FRAUD SUMMARY - CASABLANCA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000073

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP - SEXTON, CA/VO/F/P, NEA/MAG, PRM
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC FOR FPM JSCHOOLS
DAMASCUS FOR RCO HICKEY
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC MO
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - CASABLANCA

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1. SUMMARY: All consular operations for Morocco are located at
Casablanca, which is a medium-fraud post where the impact is greater
on Immigrant Visas (IV) than on Nonimmigrant Visas (NIV). Post's
FPU consists of a (part-time vice consul FPM and one FSN Fraud
Investigator (FSN/FI). The majority of visa applicants are
Moroccan--some dual nationals with European or Canadian passports.
Post also sees a small number of third-country nationals from
francophone West Africa and several Arabic speaking countries.

DV fraud consists of occasional fraudulent educational documents or
fraudulent claims to perform qualified jobs. Fraudulent
relationships are seen in both DV and IV cases, making up the
majority of fraud that post sees. Post has also seen an increase in
IV workload and fraud, many in cases involving internet
relationships. Post has not discovered serious fraud trends among
NIV applications--other than bogus work, bank, or salary statements
which are easily detected on the line due to their poor quality.
END SUMMARY.


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Morocco has long porous borders and an
extensive coastline. Demographic and economic conditions continue
to provide fertile ground fraud as the young unemployed seek better
opportunities in the industrialized West. Approximately thirty
percent of all college undergraduates are unemployed or
underemployed. In addition, Morocco's geographic proximity to
Western Europe has historically made it a convenient embarkation
point for smugglers and narcotics traffickers. The Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla, along the Mediterranean coast and the relative
proximity of the Spanish Canary Islands further exacerbates the
allure for illegal immigrants, making Europe an easier and less
expensive target for illegal migration than the United States.

With Moroccan nationals having been convicted of organizing
terrorist activities and attacks in Morocco and in third countries,
Morocco is a "country of concern" under the Department of Homeland
Security's Visa Security Program.

The relationship between post and the Interior Ministry and Police
infrastructure is positive. FPU works closely with state-owned
Royal Air Maroc (RAM) and Moroccan immigration authorities when the
authenticity of a U.S. travel document is in question. RAM
officials and immigration officials at Casablanca's Mohammed V
airport have been particularly vigilant and effective in detecting
visa fraud and contacting post. These cases mostly involve West
African nationals attempting to transit to the U.S.

The fraud level is low in obtaining Moroccan passports, birth
certificates and national identification cards from official
sources. The Moroccan authorities take identification fraud very
seriously. Any official corruption related to providing false
identification is prosecuted aggressively, with punishments for
falsifying a Moroccan national identification card ranging to a
maximum 5 years imprisonment. This also holds true for educational
documents from official government sources as noted in the DV fraud
section below.

The passport and registry offices process passport applications
carefully but slowly. This process takes at least 6 months for the
Moroccan police and passport authorities to investigate each case.
Due to this delay, bribery of local officials to place one's
passport application in the front of the queue for commune review, a
police investigation, or printing is a very common form of
corruption. To our knowledge, however, bribery related to altering
identities in a passport is rare due to the severe legal
ramifications.


B. NIV FRAUD: NIV fraud generally involves false work documents,
fake or inflated bank account information and disinformation about
pertinent 214(b) details. Normally these situations are handled at
the window, although the FSN/FI will occasionally use online checks
with tax authorities or call an employer to verify the applicant's
claims. Fraudulent documents often contain grammatical and
typographical errors and lack the required tax authority number.
Even stationery from legitimate businesses tends to look
unprofessional, so post often looks more closely at bank statements,
which are more difficult to falsify.


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The major Moroccan-American communities in the U.S. are in the
Washington D.C., Boston, Orlando, and New York areas, with growing
communities in the Denver, Los Angeles and Houston areas.
Applicants for those destinations who claim no acquaintances in the
U.S. are likely to be concealing friends and family members who may
have overstayed visas.

In addition, post processes a number of Q-1 visas for young
Moroccans to work for a year at the Marrakech restaurant in the
Epcot Center at Disney World in Florida. Return rates traditionally
had been very poor. In recent years, however, post has worked
closely with the local American representative from the Walt Disney
Corporation to implement new standards for potential applicants.
These include requiring enrollment in one of Morocco's many tourism
schools, internship experience in the hospitality industry, an
intermediate ability to speak English, and a preference for
applicants without relatives in the U.S.


C. IV FRAUD: Post has seen a continued increase in the number of
sham marriages in Fiance(e)(K) and Spouse (IR-1 or CR-1)
cases-often, but not always, relationships that have begun via the
Internet. Usually these involve older American women and young
unemployed Moroccan men with relatives in the U.S. The American
woman petitioner is generally 8-20 years older than the beneficiary,
does not speak French or Arabic, has little or no travel outside the
U.S., and met the beneficiary--who speaks little or no
English--online or via his relative in the U.S. Often the only time
the two have actually met is when the petitioner traveled to Morocco
for an engagement ceremony and/or marriage. Rarely do they return
to Morocco after a short visit to "get married."

