Key elements of the UNP-SLFP/M MOU include:
- Constitutional reforms through a Constitutional Council
within 3 months of taking power.
- A presidency, elected by popular vote with limited
executive power, that is responsible to the parliament and
the judiciary. Strengthening of powers of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet, with two vice-presidents to be elected from
the Cabinet of Ministers.
- A maximum of 32 Cabinet Ministers.
- Laws to bar Members of Parliament from changing political
parties after being elected.
- Immediate steps to investigate abductions and
disappearances.
- Stronger laws to curb corruption.
- A solution to the ethnic conflict within 9 months that
includes power sharing among all ethnic groups. (No further
details provided.) A major military offensive to eradicate
terrorism would ensue if any party (presumably including the
LTTE) refuses to accept a political solution endorsed by the
public.
- A long-term national economic plan.
- An improvement in relations with India, the EU, the U.S.,
and others.
- An end to media harassment and constitutional safeguards
against a Criminal Defamation Law.
- Better treatment of and access for NGOs.
- Electoral cooperation in the form of a "National Congress"
COLOMBO 00001020 002 OF 002
front. A National Congress government would have
Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister and Samaraweera as Deputy
Prime Minister. UNP and SLFP/M would share cabinet posts.
4. (C) Since the SLFP/M was formed in late June (reftel),
it has been unable to attract additional supporters.
However, various Embassy contacts tell us that additional
members of parliament, particularly those loyal to former
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, are interested in joining
the new UNP-SLFP/M combination. Names often mentioned
include the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader (and Minister of
Posts and Telecommunication) Rauff Hakeem and Minister of
Youth Pavithra Wanniarachchi.
5. (C) COMMENT: The MOU is an optimistic list of what a
National Congress government would attempt to accomplish and
how it would share power. It does not lay out plans for how
to be a more constructive and proactive force within the
current political context. If the alliance does not succeed
in attracting more partners, its chances of unseating the
Government are slim indeed. Nonetheless, the President and
his administration are sure to keep a close eye on this new
opposition force. The new combination is as-yet untested in
an election. Although the SLFP/M currently only has two MPs,
Samaraweera appears to retain significant support in his home
district of Matara, Galle, and other areas of the South -
where the current government also derives its strength, and
where the UNP is relatively weak. Rajapaksa has long been
wary of the intentions of former Chandrika supporters within
the SLFP (reftel) and will worry about Samaraweera's
potential to pull some of them away.
MOORE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: MAIN OPPOSITION AND RULING PARTY SPLINTER GROUP
SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT
REF: COLOMBO 883
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore, for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (C) Summary. On July 19, the leading opposition United
National Party and the recently-formed Sri Lanka Freedom
Party/Mahajana (SLFP/M) wing (ref) signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The agreement stipulates that the two
groups will jointly contest future elections. It outlines
their key policies and how they intend to share power should
they win. Key elements include constitutional reforms, a
limit on the size of the cabinet, a solution to the ethnic
conflict, and a long-term national economic plan. Embassy
contacts tell us that additional members of parliament are
interested in joining the new UNP-SLFP/M alliance. In fact,
unless the formation can attract more partners, its chances
of unseating the Government are slim. Nonetheless, the
President and his administration are sure to keep a close eye
on this new opposition force. End summary.
2. (C) On July 19, the leading opposition United National
Party and the recently formed Sri Lanka Freedom
Party/Mahajana (SLFP/M) wing (ref) signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU). The groups have agreed to link up to
contest any future elections, outlining their key policies
and how they intend to share power if they win. Opposition
Leader and UNP head Ranil Wickremesinghe and SLFP/M leader
Mangala Samaraweera spoke after the signing and invited other
like-minded parties and individuals to join their alliance.
Samaraweera said he was confident that the new coalition
would come to power before February of next year.
3. (C) Key elements of the UNP-SLFP/M MOU include:
- Constitutional reforms through a Constitutional Council
within 3 months of taking power.
- A presidency, elected by popular vote with limited
executive power, that is responsible to the parliament and
the judiciary. Strengthening of powers of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet, with two vice-presidents to be elected from
the Cabinet of Ministers.
- A maximum of 32 Cabinet Ministers.
- Laws to bar Members of Parliament from changing political
parties after being elected.
- Immediate steps to investigate abductions and
disappearances.
- Stronger laws to curb corruption.
- A solution to the ethnic conflict within 9 months that
includes power sharing among all ethnic groups. (No further
details provided.) A major military offensive to eradicate
terrorism would ensue if any party (presumably including the
LTTE) refuses to accept a political solution endorsed by the
public.
- A long-term national economic plan.
- An improvement in relations with India, the EU, the U.S.,
and others.
- An end to media harassment and constitutional safeguards
against a Criminal Defamation Law.
- Better treatment of and access for NGOs.
- Electoral cooperation in the form of a "National Congress"
COLOMBO 00001020 002 OF 002
front. A National Congress government would have
Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister and Samaraweera as Deputy
Prime Minister. UNP and SLFP/M would share cabinet posts.
4. (C) Since the SLFP/M was formed in late June (reftel),
it has been unable to attract additional supporters.
However, various Embassy contacts tell us that additional
members of parliament, particularly those loyal to former
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, are interested in joining
the new UNP-SLFP/M combination. Names often mentioned
include the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader (and Minister of
Posts and Telecommunication) Rauff Hakeem and Minister of
Youth Pavithra Wanniarachchi.
5. (C) COMMENT: The MOU is an optimistic list of what a
National Congress government would attempt to accomplish and
how it would share power. It does not lay out plans for how
to be a more constructive and proactive force within the
current political context. If the alliance does not succeed
in attracting more partners, its chances of unseating the
Government are slim indeed. Nonetheless, the President and
his administration are sure to keep a close eye on this new
opposition force. The new combination is as-yet untested in
an election. Although the SLFP/M currently only has two MPs,
Samaraweera appears to retain significant support in his home
district of Matara, Galle, and other areas of the South -
where the current government also derives its strength, and
where the UNP is relatively weak. Rajapaksa has long been
wary of the intentions of former Chandrika supporters within
the SLFP (reftel) and will worry about Samaraweera's
potential to pull some of them away.
MOORE