Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS35
2007-01-05 21:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ PRESSING AHEAD WITH A SINGLE

Tags:  PGOV PREL VE 
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VZCZCXRO0989
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHCV #0035/01 0052131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 052131Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7429
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000035 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ PRESSING AHEAD WITH A SINGLE
"REVOLUTIONARY" PARTY

CARACAS 00000035 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ PRESSING AHEAD WITH A SINGLE
"REVOLUTIONARY" PARTY

CARACAS 00000035 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Chavez has announced that his
intention to form a single "revolutionary" party early in
2007 is firm, although he has not yet specified exactly when
or how he plans to form the United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV). Chavez and other leaders of the ruling
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) are suggesting that the party
will be built upon Chavez' nation-wide election campaign
structure and will inject more ideology and party discipline
up and down the ranks of Chavez' supporters. As a first step
toward this process, Chavez' MVR party dissolved on December
18, and numerous small pro-Chavez parties have already
followed its example. He will likely call a party congress
during the first three months of 2007. The three biggest
non-MVR pro-government parties have not yet fully committed
to joining the PSUV, but the Chavez government is reminding
them that they are dispensable. Chavez is likely to use the
PSUV as a vehicle for concentrating even more power in his
hands and for quashing intra-government dissent. End
Summary.

--------------
MVR Out; PSUV In
--------------


2. (U) President Hugo Chavez reiterated December 15 that he
will combine -- and replace -- his Fifth Republic Movement
party (MVR) and numerous other pro-Chavez parties to form a
new single socialist party early in 2007. Chavez made the
announcement during a televised speech at a ceremony
recognizing his national campaign team and local campaign
leaders. Reflecting on his December 3 electoral victory,
Chavez told his supporters that "I have seen some out there
saying that their party secured so many votes. Don't fall
for lies, those votes are for Chavez." Chavez added that
pro-government parties are "free" to remain independent, but
those that do will not be considered part of the government.
His subsequent statement have reconfirmed his commitment to
creating a single pro-government party this year.


3. (U) Chavez has provided few details about the new single

pro-government party. Even the name of the party is to be
determined. The pro-government daily "Vea" currently refers
to the proposed party as the United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV),but
BRV officials have also referred to it as the Single
Socialist Party and the Unitary Socialist Party. Chavez
promised his supporters that the party would be built from
the bases up, and not be the "sum of the same faces." He has
asked that the leaders of his nation-wide electoral machine
remain in place in their "battalions" and "squadrons" to
assist with building the new party.


4. (U) Communications Minister and National MVR Coordinator
Willian Lara announced the dissolution of the MVR Party on
December 18. Lara said that all the goods and properties
pertaining to MVR would be transferred to the new Socialist
Party of Venezuela, once the single "revolutionary" party is
legally constituted. Chavez is expected to call for a party
congress sometime in the first three months of 2007 to launch
the new party. He told his MVR supporters on December 15
that he wanted the new party to focus not just on elections,
but also on the "battle of ideas" and the "socialist project."

--------------
An Undefined Proposal
--------------


5. (C) Chavez has not specified exactly when or how he plans
to form the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). He
told the host of the pro-government "Contragolpe" talk show
January 3 that political parties need to be the "vehicle for
the construction of socialism, and not the obstacles that
they are today." Chavez also continues to repeat the need
for greater "internal democracy." There is growing
speculation that Chavez will call for some form of
"ratification of the bases" to try to give the PSUV
leadership popular legitimacy. Nevertheless, we expect
Chavez will hand-pick the principal leaders of the PSUV (in
the same manner that he dominated the MVR) and that any party
elections would rubber stamp his selections.


6. (U) In an "El Universal" interview published December 17,
MVR Director General Francisco Ameliach noted that the MVR

CARACAS 00000035 002.2 OF 003


was a successful nation-wide "electoral organization," but
suggested Chavez wants the new PSUV to be more.
Specifically, Ameliach said the new PSUV should provide
greater "ideological formation" and impose more party
discipline and internal controls. Ameliach, who headed
Chavez' re-election campaign, said he retains the
registration of some five million Chavez supporters that can
be used to "impart ideology" and for "social work."

