TRANSNISTRIA OPTS TO DEAL WITH MOLDOVA -- FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 001301

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: OSCE PBTS PREL PINR MD
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA OPTS TO DEAL WITH MOLDOVA -- FOR NOW

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a reversal of earlier policy,
Transnistria's Foreign Minister Valery Litskai said at an
informal 5 plus 2 gathering that he was open for dialogue
with Chisinau and praised President Voronin's initiatives on
Transnistria. Litskai said Transnistria was prepared to
resolve the thorny issues dividing the two sides, including
demilitarization of the region, and called on Chisinau to
work out specific projects. Litskai said Transnistria only
wanted veto powers over unilateral changes to Transnistria's
future status. The Russian envoy tried to lower expectations
of a breakthrough and argued the 5 plus 2 format was
irrelevant for the time being. The next informal meeting
between Moldovan and Transnistrian negotiators is scheduled
to take place by November 10, and the likely date for 5 plus
2 talks would be November 19, if Litskai-Sova talks are
successful.

Litskai: Transnistria ready for serious talks
--------------


2. (C) At an informal three-hour 5 plus 2 dinner in Odessa
October 23 on the margins of an OSCE Confidence-Building
seminar, Transnistria's "Foreign Minister" Valery Litskai was
uncharacteristically polite and open to a serious dialogue.
Litskai welcomed President Voronin's initiatives and
characterized his earlier public rebuttals as
politically-motivated PR. He emphasized the timing was
propitious for unprecedented thawing because the situation on
the ground had improved and Transnistria no longer faced an
economic blockade and a possible melt-down of its financial
system.


3. (C) In a private conversation, Litskai asked whether the
US continued to support a federal solution of the conflict.
Litskai explained economic and security guarantees, including
Russian military presence, were less important than a veto
power over unilateral changes of Transnistria's status in a
reunified Moldova. He emphasized Tiraspol did not want to
stymie Chisinau's economic or foreign policy but needed an
institutional arrangement that would prevent Chisinau from
"swallowing" the region.

Sova: Moldova will work with Tiraspol
--------------


4. (C) Moldova's Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova (who
by mutual agreement sat next to Litskai at the table) praised
Transnistria's open-mindedness and said the GoM would
establish seven task forces to promote President Voronin's
initiatives. He pledged that specific project proposals
would be worked out for Transnistria. Litskai promised
prompt feedback and called for more active involvement of
Transnistrian and Moldovan parliaments in order to build a
lasting foundation for the eventual political solution of the
conflict. (Note: Last week Moldovan Parliamentary Speaker
Lupu proposed inter-parliamentary contacts. End Note.) Sova
and Litskai are scheduled to meet again by November 10 to
discuss specific projects drafted by the GoM's working groups.

Litskai: demilitarization not an issue
--------------


5. (C) Litskai pointed out that the Moldova region could be
demilitarized rapidly provided civilian retraining programs

for Transnistrian servicemen and external guarantees were in
place. Litskai argued the command staff could speedily work
out a schedule for destroying military hardware and
emphasized neither Moldova nor Transnistria needed their
armies because they faced no military threats. He added that
Transnistria's military capacity is shrinking each year as
older officers retire without trained younger ones to take
their places. Finally, he noted that the Transnistrian youth
are uninterested in serving in the military and are
constantly seeking shorter terms when compelled to serve.


6. (C) Litskai was quite open when he said the there was no
need for either the Moldovan or the Transnistrian forces to
have sophisticated weapons. Rifles, he said, were enough.
He noted that one of the factors working in favor of
potential future demilitarization was that no one had been
providing either side with weapons. In the long-run, Litskai
suggested that Transnistria could get on just fine with a
1,000-person strong gendarmerie and the Moldovan side could
have a similar force of some 2,000 to 4,000.

Transnistria wants assistance
--------------

7. (C) Litksai said Western countries made a big mistake by
shunning Transnistria before and lavished praised on the
Ambassador's suggestion to include Transnistria in the MCC
program. He said his office could issue a call for aid to
Transnistria's farmers if the US was willing to provide it.

Nesterushkin: 5 plus 2 framework irrelevant
--------------


8. (C) Russian Envoy for Transnistrian talks Valery
Nesterushkin said at a breakfast the next day that he was
taken aback by Litskai's "overtures." Nesterushkin tried to
lower expectation of a breakthrough, saying similar thawing
led nowhere on previous occasions. Nesterushkin added that
the 5 plus 2 negotiating framework was hanging in the balance
and was irrelevant for the "bilateral" talks between Moldova
and Transnistria, which seemed to be gaining momentum. He
said that the 5 plus 2 should not meet any time soon because
it had nothing to discuss at this stage. Despite
Nesterushkin's hope to disband Q)- or freeze -- the 5 plus 2,
the Spanish Chair said it would send an invitation to the
parties to participate in a 5 plus 2 meeting, which might
again be "informal." In response to DAS Kramer's suggestion
that the invitation await the results of the next
Sova-Litskai meeting, the Spanish said a letter might be
forthcoming which would ask for a 5 plus 2 if the
Sova-Litskai confab went well. At the end of the informal
talks at breakfast, the Spanish said they would likely ask to
hold talks on November 19 in Madrid if the Sova-Litskai
discussions went well.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Transnistria's political leadership is seeking not to
lose its grip on power now that it is faced with pressure
from business elites which benefit from EU's trade
preferences that only Moldova can provide. Voronin's
enticing offers go far to facilitate Transnistria's exports
and accommodate its grievances. With the prospect of
economic collapse caused by the Russian suspension of aid and
exacerbated by a serious drought, Transnistrian business
interests are loath to reject Voronin's proposals out of
hand. Litskai's overtures may be designed to test the ground
for a dQtente and possibly a more serious dialogue between
Chisinau and Tiraspol. Smirnov now faces more restricted
room for maneuver and may now have to accommodate his
domestic constituency and consider Moldova's offers.


10. (C) That Nesterushkin looked genuinely surprised by the
extent of Litskai's willingness to find common ground on key
issues suggests that Russia may be an important target of
Litskai's message. Transnistria's new-found openness to
Moldova could be meant as a powerful signal to Russia to
resume aid and stop harassing the regime. Next week, Litskai
will be in Moscow for talks with the MFA, which may be
decisive in determining the direction of next steps, and a
meeting of "foreign ministers" from Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Ambassador plans to meet with Litskai in
Tiraspol after his return from Moscow.


11. (C) We are witnessing events unfolding rapidly with new
momentum. However, optimism should be tempered by the fact
that Litskai is known to change his positions rapidly, and
dangle concessions in front of everyone to buy time. The
Transnistrians may feign willingness to compromise but just
drag their feet until after presidential elections in Russia,
rather than rely on promises from a lame-duck regime. Even
if Litskai and the Transnistrians are serious about
cooperating with Chisinau, one should not underestimate the
Moldovan Government's ability to mess things up.

KIRBY