Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS446
2007-03-02 19:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
HOW, WHY VENEZUELA'S 2007 ENABLING LAW DIFFERS
how-toVZCZCXRO3922 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHCV #0446/01 0611911 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021911Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7982 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0776 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000446
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: HOW, WHY VENEZUELA'S 2007 ENABLING LAW DIFFERS
FROM THE PAST
REF: A. CARACAS 00219
B. CARACAS 404
C. CARACAS 411
D. 00 CARACAS 3043
E. 05 CARACAS 1355
CARACAS 00000446 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
-------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000446
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: HOW, WHY VENEZUELA'S 2007 ENABLING LAW DIFFERS
FROM THE PAST
REF: A. CARACAS 00219
B. CARACAS 404
C. CARACAS 411
D. 00 CARACAS 3043
E. 05 CARACAS 1355
CARACAS 00000446 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The BRV frequently tries to argue that the Enabling
Law (Ley Habilitante) passed January 31 giving Chavez broad
power to legislate by decree for the next 18 months is no
different from past decree laws. A review of previous
Enabling Laws, however, shows that the current law is much
broader, less precise, and lasts longer than any of the
previous eight enabling laws, including the two passed during
Chavez' first term. Post outlines key differences between
the 2007 law, its predecessors, and regional practice to
refute BRV myths about Chavez' current decree authority for
countries that may be sympathetic to BRV arguments. End
Summary.
--------------
Decree Laws: Separating Fact From Fiction
--------------
2. (U) The National Assembly (NA) approved January 31 an
omnibus Enabling Law (Ley Habilitante) granting President
Chavez broad authority to issue decree laws in 11 different
areas for 18 months (Ref A). The scope of the Enabling Law
seems virtually unlimited, and has provoked criticism from
the opposition and regional organizations, such as the Andean
Commission of Jurists, for violating the democratic principle
of separation of power. The decrees will not be subject to
any further NA action or review, and will require only to be
published in the national gazette to become law. Chavez has
decreed four new decree-laws so far. The first, which does
not appear to be within the scope of his power, created the
Order of February 4 award (commemorating his failed 1992
coup) to honor those who have worked to instill "justice and
a love of peace in society." Two others increased state
intervention in the economy (Refs B and C).
3. (U) The BRV has defended the wide-ranging decree powers
conferred on the President by citing past precedents in
Venezuelan history. However, this argument ignores the fact
that Chavez controls 100 percent of the National Assembly and
all other government institutions, something no other
Venezuelan President has had before. Two Presidents did
however have a majority in the legislature when they received
the special powers. A comparison of the 2007 Enabling Law
with previous enabling laws shows the former is much broader
and less detailed than the latter ones, including both of
Chavez' previous authorizations. Chavez himself has called
it, "the mother of all (enabling) laws." Post outlines key
differences below to refute prevalent BRV myths about Chavez'
decree power.
--------------
National and Regional Precedents
--------------
4. (SBU) BRV Myth #1: Decree powers are nothing new in
Venezuelan history.
Reality: Decree authority was granted to six presidents
before Chavez -- Romulo Betancourt (1960),Carlos Andres
Perez (1974),Jaime Lusinchi (1984),Luis Herera (1979),
Ramon Velazquez (1993),and Rafael Caldera (1994) -- but only
in time of economic emergencies, usually following a major
fall in oil prices. In fact, article 190 of the 1961
Constitution specifically limited the president's decree
authority to economic and financial matters during fiscal
crises. In 1984, for example, Lusinchi implemented an
IMF-approved structural adjustment program. During a 1993
crisis, Velazquez implemented badly-needed economic reforms
and laws that had languished in the then-Congress for more
than a year. In 1999, Chavez faced a USD 9 billion budget
deficit and what then-Congressman Omar Barboza (Accion
Democratica) called "the worst economic crisis in living
memory."
CARACAS 00000446 002.2 OF 003
5. (SBU) The 1999 Constitution overseen by Chavez removed
the restrictions on the scope of the decree powers, giving
the President wide discretion to issue decrees in any area he
desires, not just economic and financial matters (Article
236). At the time, several Latin American academics blasted
the change as giving the President too much power. In 2000
Chavez used these expanded powers to "revitalize" the economy
and to make an essential "adjustment to the constitution"
(Ref D). Chavez and several high level Chavistas have said
the 2007-2008 decree laws will be aimed at implementing a
much broader "socialist" agenda aimed at transforming
Venezuela economically and politically.
6. (SBU) BRV Myth #2: Decree authority is nothing new in
Latin America.
Reality: While we defer to other posts on the mechanics of
how decree authority is obtained, a brief review of various
constitutions in the region indicates the decree powers
authorized in the Venezuelan constitution substantially
exceed those permitted in much of the region. In some
countries, decree authority frequently appears to be limited
to emergency situations (Colombia, Argentina, Guatemala) and
restricted in scope (usually to economic and financial
measures as was the case in the 1961 Venezuelan constitution;
examples Peru, Ecuador, Honduras). In some cases, the decree
laws themselves appear to be of limited duration (Brazil) and
subject to legislative review (Mexico).
