Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CHISINAU1367
2007-11-14 15:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

NO VORONIN-ZUBAKOV AGREEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA;

Tags:  PBTS PREL PGOV TN GM RS MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1367/01 3181527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141527Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5922
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001367 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV TN GM RS MD
SUBJECT: NO VORONIN-ZUBAKOV AGREEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA;
CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS IN MOLDOVA

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001367

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV TN GM RS MD
SUBJECT: NO VORONIN-ZUBAKOV AGREEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA;
CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS IN MOLDOVA

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the DCM, Presidential
advisor Marc Tkaciuk categorically denied the existence of
any agreement made between President Voronin and Russian
Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuriy Zubakov. The meeting
with Zubakov mostly concerned domestic political issues and
the emergence of Moldovan political groups affiliated with
Russian nationalists. Tkaciuk repeated Moldovan government
(GOM) support for USG efforts on CFE/Istanbul Commitments
with two caveats: the need for a timeline for removal of
Russian peacekeeping forces (PKF) and the need for real
progress towards a final, political settlement of
Transnistria (TN) in tandem with the removal of Russian PKF.
Tkaciuk concluded that future progress on TN would depend on
the outcome of U.S.-Russian talks on CFE. End summary.

No TN Agreement, Concern about Russian Nationalism in MD
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Tkaciuk explained that the Moldovan government (GOM)
had invited Zubakov to Moldova to discuss Voronin's recent
proposals to improve relations and increase interaction with
Transnistrian (TN) officials. Zubakov praised Voronin's
confidence-building measures (CBMs) as very interesting and
very promising, the president's advisor related. He added
that the Russian government was apparently discussing the
CBMs internally, so Zubakov didn't have a definitive response
to them. No "Kozak 2" plan emerged from the Voronin-Zubakov
conversation, Tkaciuk stressed.


3. (C) Tkaciuk wondered why the international community had
gotten spun up about the Zubakov visit, when the recent visit
of Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin had elicited no
similar wave of concern. (Note: It seemed Tkaciuk had been
asked about a Voronin-Zubakov agreement during Tkaciuk's
recent trip to London.) Tkaciuk noted that Zubakov had
talked to ambassadors (not further specified) during his trip

here and speculated that rumors about an agreement may have
developed from those meetings.


4. (C) Moldova's domestic political situation and the
emergence of Russian nationalist groups in Moldova took up
most of the meeting, according to the presidential advisor.
He described as alarming the appearance of political parties
and movements supported by Russian "structures." He cited
the November 4 "Imperial Russia" march in Moldova organized
by Russian nationalists.

GOM Supports USG Proposals on CFE with Two Caveats
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Tkaciuk reiterated his government's interest in USG
efforts to work out a solution that addressed Russia's CFE
concerns and Istanbul Commitments on Transnistria. He
stressed that he understood the U.S. had a broad agenda with
Russia and that Transnistria was only one small point on that
agenda. The president's advisor said the GOM had two
clarifications it needed to have included in any agreements
on CFE and TN: 1) Russian forces guarding the Colbasna
munitions should leave TN at the early stages of a final
agreement and Russian PKF should have a specified deadline
for their final withdrawal; and 2) parallel to the withdrawal
of the Russian PKF, real movement towards a final political
settlement of TN should take place. International civilian
and military observers could be put in place while Russian
PKF withdrew step by step, Tkaciuk opined.


6. (C) Tkaciuk suggested it might be easier to set a deadline
for the political settlement, rather than setting one for the
withdrawal of Russian PKF. For example, he thought aloud,
the TN parliament could pass a law, stating that on a certain
date TN would become part of a reunified Moldova. As soon as
Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to reunification, Russian PKF
would not be needed. Russia could claim victory (it had kept
the peace),say its forces were no longer needed, and
withdraw its PKF.