In such cases, fraud is easiest to identify where the applicant
cannot conduct the interview in English, cannot provide basic
personal information about the petitioner such as the place of work
or residence, and cannot produce evidence of the petitioner's trip
to Morocco or their ongoing communication. Another indicator of
possible fraud is the nature of the engagement and/or wedding
ceremony photos submitted. Even in poorer Moroccan communities, if
genuine, both occasions are marked by large multifaceted ceremonies
involving dozens of family members and friends, with several meals
served and elaborate decorations and clothing. A hastily-taken
picture of a few relatives and the betrothed couple sitting in a
living room or restaurant frequently alert the interviewing officer
that the relationship requires further investigation.


D. DV FRAUD: Post has seen a dramatic decline in DV fraud as far as
qualifications are concerned. The main area for fraud in DVs is now
in questionable relationship for recently added DV-2s.


E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: Post has not identified any cases of ACS
or Passport Fraud during the past year. Post has seen a few cases
where the parents claim not to be married, but have a child with a
birth certificate naming both parents. Such documents are not
issued unless the couple is married. These few cases do not affect
transmission of citizenship, but may reflect attempts to conceal a
Moroccan wife when the now-Amcit husband was involved in a sham
marriage to an Amcit to obtain citizenship.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD: Post has not had any adoption cases in the past
year and has no associated fraud to report.


G. ASLYUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post encountered one
incident towards the end of the year of asylee fraud. A Moroccan
who had falsely obtained asylee status seven years ago under the
claim that he was a Kurdish-Iraqi was detained at the Casablanca
airport upon arrival.


H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The FPU and RSO
have extensive contacts and a generally positive relationship with
several Ministries in the Government of Morocco. The FPU
coordinates the verification of Moroccan and American travel
documents with the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible
for all urban police services, immigration and customs. This
includes verifying suspect LPR credentials and/or visas presented by
West African nationals transiting Morocco to the U.S. via RAM's
direct flight to New York. In addition, immigration authorities at
Morocco's airports will verify if and when a traveler entered or

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left Morocco.

The FPU also verifies Moroccan birth certificates forwarded by
post's visa units and other USG agencies such as DHS Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents investigating immigration
violations with the Ministry of the Interior. The same office is
also helps our ACS unit following up welfare/whereabouts and other
inquiries. Finally, the FPU verifies police certificates and
possible wanted persons in Morocco with the National Security
Directorate, the bureau of the Ministry of the Interior responsible
for all police operations in Morocco's cities.

As noted above, the FPU also works closely with the Ministry of
Justice to verify Moroccan marriage and divorce certificates at the
request of the visa units. This entails calling the court at which
the certificate was issued and requesting their verification. In
most cases, the court will issue a formal letter or an official note
through the Ministry of Justice verifying the result. This has been
particularly useful in combating sham DV and IV marriages.

The FPU continues to maintain a long-standing relationship with
government-owned RAM airline. In many circumstances, it is actually
a RAM representative that identifies a passenger bearing a
fraudulent US or Moroccan travel document and notifies the
immigration or police authorities at the airport.

After the May 16, 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Moroccan Parliament
passed a new terrorism law that significantly increased the
penalties for forgeries and the fraudulent production of government
and private documents. The punishments are most serious for
government documents, such as passports, national identification
cards, and police and educational certificates, with the penalties
ranging from a minimum six month jail term to 5 years for serious
offenses. For private documents, punishments range from 6 months to
two years, depending on the harm done with the fraudulent documents.
These crimes and visa fraud are prosecuted by the Moroccan
authorities, as all individuals referred to the police by the FPU
were sentenced to at least a six-month prison term.


I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: The number of suspect and actual
sham relationships continues to rise on the IV line. These include
inter-family relationships, such as marriage to a first cousin and
Internet relationships. While first-cousin marriages are culturally
accepted in Morocco, it is rare that the beneficiary can provide
evidence of a non-familial relationship with the petitioner. The
workload volume on IV relationship cases has increased since 2005
with IR-1 numbers up 48%, CR-1 numbers up 3.4%, and K-1 numbers up
44%.

K-3 numbers have declined; however post attributes this decline to
processing issues--CR/IR-1s were arriving at post before K-3s in
several instances-and other forms of fraud. Additionally, anecdotal
evidence from current IV applicants and American Citizen petitioners
at post indicates that numerous previous K-1 recipients were
actually already married to the petitioner, but using the K-1 to get
to the U.S. quicker. Thus, post began this year to require official
confirmation of the beneficiary's singlehood-a certificate issued by
Moroccan authorities.


J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The FPU consists of a single FSN Fraud
Investigator (FI) and an FPM vice consul who also serves as the ACS
Chief. In addition to general NIV and ACS training, the FI has
attended regional fraud prevention courses at Nicosia in 1996, Rome
in 1999, and FSI in 2007. Morocco remains in the top ten countries
worldwide for Diversity Visa entrants. As a result, demand for the
FSN/FI's knowledgeable, fraud-related interpretation assistance on
the visa line is increasingly occupying his time. In addition, due
to his experience, he backs up most FSN positions in the section.
GREENE