Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CHISINAU1275
2007-10-22 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

TRANSNISTRIA: SMIRNOV'S POWER WEAKENING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS ECON PHUM MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6102
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1275/01 2951508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221508Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5812
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001275 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS ECON PHUM MD
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: SMIRNOV'S POWER WEAKENING

REF: A. CHISINAU 1243

B. CHISINAU 388

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001275

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS ECON PHUM MD
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: SMIRNOV'S POWER WEAKENING

REF: A. CHISINAU 1243

B. CHISINAU 388

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: With Transnistria's (TN) economic situation
deteriorating, "President" Smirnov is showing unprecedented
signs of weakness, and the previously unquestioned position
of the TN leader now seems increasingly uncertain. While TN
leaders formerly presented a united front, in recent meetings
with the Ambassador, "Foreign Minister" Litskai and "Speaker"
of the Supreme Soviet Shevchuk were openly critical of the
leader's "uncompromising" policies. They noted that Smirnov
was increasingly nervous and complained of his erratic and
irrational behavior.


2. (C) The gap between the Legislature and the Executive in
TN appears to have widened, as evidenced by recent Supreme
Soviet measures to address the economic situation which
openly shot down Smirnov's proposals. Meanwhile, the stature
of the more flexible Shevchuk has risen. Shevchuk's
receptive response to Voronin's recent initiatives contrasted
favorably with Smirnov's knee-jerk rejection. The TN Supreme
Soviet is taking the lead on drafting its own proposals in
response. Depending on where the Transnistrian dynamic
leads, we could see changes that augur for greater
flexibility at the 5 plus 2 negotiating table in the months
ahead. END SUMMARY.

DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION WEAKENS SMIRNOV
-------------- ---


3. Transnistria's economic situation has deteriorated
sharply since Russia severed financial assistance to the
separatist region in April (REF B). A record drought over
the summer compounded the situation, causing crop losses,
increases in food prices and high inflation. The TN central
bank projects inflation may reach 30-35% by the end of the
year. Since Russia cut financial assistance to TN, Tiraspol
has been struggling to cope with mounting budget deficits and
demands to maintain social spending. In response,

Transnistrian leader Smirnov announced plans to increase
taxes on corporate profits, utility rates for consumers and
food prices.

SUPREME SOVIET CHALLENGES THE EXECUTIVE
--------------


4. (C) Meanwhile, the stature of Yevgeny Shevchuk, leader of
the opposition Obnovlenie Party, which controls a majority in
Parliament, has risen, as the Legislature increasingly
challenges the Executive. Over the past two months, the
Supreme Soviet has dealt Smirnov several defeats. Smirnov's
efforts to raise taxes on alcoholic beverages, increase
duties on the export of building materials, and modify the
tax system to allow random checks of TN enterprises were all
rejected by the Obnovlenie-controlled Supreme Soviet.


5. (C) The Supreme Soviet has also acted more independently.
It repealed Smirnov's migration tax on foreigners and those
transiting TN, stating that the tax was inconsistent with TN
law, and voted to cancel the 100% duty on imports of some
goods from right-bank Moldova. On October 10, the Supreme
Soviet rejected the Executive's 2008 economic forecast, the
basis for the budget, as "unrealistic." The Chairman of the
Standing Committee for Economic Policy, Budget and Finance
noted that the Executive's economic projections did not take
into account the lack of Russian budgetary support, and thus
provided a distorted view of the current economic situation
and prospects for 2008. For example, the Executive set the
inflation target at 12% for 2008, despite inflation which
could reach 30-35% in 2007.


6. (C) Though Smirnov delivered his standard rejectionist
response to President Voronin's recent confidence-building
proposals (REF A),Shevchuk stepped forward with a more
positive reply. Smirnov seems isolated in his rebuff of
Voronin's offers, as the Parliament moves forward with
drafting its own proposals. (COMMENT: Just as in the case of
complying with Moldovan export rules, business interests'
views - which Shevchuk is seen to represent - conflict with
Smirnov's views and appear to be more receptive of Chisinau's
initiatives. END COMMENT.)

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) We lack insight into the rational for Russia's
suspension of direct support to TN, but the result is a
weakening of Smirnov's control. Perhaps the Russians are
sufficiently satisfied with Chisinau's pledges to maintain

CHISINAU 00001275 002 OF 002


Russian investors' property rights in TN so that they no
longer need to support a hard line against business. The
Russians may believe that the time to act is before the 2009
Moldovan parliamentary elections, which likely will lead to a
change in government with a new President who almost
certainly will not support a Russian-centric resolution to
the TN conflict.


8. (C) Russia may also believe that TN has served its
purpose, linking Moldova inextricably to Russia's sphere of
influence. If such is Russia's thinking, then Smirnov, whose
personal, ideological and financial ties obstruct a solution,
is no longer an asset. Removing Smirnov has long been
Chisinau's precondition for a political settlement to the
conflict. In 2001, when a possible resolution was in sight,
President Voronin secured a promise from Russia to remove
Smirnov prior to the TN "presidential" elections. However,
the resilient Smirnov survived then, despite Russian pressure
and rumors that the FSB - frustrated by his intransigence )
was planning to permanently "retire" him.


9. (C) In any case, Russia's withdrawal of economic support
for TN appears to have weakened Smirnov and emboldened
Shevchuk. The legislative defeats Smirnov suffered
demonstrate Shevchuk's growing power inside TN. Shevchuk has
presented himself as a reasonable interlocutor concerned
about economic affairs and open to negotiations with Chisinau
within the 5 plus 2 format. We are under no illusion that
Shevchuk is a democrat, however, as Smirnov noted during the
visit of Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, "everyone is
ignoring me, even the Russians." We believe Shevchuk and
Obnovlenie will continue to challenge the Executive as TN
struggles with its mounting economic crisis. Smirnov has
been a major obstacle to Moldova's reunification to date, but
his star appears to be fading. END COMMENT.
KIRBY