--------------
The Bandwagon Effect
--------------


7. (SBU) In the wake of the dissolution of the MVR, a number
of minor parties that supported Chavez during the December 3
election on their own party ticket announced their imminent
dissolution and intention to join a United Socialist Party of
Venezuela. Lina Ron, the firebrand President of the Popular
Venezuelan Unity party (UPV),published a December 19 op-ed
endorsing the creation of a single "revolutionary" party,
noting "Who am I to put conditions on the second liberator of
my country?" The same day, she called a press conference and
announced the dissolution of UPV and her readiness to form a
"socialist, Bolivarian, nationalist, patriotic,
anti-imperialist, and humanist" party.


8. (SBU) Other minor pro-Chavez parties, such as the
Electoral Movement of the People (MEP) and the Revolutionary
Middle Class Party, quickly announced their intention to
follow suit. By the end of 2006, at least 11 of the 23
parties that supported Chavez and his MVR during the December
3 presidential election pledged to dissolve and join Chavez'
proposed single "revolutionary" party. None of these parties
passed the two percent electoral threshold in the
presidential election for automatic placement on subsequent
ballots and would have had to collect signatures to retain
their status as viable political parties.

--------------
The Hold-Outs
--------------


9. (SBU) Patria Para Todos (PPT),PODEMOS, and the Communist
Party (CPV),the most popular pro-Chavez parties outside of
the MVR, have all deferred decisions on whether to join a
single "revolutionary" party, citing the need to consult with
their party bases. PPT separated from the Radical Cause
(Causa R) party in 1997, and PODEMOS separated from the
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party in 2003. Both Causa R
and MAS are opposition parties that supported the 2006
presidential candidacy of Manuel Rosales. All three
pro-government parties managed to poll more than the two
percent threshold for maintaining political party status.
PODEMOS and PPT are reportedly planning party conferences to
discuss the idea later in January. The Communist Party
indicates it will convoke an special party conference in
early March to debate the same. MVR DG Ameliach told "El
Universal" that he had already spoken to leaders in all three
parties and that all agree on the need to "form a single
force." He added that their differences are confined to how
to implement such an idea.


10. (C) While stressing that all pro-Chavez parties are
"free" to accept or turn down Chavez' "invitation" to join a
new United Socialist Party of Venezuela, government pressure
on the hold-outs is starting to build. MVR National Assembly
deputy Carlos Escarra recently warned that pro-Chavez parties
better get on board soon, or they will "miss the train." UPV
President Lina Ron urged other pro-Chavez parties "to hurry
up because the door may shut on you." The pro-government
daily "Vea" has run numerous editorials in support of the
formation of the PSUV. A post-election "Vea" editorial
stressed that MVR won 70 percent of the Chavez vote, compared
to just six percent for PODEMOS, four percent for PPT, and
two percent for the PCV. A January 4 "Vea" editorial urges
leaders in those parties to show "political maturity" and put
themselves above "personal positions, sterile doctrines, and
small ambitions."

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) After winning the December 3 presidential election by
a wide margin, Chavez is in a solid position to impose what
is essentially an MVR hostile take-over of the smaller

CARACAS 00000035 003.2 OF 003


pro-government parties. We expect almost all such parties
will eventually opt to join a United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) in the hope of retaining some prospect of
influence -- and spoils -- within the BRV. The alternative
is to occupy what would be political purgatory between the
government and opposition. Ironically, Chavez may succeed in
eradicating the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV),something
Venezuelan military dictators never succeeded in doing. At
the same time, Chavez appears predisposed to adopt models of
party discipline and ideology that may well make former PCV
members feel quite at home in the soon-to-formed PSUV.


12. (C) While Chavez is not only taking on a political
project that he may not really need, it is also one that may
prove difficult to implement. The Venezuelan president has
far more experience as an institution-destroyer as a means to
enhance his control of power than he does as an
institution-builder. Politically, he has relied principally
on his charismatic, populist appeal and the tools and
resources of government, not the MVR party. Consequently,
the MVR party, while a solid electoral machine, is widely
perceived to lack both the structure and infrastructure that
characterize fully functioning parties, including smaller
pro-Chavez parties like the PPT and PCV. It may prove to be
an operational challenge to graft the MVR's election
apparatus with the existing and well-established
infrastructure of other pro-Chavez parties. The extent
Chavez is seriously interested in constituting a political
entity that could function in any meaningful way without him
also remains an open question.

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