Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CHISINAU1284
2007-10-23 14:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

MINISTER SOVA INSISTS PLAN NEEDS CLEAR DEADLINES

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PBTS PREL MD 
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VZCZCXRO7136
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1284/01 2961455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231455Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5825
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001284 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PBTS PREL MD
SUBJECT: MINISTER SOVA INSISTS PLAN NEEDS CLEAR DEADLINES

REF: A: CHISINAU 1273

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001284

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PBTS PREL MD
SUBJECT: MINISTER SOVA INSISTS PLAN NEEDS CLEAR DEADLINES

REF: A: CHISINAU 1273

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Minister for Reintegration Sova welcomed and
supported EUR DAS Kramer's outlines of the three-point
proposal presented in Moscow, which looks at Transnistria in
the context of the CFE treaty, but said clear timelines must
be established. Sova proposed limiting to one year the
transfer period from peacekeeping forces to civilian
observers. Sova questioned the idea of destroying all
Russian munitions on site, because a lot of this material
could more easily be removed to Russia. On-site destruction
could take years and lead to footdragging. Sova proposed
also imposing a deadline guaranteeing that the process of
removing munitions would be over in one-two years. End
Summary.

Clear Deadlines Necessary
--------------


2. (C) After President Voronin's early-morning meeting with
EUR DAS David Kramer, Ambassador Kirby, and EUR/RPM Deputy
Director Jennifer Laurendeau (ref A),Minister for
Reintegration Vasile Sova was briefed by President Voronin's
Political Advisor Marc Tkaciuk about the meeting and the
USG's three-point CFE plan which Kramer had presented.
Sova's mid-afternoon response thus reflected the results of
preliminary GOM consultations on this proposal. Several
times Sova used the expression "we think," indicating that
the suggestions he articulated, which are reported below,
reflected consideration and input from Tkaciuk.


3. (C) Minister Sova welcomed Kramer's proposals, supporting
the joint goals of settling Transnistria and keeping Russia
in CFE. However, he said the plan required that clear terms
of reference be set. Sova suggested that the time period for
transference from peacekeeping forces to civilian observers
should be limited to one year. OSCE observers could monitor
the demilitarization process and winding down of the
peacekeeping forces, but the mandate of those civilian
observers should not last for over one year. (Comment: When

pressed by DAS Kramer on the time limit, Sova expressed
flexibility. End Comment.)


4. (C) Sova suggested that the civilian mission monitoring
the shutdown of peacekeeping forces should not include
Russians and Ukrainians, since they were in those forces.
Kramer responded that he would hesitate to accept that
suggestion, arguing that the Ukrainians could play a very
important and useful role. In Brussels, Deputy Foreign
Minister Veselovsky had offered as many as 500 Ukrainian
civilian observers. Though this was more than would be
needed, Kramer suggested that Ukrainian participation should
not be ruled out. Sova responded that Yanukovich would
pursue narrow Ukrainian interests, as Ukraine wanted to
snatch Transnistria for itself.

Deadlines needed for Removal of Munitions
--------------


5. (C) While fully supporting the idea of ridding Colbasna of
all munitions, Sova said that it would not be a good idea for
the agreement to limit the options to on-site destruction, as
a lot of the material could be removed to Russia. With the
understanding that there are 22,000 tons of munitions there,
Sova said on-site destruction could take many years, and lead
to a lot of foot dragging. Sova suggestion that the first
step would have to be sending observers to see what is
actually there. In terms of timelines, even destroying a
hundred missiles a day could take a hundred years to complete
the process. Thus it was critical that the agreement include
a guarantee that the process be completed in one-two years.


6. (C) To reinforce the necessity of guaranteed deadlines,
Sova narrated his own historical experience. As deputy
minister, Sova had spent three years from 1991-1994 carrying
out negotiations on withdrawal of munitions. An agreement was
signed in 1994 on removal within three years, i.e., by 1997.
It is now 2007, and that still has not been carried out.
Hence, Sova said he fears the same would happen now, and thus
any agreement must include a guarantee of the timeline.

Next Steps on the Proposal Package
--------------


7. (C) Sova said he found the proposal's conceptual
framework complex, but felt the proposal has practical
possibility, as long as the timeframe issue is considered,
and the proposal is implemented in as short a period as
possible. Kramer underscored that there was a window of
opportunity now, as it would get worse if the Russians pulled
out of CFE. The ball is now in the Russians' court, and

CHISINAU 00001284 002 OF 002


Kramer said the U.S. is waiting to hear back from them. The
U.S. told Moscow that we would consult with the Moldovans and
Georgians as well as other allies.


8. (C) In Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin had
suggested the possibility of renewing 5 plus 2 talks.
Karasin had reiterated the Russian position that direct talks
between Transnistria and Moldova could solve the problem. He
acknowledged that Voronin and Smirnov would not get together.
However, Kramer said, the problem is that when Litskai
comes, he claims to lack full negotiating authority. Kramer
had told Karasin that the Russians need to urge Transnistria
to come to the table ready for serious discussions.

Dual Citizenship Law Could be Impediment to Settlement
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Ambassador raised his concerns about the proposal
in Parliament prohibiting people with dual citizenship from
government jobs. Though this might appear to be directed at
people with Romanian citizenship, it would clearly hurt those
in Transnistria with Moldovan passports, as well as those
with Russian and Ukrainian passports. The bill could thus
become an impediment to a Transnistrian settlement. Sova
acknowledged that there were discussions on this
controversial issue. One suggestion was that it might apply
only for people running for office, and then perhaps only
that they be required to declare their second citizenship.
The issue remains unresolved.

Resolution of Issues with Romania Also Important
-------------- ---


10. (C) DAS Kramer said he was planning to go to Romania in a
few weeks. He urged signing the border treaty with Romania,
and told Sova he had said the same to President Voronin and
Foreign Minister Stratan. With respect to the border treaty,
everyone in Moldova says it is 95 percent done, and everyone
in Romania says it is 95 percent done. Kramer urged
finishing that last 5 percent and signing the border treaty.
Kramer had checked with the Romanians, and said that they are
not linking the border treaty with the political treaty, and
are willing to move ahead independently with signing the
border treaty. Sova suggested that Moldova wants the border
treaty only in conjunction with the political treaty. Kramer
counseled dropping that position, and seizing victory where
you can, as having a border treaty would pave the way for
reaching a political treaty. Kramer urged not letting one
become hostage to the other. Reaching this accord would be
good for Moldova's standing with the EU. Sova said he would
like to see something signed with the Romanians by the end of
the year.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Sova's addition of timeframe requirements should be
considered as part of Moldova's official response to the
proposals effecting Transnistria and Russian continued
participation in CFE -- and a reasonable, if not unexpected,
request. His own experience of having already negotiated an
agreement on withdrawal of Russian munitions that remained
unfulfilled speaks to the need for guarantees on any
agreement that might be reached in the future.
LINDEN