OPPONENTS TAKE AIM AT PRO-THAKSIN FRONT-RUNNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000192

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NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/4/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: OPPONENTS TAKE AIM AT PRO-THAKSIN FRONT-RUNNER

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 185 (NORTHERN VILLAGERS)


B. BANGKOK 6007 (FRAUD, ARMY INTERFERENCE)

C. BANGKOK 5914 (THAILAND ELECTION ROUNDUP)

D. CHIANG MAI 182 (THAKSIN LOYALISTS POISED TO RECAPTURE NORTH)

E. BANGKOK 5749 (ELECTION PLAYBILL)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Morrow, Consul General, Chiang Mai, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Morrow, Consul General, Chiang Mai, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




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Summary
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1. (SBU) Competing political parties are trying to make inroads
in northern Thailand, a stronghold of former Prime Minister
Thaksin and the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP). The
opposing parties believe PPP, lacking the advantages of
incumbency and under close scrutiny by election authorities to
prevent vote-buying and other campaign violations, can be taken
down a notch in the December 23 elections. PPP's opponents have
recruited heavily to put forward recognized candidates with
previous experience in parliament. Nonetheless, strategists for
PPP, as well as some rival politicians, continue to project that
PPP will win at least as many northern seats as Thaksin's party
did in 2001, though fewer than in 2005. Some recent analyses,
however, forecast lower totals for PPP in the north. End
Summary.

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PPP Opponents Take Aim
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2. (SBU) In recent weeks Consul General has spoken to several
politicians from parties opposing the pro-Thaksin People's Power
Party about their strategies for taking on the front-runner in
its northern Thailand stronghold. Most are counting on election
and military authorities to crack-down on past free-wheeling
vote-buying by the Thaksin camp (while largely allowing the
competition to have a free hand). They also believe PPP
prospects will be limited since it lacks the advantage of
incumbency enjoyed by its antecedent party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT),
in 2005.


3. (SBU) PPP's rivals, while largely parroting the party's
populist economic platform, are also pitching the need to
empower consumers (through greater savings and earnings) rather
than merely feeding them handouts. In addition, PPP rivals in
the north are studiously avoiding an anti-Thaksin tinged message
out of deference to the native son's widespread popularity here.

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Counting on Authorities to Tilt the Playing Field
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4. (C) A Chiang Mai-based former parliamentarian and candidate
for the Democrat Party, widely seen as PPP's strongest rival,
told us that TRT bought its way to victory in the last two
elections. But now the Royal Thai Army (RTA) intelligence is
all over the PPP; it knows and monitors every money man and will
block or arrest them to prevent vote-buying. Conversely, he
said, the authorities will allow rival parties to have a free
hand. Without vote-buying, he claimed, PPP will lose half the
voters TRT once had.


5. (C) Other sources were more cautious. A first-time
candidate for Motherland (Puea Paendin),a recently formed party
that has shown momentum nationally, said PPP is still the
wealthiest party. Personally he has seen little military
presence at campaign events in his Chiang Mai district. He
expressed doubt about the RTA's and military-appointed
government's ability to effectively control illegal campaign
spending in the countryside. Election Commission of Thailand
(ECT) officials in Lampang speculated that most vote-buying that
may have taken place likely happened before the new election
laws entered into force on October 8. They also spoke of a new
vote-buying method reported in other provinces - party
canvassers purchasing life insurance cards for voters. In

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Lampang, the ECT has received a number of anonymous tips on
vote-buying, but upon investigation it could confirm none of
these. No local candidate has yet lodged a spending complaint.

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Lack of Incumbency Deprives PPP of Old Levers
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6. (C) Several sources pinned their hopes on the fact that the
pro-Thaksin camp, ousted from government in the September 2006
military coup, now lacks the electoral advantage of incumbency.
Our Motherland source said appointed regional and local
officials, from governors down to sub-district heads, would be
able to influence voters without being beholden to the PPP.
Also, he claimed the ECT was in TRT's pocket in 2005 and thus
looked the other way on electoral violations. But this time it
would be strict. A Lampang-based former parliamentarian and
Motherland candidate said the biggest difference between this
election and last was that, in 2005, TRT had money and the
advantage of incumbency, whereas this time "they (PPP) only have
money." Yet she expressed concern that the ECT "lacked teeth"
and doubted its ability to impact the race.


