NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE FLOW INTO THAILAND SURGES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000092

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2017
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM TH KN CH
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE FLOW INTO THAILAND SURGES

REF: A. BANGKOK 2404, B. 06 CHIANG MAI 79, C.CHIANG MAI 50

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CLASSIFIED BY: John Spykerman, Political Officer, CG Chiang Mai,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. The ever-increasing North Korean refugee flow
into Thailand is disrupting the RTG's ability to handle the wave
of those seeking to use Thailand as a conduit to resettlement in
a third country. Many sources believe the new RTG plan to
process resettlement cases with Republic of Korea (ROK) at the
point of detainment without involvement of the United Nations
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) will eventually break down
under the pressure of thousands of North Koreans reportedly
waiting in southern China for their chance to slip into
Thailand. If the path to South Korean resettlement becomes
rockier, more refugees may seek assistance outside of this
process, opening the door to more requests for resettlement to
other countries and exposing the refugees to greater trafficking
and health risks as their stopover in Thailand becomes longer
and less controlled. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PolOff visited Chiang Rai in mid-May to assess recent
changes in RTG policies regarding the processing of North Korean
refugees for resettlement in South Korea (ref A). The new policy
directs the resettlement process to occur at the point of entry
and eliminates UNHCR's facilitating role in the North Koreans'
resettlement requests. Under the agreement, local police arrest
refugees after they enter Thailand, the local courts then charge
and convict the refugees with illegally entering the country,
refugees pay a fine or serve a few days in a local jail, and are
then sent to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Mae Sai
for resettlement processing by ROK officials. Under the previous
system, refugees were held at the Mae Sai IDC only until a large
enough group was ready to be sent to the Bangkok IDC for
processing by the UNHCR and ROK. The new system is supposed to
reduce the number of days refugees are under RTG care -- often
more than 30 days under the previous system -- although it is
not apparent local facilities or budgets are able to house ever
increasing numbers of North Koreans, or whether the time served
under detainment will actually be any shorter.

Some 700 Refugees Likely to Be Detained This Year


3. (S) The number of North Korean refugees entering Thailand has
grown dramatically in recent years, now averaging 60 new
detainees in Chiang Rai province each month. Thai border
enforcement caught 40 refugees crossing the Mekong River into
Thailand in all of 2003. By 2006, the number of refugees
surrendering to police in Chiang Rai had increased to 367. In
the first four months of 2007, immigration officials at the Mae
Sai border crossing say they processed some 235 North Korean
refugees, with another 58 people currently housed at the local
detention center. Officials expect to detain more than 700 North
Koreans by year's end. In addition to these, an unknown number
of North Koreans have made directly for Bangkok, where they
either turn themselves in to immigration police there or seek
shelter at safe houses run by missionaries. Sources vary widely
on how many North Koreans are in China preparing to seek
resettlement via Thailand. Some media reports tag the number at
up to 100,000, but Consulate General Chengdu notes the ROK CG in
Chengdu pegged the figure at closer to 4,000 in Yunnan Province.


4. (C) Despite this growth, refugee demographics remain
consistent. Refugees are overwhelmingly female and aged 25-55,
with small numbers of older men and children. Chiang Rai
officials involved in the detainment process say most are from
rural areas in North Korea, but appear to be at least modestly
educated. Sources familiar with refugee trafficking networks
explain that women are better able to find employment and
occasionally husbands during their long trek through China and
thus able to support the costs of travel, while many working-age
males cannot escape military and farming commitments in North
Korea. Immigration officials say most refugees arrive with only
minor health concerns, such as malnourishment or dehydration,
although they monitor children and the elderly for further signs
of illness.

A Better Understanding of the Causes, But Not Much Progress on
the Solutions

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5. (C) In a similar trip to Chiang Rai last year, PolOff noted
that provincial officials were perplexed at why they were
dealing with refugees from a country that does not border
Thailand (ref B). This year, in contrast, everyone from the
governor down to mid-level immigration officers is well-informed
about the path North Koreans follow on a months-long trek across
China and eventually into Thailand. Many officials express a
rueful sense of pride that North Koreans single out Thailand as
an oasis of compassionate understanding in a region of
unsympathetic governments that would likely push the refugees
back, even though this compassion (or rather, lack of overt
hostility) is what drives more refugees to come here and cause
headaches for Thai bureaucrats.


6. (C) However, this greater understanding has not led to
noticeably better solutions. Although the new policy requires
ROK processing to occur at Mae Sai (along with another detention
center in central Thailand for those detained in and around
Bangkok),many Chiang Rai officials have not had contact with
ROK Embassy representatives. In fact, local police officers are
still at a loss on how to cope with the language barrier, mostly
relying on local Korean expats who charge up to $20 USD per hour
for translation, or how to handle increased food and
transportation expenses for arresting the refugees. Chiang Rai
officials say their border security budgets must absorb these
additional costs, while last year's promises of increased ROK
interpretation and dietary assistance have yet to materialize.


