Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS423
2007-02-28 19:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

ACTION REQUEST: BRV QUERIES ON MILITARY

Tags:  MARR MASS PGOV PM PREL VE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCV #0423/01 0591925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281925Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7957
INFO RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000423 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PM PREL VE
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: BRV QUERIES ON MILITARY
ACQUISITIONS


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Downes,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000423

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PM PREL VE
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: BRV QUERIES ON MILITARY
ACQUISITIONS


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Downes,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) This is an Action Request; See Paragraph 3, and action
recommendation in Paragraph 5.


2. (C) BACKGROUND: In May 2006 the Department announced that
the BRV was not fully cooperating with the global war on
terrorism. As a result, the USG, though the Arms Export
Control Policy, "suspended" all Foreign Military Sales cases
to the Venezuelan Air Force (FAV),closed FAV's Military
Acquisition Office (VMAO) in Miami, and placed a moratorium
on all commercial training and contracts that required export
licenses under the Policy. At the time of the closing the
BRV had some items in the pipeline as well as material in the
warehouse. The Director of Logistics for FAV Major General
(MG) Jose Felix Caraballo Gomez faxed a January 27 request
for information to MILGROUP concerning the status of FAV's
purchases currently in the pipeline and regarding the removal
of items in the VMAO.


3. (U) Post requests Department guidance on responding to the
issues raised by the FAV in MG Gomez' fax. In particular, MG
Gomez raises the following matters:

--The status of repaired and returned parts that are
currently at repair facilities, including those in
calibration at the Air Force Metrology and Calibration
Program (AFMETCAL).

--The status of parts acquired and processed through VE-D-QCP
that are now in the Bond Room of Tech Space
Aero in Belgium.

--The status of parts ordered, processed through contracting,
acquired, or ready for delivery in BV, BA, BB,
BZ, BD status, among others. (Note: Post assumes Gomez is
referring to back-ordered parts. End Note)

--The status of parts acquired and/or repaired that are
currently in the VMAO awaiting export licenses.

--The status of discrepancy reports in process.

--The status of safety bulletins and technical orders.

--Will there be any cost associated with the cancellation,
storage, or other transactions related to cases
affected by the sanctions?

--FAV continues to require receipt of information from the
Security Assistance Management Information System
(SAMIS),AFSAC Online, and Country Manager due to the fact
that there remain active cases and requirements
in process.

--FAV is required to recuperate a percentage of the funds
credited to the holding accounts 1QD and 1QF that have extra
funds.

--MG Gomez requests a meeting between VAF, State, and DoD
interested parties to discuss the status of pending
transactions, holding accounts, and items in the VMAO.

--------------
Embassy-Proposed Course of Action
--------------


4. (C) MG Gomez' fax presents a challenge for us, but one
that we can deal with. To be sure, he's asking the right
questions, and by asking them now, he probably thinks he is
forcing us to act. In order to answer those questions, we
collectively (BRV and USG) need to know what is in the
warehouse and the pipeline. MG Gomez' note indicates that
the FAV will compile an inventory of all the items they
believe are included in these cases. Embassy suggests that
the Department respond to MG Gomez' letter (or authorize us
to do so),by asking him to expedite said detailed inventory,
to include all items in storage in the United States or
elsewhere and those items in the pipeline, through the
Venezuelan Embassy in Washington. Our guess is that the FAV
won't be able to do this. At that point, we can propose a
meeting among FAV working-level contacts (two of whom have
already applied for PCS visas to serve in the DAO at the BRV
Embassy in Washington, apparently to clean this up),along
with appropriate representatives from DOD and PM.

--------------
Ambassador's Recommendation
--------------


5. (C) We should conclude the VMAO drama as soon as possible.
It is a net loser for the USG. To Venezuela, the rest of
the world, and even inside the United States, retaining
material already purchased by the BRV and offering no
compensation will appear to be expropriation without
compensation. Chavez would have a field day with the issue
in light of our public comments on private sector
expropriations. Our own Embassy warehouse might eventually
be at risk. The longer this issue stretches out, the more
damage we do to ourselves. As best as we can tell from here,
there is no truly sensitive equipment in the VMAO, and little
that could be classified as "lethal." I hope the
policymakers will direct the lawyers to find an argument
permitting the immediate export of everything in this
warehouse that is not subject to absolute legal prohibition.

BROWNFIELD