THE ANTI-BUSH "SHADOW TOUR": CHAVEZ ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000584

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SUBJECT: THE ANTI-BUSH "SHADOW TOUR": CHAVEZ ON THE
DEFENSIVE

REF: A. CARACAS 000044


B. BUENOS AIRES 000465

C. LA PAZ 000679

D. PORT AU PRINCE 000492

E. CARACAS 000574

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1. 4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Chavez visited Argentina, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, Haiti, and Jamaica March 8-13 in an obvious, but
in our view unsuccessful, effort to upstage the President's
March 8-14 visit to Latin America (Refs B-D). Upon his
return to Venezuela, an unusually defensive Chavez appeared
on a special television broadcast to boast that he delivered
a "knock-out" against the President and to complain about the
scant, and often critical, coverage the international media
gave to Chavez' "shadow tour." While Chavez is not losing
support among his fervent supporters with his regional
pretensions, the opposition appears to be finding a receptive
audience by questioning the value of Chavez' foreign aid
initiatives. Chavez had predicted that huge demonstrations
would "repudiate" the President's visit to Latin America, but
no such extraordinary protests materialized, not even in
Venezuela. While Chavez did not appear to do significant
damage to himself at home or abroad, he does appear to have
diluted his own media and political appeal by virtue of his
own mistakes during his latest foreign adventure. End
Summary.

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The Chavez "Shadow Tour"
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2. (SBU) President Chavez returned to Caracas March 13 after
shadowing President Bush's March 8-14 visit and declared that
he had delivered a "knock-out" against the President. Chavez
visited Argentina March 8-10, Bolivia March 10-11, Nicaragua
March 11-12, Haiti on March 12 and Jamaica on March 13. With
the exception of his trip to Argentina, which he mentioned
several days in advance, Chavez announced each leg of his
trip only days before arriving, and most appeared fairly
haphazardly organized. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan
president continues to insist publicly that the fact that he
was in the Southern Cone, the Andean region, and Central
America at the same time the President visited Uruguay,
Colombia, and Guatemala was "pure coincidence." While
extended foreign tours are nothing new for Chavez, his
defensiveness regarding his latest Latin American tour is.

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"I Was Working"
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3. (SBU) Chavez defended his trip during a special March 13
television broadcast of "Alo, Presidente" (his daily
broadcast is usually only televised on Thursdays). He
insisted that his March 8-13 visits in the hemisphere were
part of his ongoing efforts to promote regional integration
and that the President's trip to the region was the real
"shadow tour". In an apparent effort to counter criticism of
the cost of his foreign travels, Chavez told his viewers that
he was working "for the best interests of the country" and
not engaged in tourism or "wasting time." He asserted that
while the President was met by protests (including ones the
BRV helped orchestrate),he was warmly received on his stops.


4. (SBU) During the same broadcast, Chavez dwelled on what he
asserted was USG manipulation of international news channels
(sic) to give his own Latin American tour scant coverage,
especially the second half of his tour to Nicaragua, Haiti,
and Jamaica. He accused "right wing" media of
mischaracterizing him as a "showman" and blasted CNN and
other news stations for saying the President is more popular
in Latin America than Chavez. He deconstructed critical
op-eds by former Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castaneda and
Andres Oppenheimer line by line. In contrast, the BRV
required local television stations to cover Chavez' March 9
speech to an anti-Bush rally in Buenos Aires live for the
entire two hours he spoke and pro-government media outlets
gave Chavez' tour prominent, daily coverage.


5. (SBU) Chavez also made his recent Latin American tour the
focus of his March 14 "Alo, Presidente" radio broadcast,
indulging in a lengthy diatribe against the governing "elite"
and "mafia" of the United States. He complained that the

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President declined to mention him by name during recent press
conferences and insisted that U.S. efforts to "contain" him
were the central theme of the President's Latin American
visit (sic). The Venezuelan president noted with
satisfaction that Barbara Walters had interviewed him earlier
in the day and said he told her that his dispute with the
President is not "personal," but based on political
differences.