7. (C) Yet she admitted TRT's influence remained deep-rooted in
the north, and that many police and other local officials
appointed during the Thaksin era were still in place. Post is
aware of one case where two such officials were recently
"purged." A local journalist provided us with specifics on a
television report of the transfer of two district (amper)
assistant officers in Chiang Rai for being "partial" toward
certain candidates. According to the journalist, both were
closely linked to local PPP heavyweights. The governor
transferred them to other duties for allegedly meeting with
village and sub-district (tambon) heads to urge their support
for PPP.

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Preaching Empowerment, Not Handouts
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8. (C) Our Democrat Party (DP) source, when asked about strong
public support for PPP's pledge to continue or restore the TRT
government's populist economic programs (Ref A),scoffed that
TRT "used" the people: instead of empowering them, it bought
them off with populist handouts. DP campaigners are promising
policies that will allow people to increase personal savings
vice spending. For example, DP is calling for free public
education that will remove the hidden costs of the current
"free" public education, such as personal spending on school
books, uniforms, meals, etc. DP also proposes changing the
health care system to eliminate hidden costs there, too,
especially for medications.


9. (C) Our Motherland source highlighted the economy as a key
campaign issue, given steadily declining consumer confidence
over the last year. As a Chiang Mai candidate, he is
campaigning to broaden the province's economy beyond its current
dual anchors - agriculture and tourism - both are which are
vulnerable to seasonal fluctuations. Motherland is promoting
the development of two additional anchors: a design/fashion
sector, and a high-tech and medical research sector, both of
which would build on Chiang Mai's strong university base. He is
also advocating alternative energy policies that are attractive
to northern farmers hurt by rising fuel prices. Another
Motherland candidate (and former Chiang Mai-based
parliamentarian) complained that TRT handouts were bad economic
policies that just generated personal debt. She is campaigning
to strengthen the economy's foundation so consumers can earn
more and borrow less. This complements the King's sufficiency
economic principle, she noted, which advocates against debt.

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Thaking It Easy on Thaksin
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10. (C) Given former PM Thaksin's widespread popularity in his
native north, PPP rivals here are steering clear of an
anti-Thaksin message on the campaign trail. Motherland, in
particular, is toeing the national party line of being an
"alternative" for voters and not committing to either of the two
leading parties (PPP and DP). Our three Motherland contacts
emphasized they are campaigning as a "middle path" party that
can bridge current political divisions. For one thing,
Motherland fears it would be punished by northern voters if it

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were to openly side with the Democrats and against PPP. For
another, they expect to garner more seats by holding the center,
and thus boost their chances of joining a government that has as
few coalition partners as possible. Despite their careful
public balancing act, however, our Motherland sources expressed
a greater comfort level with, and greater likelihood of, a
partnership with the Democrats vice PPP. As they see it, any
PPP-led government just a year after the anti-Thaksin coup is a
recipe for uncertainty at best and instability at worst.

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PPP Candidates Remain Confident
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11. (C) Despite being in the gunsights of rival parties and
government and military authorities, PPP strategists are
confident of their ability to retain a strong hold on the north.
On November 30, Consul General met with two Chiang Rai-based
former parliamentarians who are running for re-election under
the PPP banner: the sister of PPP deputy leader Yongyuth
Tiyapairath, and PPP Deputy Spokesman Samart Kaewmeechai. They
made the following points:

-- PPP is not worried about lacking the advantages of
incumbency. It expects to win a plurality (or better) of seats
on the strength of its reputation and strong voter
identification, its policy implementation track record (as the
successor to TRT),popular support for Thaksin, and public
dissatisfaction with the coup, the military-appointed
government, and the economy. PPP is pitching December 23 as a
referendum on democracy (PPP) versus the coup-backers (DP and
most other parties) - a concept it believes is more important
than any party's campaign platform or any individual candidate.
(Note: Lampang ECT officials made the same point a week
earlier: for most voters, election day boils down to "are you
pro-Thaksin or pro-coup?").

