PRESIDENT VORONIN SUPPORTS U.S. CFE PROPOSALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001273

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PREL KCFE OSCE PARM MD
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT VORONIN SUPPORTS U.S. CFE PROPOSALS

REF: SECSTATE 146521

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a cordial meeting with President Voronin,
DAS David Kramer presented elements of our forward-leaning
CFE package proposals delivered in Moscow. Arriving in
Moldova after his Moscow talks, Kramer said the U.S. had
presented this package to the Russians, and is waiting for
the Russian response. The goal is to get the Russians to
agree to remain within CFE. In that regard we have
encouraged the Russians to help restart the stalled
Transnistria talks as soon as possible. The three-part
package relevant for Moldova involves agreement on (1) a
meeting involving the 5 2 to make a serious push on a
Transnistrian settlement that would in turn create conditions
for the rest of the package, (2) the removal, or destruction
in place, of the munitions at Kolbasna; and (3) the
introduction of a new OSCE mandate to have civilian observers
monitoring the peacekeepers, with the goal of
demilitarization. President Voronin strongly approved this
package approach. END SUMMARY.

Linking Transnistria Settlement to CFE
--------------


2. (C) In an October 19 meeting, DAS David Kramer, the
Ambassador, and EUR/RPM Deputy Director Jennifer Laurendeau
briefed President Voronin on the recent 2 plus 2 meetings in
Moscow on CFE, as well as Kramer's own talks there which took
place earlier. Kramer thought the Russians would take no
further actions to fulfill their Istanbul commitments, and if
this continued until December 12, would go ahead with their
announced suspension of CFE. The USG is thus trying to find
creative ways to elicit further movement in the context of a
package approach linking a Transnistria settlement to CFE
ratification. Kramer made that linkage clear to the
Russians. The USG insists Russia has to move forward on
Istanbul commitments, while the Russians believe (1) there is
no link between Istanbul and CFE and (2) in any case, they
have already fulfilled what they undertook to do in Istanbul.
Kramer suggested to Voronin that if the Russians withdrew on
December 12, any further movement on these issues would be
virtually impossible.


3. (C) Kramer said he found his counterpart during the CFE
talks in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin, to
be a decent professional, in sharp contrast to the
notoriously-difficult Russian negotiator for Transnistria,
Nesterushkin. Karasin gave the impression that the Russian
side wants a resumption of talks, though Kramer thinks
Karasin's hands are tied. Kramer had stressed that absent
Russian pressure on Transnistria to resume the talks, there
would be no progress on a Transnistria settlement and Russian
troop withdrawal. Kramer said Secretary Rice had endorsed
efforts to get the Transnistria talks back on track.
Starting the process of CFE ratification would be contingent
upon Russian agreement to the CFE package presented in
Moscow. Kramer said that the Russians want the allies to
move forward with ratification, but the USG cannot move
forward unless we have an agreement in principle on the
Moldova commitments. Ratification could come in phases, with
some of the allies ratifying earlier than others; the USG
might be one of the last to ratify.

The Three-Point Package
--------------


4. (C) Kramer explained the parts of the CFE package relevant
for Moldova. Step one would be to get the Transnistria talks
resumed. Next would be to either remove or destroy in place
the Russian armaments at Colbasna. Voronin and Kramer agreed
this would be easy to accomplish if the Russians decided that
they wanted to do it. Kramer stressed the need for
transparency and preliminary site inspection, as there have
been many reports that the Transnistrians have long since
sold the munitions, and no one knows for sure what is there.
Some discussion ensued about the possibility of destruction
of munitions on site. As the Russians have frequently argued
that the Transnistrians would not allow them to remove the
munitions, in situ destruction might be a better alternative.
During the Moscow talks the Russians said that objections
came from Ukraine and Moldova. Voronin said that Moldova had
no problem with in situ destruction and undertook to reach
out to Ukraine to consider a joint statement that Ukraine and
Moldova would support in situ destruction of Russian
armaments. With the armaments gone, all agreed there would
be no need for the 600 soldiers guarding Colbasna to remain
in Transnistria.


5. (C) Taking into account Voronin's previous comments that
no fighting would break out if peacekeepers were withdrawn,
Kramer proposed a new OSCE mandate to have civilian observers

CHISINAU 00001273 002 OF 002


monitoring the peacekeepers with the goal of demilitarizing
the region. Voronin and his advisor Marc Tkacuk were both
very pleased with this idea. Voronin suggested a deal with
the Ukrainians, that both Moldova and Ukraine start by
unilaterally removing their peacekeepers, to be replaced by
OSCE civilian observers. Withdrawal of troops and munitions
would mean that the backbone would be taken out of the
Transnistria regime. Some movement in the settlement process
would be necessary before the Russians would take this step.

Next Steps on Transnistria
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Kirby said that both he and David Kramer
will attend the OSCE-sponsored informal 5 plus 2 get together
in Odessa October 23. President Voronin promised he would
issue a press release emphasizing Moldova's readiness to
return to 5 plus 2 negotiations without any pre-conditions.
Ambassador Kirby praised President Voronin's useful public
diplomacy in the past weeks, reaching out to the
Transnistrian people directly via interviews in
Russian-language press. The Ambassador mentioned his
September trip to Tiraspol, in which he had met with both the
obstinate Transnistrian Foreign Minister Litskai, as well as
the more constructive Parliamentary speaker Shevchuk. The
Ambassador had also attended the October 11 3 plus 2 meetings
in Vienna, and expressed conviction that the upcoming Finnish
chair will provide better leadership than the Spanish
presidency had. He expects the Finnish chairman to come to
Moldova by the end of January or February, but to send
someone earlier in December to start the process.

Moldova Working to Improve Relations with the Russians
-------------- --------------


7. (C) President Voronin spoke of his participation in the
October 5-7 CIS Summit in Dushanbe where he brought up
Transnistria during his brief bilateral with Russian
President Putin. Voronin reported his impression that the
Kremlin was playing one game, and the Russian MFA was playing
another, while Putin was simply unaware of what was going on
in Transnistria. Their meeting did not result in any
agreements to achieve any kind of breakthrough, and was just
an exchange of impressions. In response to DAS Kramer's
direct question asking whether Voronin was optimistic that
Putin wanted to solve Transnistria, the Moldovan President
responded ironically "not very much."


8. (C) President Voronin said he has been working to improve
his bilateral relations with the Russians, trying to resolve
all outstanding bilateral issues such as the wine ban, in
order to clear the plate so that only the Transnistria
settlement remains. As an example of improved
Russian-Moldovan relations, Voronin noted that on Monday
October 22 an inter-parliamentary commission is expected to
pay a return visit to Chisinau, following the Moldovan
delegation's two-day working visit to Moscow. Most
outstanding issues are already resolved, so Voronin hopes
focus on a Transnistria settlement will now be possible.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) President Voronin clearly welcomed the U.S.
initiatives and DAS Kramer's engagement, and seemed pleased
to be offered some new possibility for forward movement. The
Moldovan president twice suggested joint action with the
Ukrainians in support of this package, both on removing
peacekeepers, and on dropping opposition to in situ munitions
destruction. Voronin's confident expectation that the
Ukrainians would go along with his proposals suggests that he
is counting on the orange-coalition to be a constructive
partner in helping to reach a Transnistrian settlement.


10. (U) DAS Kramer cleared this cable.
KIRBY