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The Chavez Show Underwhelms
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6. (SBU) Local perceptions of Chavez' trip are largely a
reflection of peoples' attitudes toward his government:
Chavez supporters parrot the Venezuelan president's
pronouncement that the trip was a success while members of
the opposition view the trip, as one professor puts it, to
have been the latest example of Chavez' "messianic
overreach." The trip has given the opposition ammunition to
point out that Chavez:

-- did not have as much "face time" with other Latin American
presidents (Kirchner's non-attendance at the March 9
anti-Bush rally is much commented upon);

-- appeared to be chasing the President around the
hemisphere, letting the President, in effect, set Chavez'
agenda;

-- did not attract the crowds that Chavez had drawn in
previous tours or generate "rock star" fervor.

In addition, the local media gave prominent coverage to
Chavez' condemnation of ethanol as an alternative energy
source, as well as Chavez' promise to "talk to Lula" about
this issue. Chavez' ongoing attacks on ethanol as taking
away food from people to feed luxury cars is becoming a very
public difference between the BRV and the Brazilian
government (Embassy will address the BRV's rather confused
views on ethanol septel).


7. (C) Venezuela's opposition is also capitalizing on the
many aid promises Chavez made during his tour (Ref E),
contrasting the large sums Chavez has pledged with the
pressing, unaddressed social needs at home. The local media
reported in detail on the accumulating commitments Chavez is
making to other Latin American countries. On the road,
Chavez continues to try to build a case that the BRV is a
more generous aid donor in the region than the USG. In
Venezuela, Chavez tends to describe such programs only in
broad terms, highlighting the BRV's commitment to regional
integration, social solidarity, and the BRV's opposition to
existing international financial institutions and the USG.
Primero Justicia and other opposition leaders commented to
the media that it is "absurd" for the BRV to criticize the
country with which it has its most important economic
relationship.

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Size Matters
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8. (SBU) Prior to departing on his trip, Chavez had predicted
that the President would be met with large demonstrations of
"repudiation." He continues to insist that large crowds
rejected the President's visit, but the Venezuelans we have
spoken to are, by and large, unimpressed by the anti-Bush
rallies in the region, including the ones attended by Chavez.
Moreover, while Chavez was on the road, anti-Bush
demonstrations and a downtown Caracas rally in Venezuela
fizzled. The March 11 "Bush Out of Latin America" march on
the Embassy attracted the participation of only around 50
people (fewer than the local police on hand). A follow-up
March 12 effort attracted only four lonely Chavistas.

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Comment
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9. (C) By dint of his deep pockets (and willingness to make
ever more promises),Chavez strengthened ties somewhat with
Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Jamaica (Refs B-E).
He also continued to posture himself as a regional (albeit
self-appointed) leader. But by the high standards he set for
himself before departing for Argentina (Ref A),Chavez'

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latest Latin American tour, compared to previous trips, was a
relative flop. While Chavez managed to persuade other Latin
American countries to give him an international platform to
rail against the President's March 8-14 visit to the region,
he did not succeed in stealing international media attention
away from the President, and he had difficulty attracting the
crowds that he would have hoped for.

10 (C) Moreover, the media attention Chavez did generate
focused renewed scrutiny of his authoritarian showmanship.
Chavez noted publicly that former Vice President Jose Vicente
Rangel wrote him to urge him to task the BRV's embassies to
go on a diplomatic (read propaganda) offensive. Chavez had
also predicted that anti-Bush demonstrations would resemble
the violent protests that then Vice-President Nixon faced
during his 1958 visit to Venezuela, but no such ugly
incidents materialized, not even in Venezuela. While we
expect Chavez will continue to be able to buy friends and
influence partners, his own outsized ego, excessive ambition,
and poor delivery on promises are likely to continue to
hinder his efforts to lead an anti-American coalition.

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