-- Military attempts to intimidate voters against supporting
PPP are backfiring. Our contacts reiterated complaints they had
made in the press earlier in the week about RTA and police
personnel intimidating PPP supporters (Ref B). However, they
did not dwell on the issue or provide details, other than
Samart's specific allegation that soldiers had surrounded the
house of his campaign assistant to cow supporters into staying
away from him. Despite their public protestations, Samart and
Tiyapairath said privately they believe the military's
heavy-handed tactics only solidify the resolve of PPP supporters
to get out and vote. (Note: A Chiang Mai-based "Bangkok Post"
reporter known to have good military contacts told us the police
and military are cracking down on vote-buying in Chiang Rai,
which they fear is a transit point for cash flowing into PPP
coffers from Laos and Burma. Police have been able to obtain
court orders to search the homes of some PPP canvassers based on
allegations of drug dealing - post cannot confirm whether these
are trumped up or not. Also, soldiers are making their presence
known in some villages and have taken photos of canvassers'
houses. Other sources have told us that Chiang Rai is a target
of RTG and RTA concern because of the firm political grip held
there by powerful Thaksin confidant Yongyuth. End Note).

-- PPP is concerned about military activities in Chiang Rai's
3rd electoral district, which includes many hill tribe villages
along the Burma border. PPP claims soldiers there have
threatened to revoke or deny citizenship to hill tribesmen who
vote for PPP.

-- Some military personnel (the "professional" ones),try to
stay neutral and are apologetic when ordered to observe election
events. Other soldiers, who actively backed the 2006 coup, are
problematic.

-- PPP candidates need to scrupulously follow election campaign
rules because the ECT is looking solely for PPP wrongdoing and
ignoring the actions of rival parties.

-- PPP's biggest rival in Chiang Rai is the Chart Thai party,
whose lead candidate owns a casino that he is using to buy votes
by handing out free gambling chips.

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The Survey Says:
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12. (C) PPP strategists, as well as some rival candidates,

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expect PPP to win at least as many northern seats as Thaksin's
party did in 2001, though fewer than in 2005. Of the 77
constituency seats up for grabs in the northern region's 17
provinces, TRT captured 71 in 2005 and 55 in 2001. PPP Deputy
Spokesman Samart projects his party to win "60 plus" this time
(the same figure he gave us over a month ago). Motherland
candidate Kingkarn Na Chiengmai, a two-time parliamentarian
prior to 2001, agreed, telling us PPP was on track to win 60 to
65 northern seats, compared to five or six at most for her own
party.


13. (SBU) Some recent analyses, however, forecast lower totals
for PPP in the north. A "Daily News" survey among its reporters
nationwide during November 25-28 projected just 37 seats for PPP
in the north. And "The Nation" newspaper's latest weekly
analysis by its journalists, published December 3, forecasts 35
northern seats for PPP. (Comment: as Ref C notes, all poll
statistics in Thailand should be considered with skepticism).

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Comment
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14. (C) Taking on PPP in its northern stronghold is a
challenging task under any circumstances. While we believe
rival parties are getting favorable treatment from military and
election authorities, most other factors conspire against the
PPP's competitors: namely, loyalty to favorite son Thaksin,
widespread support for TRT government policies, strong voter
identification with the PPP and its candidates, declining
consumer confidence, and a sense that the military coup plotters
and their sympathizers should be punished (at the ballot box)
for ousting a leader with whom most northern voters closely
identified as someone who "gave back" to his supporters.
Meanwhile, we continue to emphasize in our meetings with
regional authorities and the public our belief that the
elections should be free and fair, with participants able to
compete on a level playing field.
MORROW