7. (C) There is also a disconnect between a process that
encourages more refugees to enter Thailand and the approach
preferred by local police and military officers, especially in
the Third Army, who would deny more refugees entry. Chiang Rai's
police chief even speaks longingly of U.S. anti-illegal
immigration tactics used on the Mexican border. Police told
PolOff they are aware of a number of South Korean expats and
religious organizations in northern Thailand -- nominally
serving on missions to ethnic minority groups -- that are likely
bases of support for traffickers, but that Bangkok is not
interested in a more confrontational investigation of the
organizations' operations. Police likewise see little hope of
working with Lao and Burmese border officials to better monitor
incoming refugee groups. Officials in those two countries prefer
to ignore the refugees and allow them to continue on downriver
to Thailand, recognizing that to detain them would be to become
responsible for them.

An Already Crowded Detention Center


8. (C) The Mae Sai IDC is ill-prepared to house large numbers of
refugees, despite RTG assurances otherwise. Formerly used as a
stop for illegal Burmese migrant workers who would be deported
the next day, the IDC is now home to dozens of North Koreans who
spend weeks at a time there. The two detention rooms, separated
by gender, are located on the second floor of the IDC. Each room
is about 100 square meters and, according to immigration
officials, able to hold 100 people. This stated capacity,
however, is unrealistic for holding detainees over long periods
of time under humane conditions. On the day PolOff visited, both
rooms were packed with 48 North Korean women and children housed
on one side, while 10 North Korean males were in the other room
with a large group of ethnic Shan migrant workers from Burma
detained for the day. On the women's side, detainees took turns
sleeping on the floor, while others huddled together or tended
to the half-dozen toddlers crawling over their resting mothers.
Refugees receive three meals a day, but must spend their entire
period of detention in these unfurnished (except for a toilet
and sink) rooms. Immigration sources say if the IDC becomes more
crowded they will house some detainees off-site. With most North
Koreans hoping for a quick exit from Thailand, officials
anticipate little flight risk at these low-security, improvised
detainment centers. Of greater concern for them is where to find
the budget to establish these overflow sites.

Security and Safety Concerns Emerging


9. (C) Local officials recognize that even with on-site
resettlement processing, any further increase in refugees will
overwhelm their system. Chiang Rai's police chief said that
completion of the R3A highway connecting China and Thailand
through Laos later this year will lead to far greater numbers of

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refugees, who now make the 400-km trip mostly by riverboat (ref
C). With few options for housing detainees beyond the IDC and
word spreading quickly about the undesirable conditions there,
officials expect more refugees will try to make their own way to
Bangkok or seek assistance and shelter from organizations
throughout the country, instead of immediately turning
themselves in to police at the border as most do now. Claiming
that the U.S. policy of resettling ethnic Hmong from Laos
encouraged more Hmong to enter Thailand illegally, Chiang Rai
Gov. Amorapun Nimanandh predicted that more North Koreans will
look to the United States if refugees encounter problems with
the current resettlement processing.


10. (C) Police also highlighted several areas of concern for
refugees' safety in the event that greater numbers overwhelm the
system. With the ROK offering thousands of dollars to resettled
refugees, more profit-oriented individuals are getting involved
in trafficking operations and charging a cut of this allotment
as repayment for their services. If the processing operation
breaks down or faces significant delays, many North Koreans will
find themselves stuck in Thailand facing significant debts --
opening the door to further trafficking-in-persons risks. Chiang
Rai's police chief also worried that the ability to distinguish
legitimate refugees from people with other motives would
diminish if immigration officials become even more pressed for
resources.

Comment: More Refugees, More Headaches


11. (C) The recent tweaking of RTG refugee procedures to process
resettlement cases at the border may keep the problem out of
sight in the capital, but the larger issue at stake is that this
program designed to handle a few dozen cases at a time ignores
the thousands of North Koreans reportedly waiting for their turn
to come down the Mekong River. Those who have spoken with the
refugees say South Korea remains their preferred resettlement
choice due to three factors: family connections between the two
Koreas, the financial incentive of the ROK's resettlement
payment, and the for-now endurable RTG arrest and detainment
process. However, if conditions worsen in terms of the length of
detainment and crowding in IDC cells, refugees will likely seek
out new routes and head to Bangkok or elsewhere, overwhelming
RTG border security and creating headaches for UNHCR offices and
foreign missions anyway.
CAMP