--------------
Duration
--------------
7. (SBU) BRV Myth #3: Chavez needs decree authority for 18
months to issue laws before and after constitutional changes
are made. This is a reasonable length of time.
Reality: Most decree powers were granted for three to six
months to quickly address emergency situations. The only two
exceptions have been Lusinchi (1984) and Chavez (2000),both
of whom were given decree authority for one year.
--------------
Scope
--------------
8. (SBU) BRV Myth #4: Enabling laws have always drawn
criticism and the opposition is only complaining because its
interests will not benefit from the new laws.
Reality: It is true that enabling laws have always engendered
debate because of concern about concentrating excessive power
within the executive by ceding legislative authority to him.
As a result, presidents tended to tread carefully when
requesting the power, explaining their exact reasons and the
results they hoped to accomplish. Likewise, Congress usually
detailed the areas in which the President could exercise
decree authority and the specific types of laws that the
president could pass. The 1993 and 2001 enabling acts
required the President to notify the legislature 10 days
before the decree laws were promulgated.
9. (SBU) The 2007 law is the least detailed bill ever,
listing vague descriptions of the measures the President can
take in each of 11 different areas, including one (energy)
which the President had not initially requested. Aside from
publicly declaring his intention to nationalize the
electricity, telecommunications, and petroleum sectors,
Chavez does not appear to have shared his plans with his
parliamentarians as indicated by the public bickering between
the NA and Cabinet ministers for control of certain laws like
the National Police Law. The President is also not required
to notify the NA before promulgating laws. The fact that
Chavez' first decree creating the Order of February 4 was not
covered by the enabling law, shows his disregard for the
minimal limits that were in place.
--------------
The Theoretical Veto
--------------
10. (SBU) BRV Myth #5: The Constitution allows the people to
overturn any decree laws via referendum.
CARACAS 00000446 003.2 OF 003
Reality: The BRV's control of the National Electoral Council
(CNE),the CNE's openly pro-Chavez bias during the 2004
recall referendum and subsequent elections, and the precedent
of the Tascon List, which the BRV used to fire pro-opposition
civil servants and deny opposition supporters government
benefits (Ref E),make it highly unlikely that voters would
attempt to call a referendum against any Chavez decree, or
that such an attempt would even be successful.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Post offers the points above for discussing the
Enabling Law with audiences that may be sympathetic to the
BRV's arguments. The 2007 Enabling Law grants Chavez the
widest-ranging, least-restrictive decree authority in
Venezuelan history and exceeds regional practice. By ceding
its legislative authority, the National Assembly has
permitted Chavez to concentrate even more power in the
executive branch and assisted the continued dismantling of
democratic institutions.
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: HOW, WHY VENEZUELA'S 2007 ENABLING LAW DIFFERS
FROM THE PAST
REF: A. CARACAS 00219
B. CARACAS 404
C. CARACAS 411
D. 00 CARACAS 3043
E. 05 CARACAS 1355
CARACAS 00000446 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The BRV frequently tries to argue that the Enabling
Law (Ley Habilitante) passed January 31 giving Chavez broad
power to legislate by decree for the next 18 months is no
different from past decree laws. A review of previous
Enabling Laws, however, shows that the current law is much
broader, less precise, and lasts longer than any of the
previous eight enabling laws, including the two passed during
Chavez' first term. Post outlines key differences between
the 2007 law, its predecessors, and regional practice to
refute BRV myths about Chavez' current decree authority for
countries that may be sympathetic to BRV arguments. End
Summary.
--------------
Decree Laws: Separating Fact From Fiction
--------------
2. (U) The National Assembly (NA) approved January 31 an
omnibus Enabling Law (Ley Habilitante) granting President
Chavez broad authority to issue decree laws in 11 different
areas for 18 months (Ref A). The scope of the Enabling Law
seems virtually unlimited, and has provoked criticism from
the opposition and regional organizations, such as the Andean
Commission of Jurists, for violating the democratic principle
of separation of power. The decrees will not be subject to
any further NA action or review, and will require only to be
published in the national gazette to become law. Chavez has
decreed four new decree-laws so far. The first, which does
not appear to be within the scope of his power, created the
Order of February 4 award (commemorating his failed 1992
coup) to honor those who have worked to instill "justice and
a love of peace in society." Two others increased state
intervention in the economy (Refs B and C).
3. (U) The BRV has defended the wide-ranging decree powers
conferred on the President by citing past precedents in
Venezuelan history. However, this argument ignores the fact
that Chavez controls 100 percent of the National Assembly and
all other government institutions, something no other
Venezuelan President has had before. Two Presidents did
however have a majority in the legislature when they received
the special powers. A comparison of the 2007 Enabling Law
with previous enabling laws shows the former is much broader
and less detailed than the latter ones, including both of
Chavez' previous authorizations. Chavez himself has called
it, "the mother of all (enabling) laws." Post outlines key
differences below to refute prevalent BRV myths about Chavez'
decree power.