Concern about German Position on Russian Peacekeepers
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Tkaciuk shared in confidence his worry about Germany's
position on Russian PKF in TN. The presidential advisor said
that German officials believed that, if Moldova and Russia
agreed on the disposition of Russian PKF in TN, then the
issue of foreign forces in a sovereign country was off the
table and the international community had no more say in the
issue. Tkaciuk thought that the Germans were trying to find
a way of using the 1992 TN ceasefire accords to legitimize
the Russian military presence in TN. Tkaciuk stated that

CHISINAU 00001367 002 OF 003


Moldova would not agree to a Russian military presence on its
territory.


8. (C) The DCM reiterated the U.S. position on Moldovan
neutrality: it was the prerogative of the Moldovans to
decide to be neutral and the U.S. would respect Moldova's
choice. However, the U.S. as a sovereign nation would not
guarantee the neutrality of Moldova as another sovereign
nation.

"Subversives" Responsible for GOM Decision on TN Vehicle
Registration
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The DCM noted that the recent GOM decision to require
Transnistrians to register their vehicles with Chisinau
authorities (else be barred from circulating in the right
bank) had undermined the positive atmosphere GOM officials
had created starting with Voronin's CBMs. Tkaciuk was
dismayed at the decision and noted that it had not been
carefully coordinated within the GOM. The idea had been
wandering through the bureaucracy untended, Tkaciuk
explained, when suddenly it appeared in the press. Minister
for Reintegration Sova had been out of the country, and
Tkaciuk himself learned of the decision when he read the
morning news. Tkaciuk said "subversives" were responsible
for issuing the government decision. He didn't know who
exactly was behind it; officials were trying to find out.
(Comment: The initiative came from Minister Molojen's
Ministry of Information Development. End Comment.)
Meanwhile, Tkaciuk grimaced, the decision had undermined
fragile progress on CBMs and TN. The GOM was now trying to
change parts of the decision and find a face-saving way out
of the mess.

Next Steps
--------------


10. (C) When asked if the Russian elections would slow down
the search for a resolution to the TN conflict, Tkaciuk
thought not. The presidential advisor dismissed the recent
Russian Duma vote confirming Russia's December withdrawal
from CFE as merely an instrument that President Putin could
wield in the ongoing CFE discussions with NATO allies. When
no longer needed, Tkaciuk said, the Russians would just hang
the idea back up on its nail. Asked about Moldova's next
steps on TN, Tkaciuk said they depended on the outcome of the
conversations between Russia and the U.S. on CFE. Moldova
has done all it could, Tkaciuk concluded.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) This time the storm around rumors of another TN
agreement/plan was more of a rain shower. Perhaps we're a
little wiser, perhaps a little more cynical, or just less
hopeful. Tkaciuk, the official who most closely reflects
President Voronin's thinking on TN, seems to be waiting for
the outcome of the U.S. discussions with Russia on CFE.
Other than repairing the damage to Chisinau-Tiraspol
relations caused by the vehicle-registration flap, Moldovan
officials don't appear to be preparing new efforts on the
Transnistrian front. From our vantage point, we believe that
Moldova's next steps on TN will be tied to the CFE
discussions.


12. (C) Tkaciuk's idea about establishing a deadline for a
political settlement rather than focusing on a time line for
withdrawal of Russian PKF is a good one, if we assumed the
Russians would recognize they were no longer needed after
Chisinau and Tiraspol had agreed to reunification -- an
assumption we're not prepared to make. Either way removal of
Russia's ammunition stored at Colbasna is a necessary step
for the withdrawal process.


13. (C) When Tkaciuk discussed Russian nationalists in
Moldova, he might have been concerned about the possible
involvement of individuals sent from the Russian Federation
to influence the 2009 national, parliamentary elections. A
couple years ago, governmental leaders accused Russian groups
of trying to undermine the Communist Party during the 2005
parliamentary elections and prohibited a Russian group from
entering Moldova. Because of Voronin's rejection of the
Russian Federation's Kozak Memorandum in 2003, Russian
operatives may have been trying to retaliate against
Voronin's party. It seems Tkaciuk is Voronin's closest
advisor on Communist Party affairs. If so, Tkaciuk may want
to forestall a return to the Moldovan and Russian cycle of
retaliation of 2005 and will keep a close eye on these
developments.

CHISINAU 00001367 003 OF 003


KIRBY