--------------
National and Regional Precedents
--------------
4. (SBU) BRV Myth #1: Decree powers are nothing new in
Venezuelan history.
Reality: Decree authority was granted to six presidents
before Chavez -- Romulo Betancourt (1960),Carlos Andres
Perez (1974),Jaime Lusinchi (1984),Luis Herera (1979),
Ramon Velazquez (1993),and Rafael Caldera (1994) -- but only
in time of economic emergencies, usually following a major
fall in oil prices. In fact, article 190 of the 1961
Constitution specifically limited the president's decree
authority to economic and financial matters during fiscal
crises. In 1984, for example, Lusinchi implemented an
IMF-approved structural adjustment program. During a 1993
crisis, Velazquez implemented badly-needed economic reforms
and laws that had languished in the then-Congress for more
than a year. In 1999, Chavez faced a USD 9 billion budget
deficit and what then-Congressman Omar Barboza (Accion
Democratica) called "the worst economic crisis in living
memory."
CARACAS 00000446 002.2 OF 003
5. (SBU) The 1999 Constitution overseen by Chavez removed
the restrictions on the scope of the decree powers, giving
the President wide discretion to issue decrees in any area he
desires, not just economic and financial matters (Article
236). At the time, several Latin American academics blasted
the change as giving the President too much power. In 2000
Chavez used these expanded powers to "revitalize" the economy
and to make an essential "adjustment to the constitution"
(Ref D). Chavez and several high level Chavistas have said
the 2007-2008 decree laws will be aimed at implementing a
much broader "socialist" agenda aimed at transforming
Venezuela economically and politically.
6. (SBU) BRV Myth #2: Decree authority is nothing new in
Latin America.
Reality: While we defer to other posts on the mechanics of
how decree authority is obtained, a brief review of various
constitutions in the region indicates the decree powers
authorized in the Venezuelan constitution substantially
exceed those permitted in much of the region. In some
countries, decree authority frequently appears to be limited
to emergency situations (Colombia, Argentina, Guatemala) and
restricted in scope (usually to economic and financial
measures as was the case in the 1961 Venezuelan constitution;
examples Peru, Ecuador, Honduras). In some cases, the decree
laws themselves appear to be of limited duration (Brazil) and
subject to legislative review (Mexico).
--------------
Duration
--------------
7. (SBU) BRV Myth #3: Chavez needs decree authority for 18
months to issue laws before and after constitutional changes
are made. This is a reasonable length of time.
Reality: Most decree powers were granted for three to six
months to quickly address emergency situations. The only two
exceptions have been Lusinchi (1984) and Chavez (2000),both
of whom were given decree authority for one year.
--------------
Scope
--------------
8. (SBU) BRV Myth #4: Enabling laws have always drawn
criticism and the opposition is only complaining because its
interests will not benefit from the new laws.
Reality: It is true that enabling laws have always engendered
debate because of concern about concentrating excessive power
within the executive by ceding legislative authority to him.
As a result, presidents tended to tread carefully when
requesting the power, explaining their exact reasons and the
results they hoped to accomplish. Likewise, Congress usually
detailed the areas in which the President could exercise
decree authority and the specific types of laws that the
president could pass. The 1993 and 2001 enabling acts
required the President to notify the legislature 10 days
before the decree laws were promulgated.
9. (SBU) The 2007 law is the least detailed bill ever,
listing vague descriptions of the measures the President can
take in each of 11 different areas, including one (energy)
which the President had not initially requested. Aside from
publicly declaring his intention to nationalize the
electricity, telecommunications, and petroleum sectors,
Chavez does not appear to have shared his plans with his
parliamentarians as indicated by the public bickering between
the NA and Cabinet ministers for control of certain laws like
the National Police Law. The President is also not required
to notify the NA before promulgating laws. The fact that
Chavez' first decree creating the Order of February 4 was not
covered by the enabling law, shows his disregard for the
minimal limits that were in place.
--------------
The Theoretical Veto
--------------
10. (SBU) BRV Myth #5: The Constitution allows the people to
overturn any decree laws via referendum.
CARACAS 00000446 003.2 OF 003
Reality: The BRV's control of the National Electoral Council
(CNE),the CNE's openly pro-Chavez bias during the 2004
recall referendum and subsequent elections, and the precedent
of the Tascon List, which the BRV used to fire pro-opposition
civil servants and deny opposition supporters government
benefits (Ref E),make it highly unlikely that voters would
attempt to call a referendum against any Chavez decree, or
that such an attempt would even be successful.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Post offers the points above for discussing the
Enabling Law with audiences that may be sympathetic to the
BRV's arguments. The 2007 Enabling Law grants Chavez the
widest-ranging, least-restrictive decree authority in
Venezuelan history and exceeds regional practice. By ceding
its legislative authority, the National Assembly has
permitted Chavez to concentrate even more power in the
executive branch and assisted the continued dismantling of
democratic institutions.
BROWNFIELD