NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CEDES POWER TO CHAVEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000264

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CEDES POWER TO CHAVEZ

REF: A. CARACAS 00219

B. CARACAS 00062

C. CARACAS 00035

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Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON
FOR 1.4 (B) and (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) On January 31, the Venezuelan National Assembly (AN)
passed the Omnibus Enabling Law, which gives unlimited power
to legislate to President Chavez for 18 months. With this
act, the 100-percent pro-Chavez National Assembly eagerly and
completely abdicated its responsibility as an independent
lawmaking body and as a check and balance in Venezuelan
democracy. AN Deputies Saul Ortega and Carlos Escarra met
with PolCouns and Poloff before the vote, and were defensive
about opposition accusations that they were ceding too much
legislative power to Chavez by approving the most extensive
decree powers in Venezuelan history. They argued the AN
would still review at least 40 laws this year, including the
International Cooperation Law, designed to control foreign
assistance to NGOs. Escarra, a member of the president's
constitutional reform committee, said the BRV also planned to
hold a constitutional referendum by mid-September. Ortega
said they would like to revive the Venezuela-U.S.
parliamentary friendship group and seek a meeting with
several members of Congress, notably Speaker Pelosi. End
Summary.

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Deputies Defend Decree Law
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2. (C) On January 31, the Venezuelan National Assembly
granted unprecedented legislative power to President Chavez.
Literally minutes before granting Chavez the most extensive
decree powers in Venezuela's history (Ref A),PolCouns and
Poloff met with National Assembly (AN) Deputies Saul Ortega
and Carlos Escarra, both Fifth Republic Movement (MVR)
deputies from Carabobo and Aragua States, respectively.
Neither deputy appeared concerned that Chavez' new power
would dismantle the democratic principle of checks and
balances and consolidate extreme power in the executive at
their expense. In fact, both were eager to refute opposition
claims that the legislature was ceding its powers to the
President via the Enabling Law (Ley Habilitante),the "first
motor of Chavez' "socialist" revolution.


3. (C) Escarra explained that the AN had five duties: to
legislate, to audit other branches of government, to
coordinate public policy, to hold popular consultations with
the people, and to serve as spokesperson for the people.
Only one--the legislative function--was now being "shared"
with the executive. (Note: AN contacts have routinely told
us, they see their role as supporting the President, not
questioning him.) Ortega added that the AN would still
approve at least 40 laws this year, in addition to Chavez' as
yet unspecified proposals for constitutional amendments.
Escarra defended the duration of the decree powers for 18
months as necessary so the President could decree laws before
and after the changes to the constitution were made. The
deputies opined that the National Police Law and other bills
concerning social and security issues would likely be among
the first decree-laws promulgated. Decree laws dealing with
the economy, including the hydrocarbons and gas sectors,
would likely come after the constitutional reform.

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Constitutional Reform Accelerated
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4. (C) Escarra, a constitutional lawyer by training and
member of the presidential constitutional reform commission,
also laid out an ambitious timeline for the constitutional
changes, Chavez' "second motor" of the "socialist"
revolution. He said the commission was working long hours in
order to deliver a draft proposal to Chavez by late February
or early March. Escarra predicted the President would take
one to two weeks to review their suggestions before
submitting a formal proposal to the AN by mid-March. The
Assembly would hold three readings of the draft proposal.
Between the readings they will hold consultations with the
public through the "parliament-in-the-street" program. All

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told, the readings and popular consultations could take three
to four months. A consultative referendum could then be held
in mid-September.


5. (C) Escarra described the forthcoming proposed amendments
as improvements to "polish up" the existing constitution. He
argued that the opposition's arguments that a constitutional
assembly was required to implement such changes were spurious
because the BRV was not re-writing the constitution,
significantly changing the document's structure, or
re-founding the country -- the three requirements for calling
such an assembly. Escarra said the opposition was trying to
insert itself into the process, but lost that opportunity by
boycotting the 2005 legislative election. However, Ortega
and Escarra said they would have a chance to participate
during the popular consultation phase. Ortega noted that the
opposition successfully used this mechanism to introduce
their proposals within the National Police Law.

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Other Motors of Socialism
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6. (C) Ortega predicted that separate referenda -- not
decree laws or amendments -- would probably be held for some
of the other "motors" of Chavez' "socialist" revolution. He
said the "new geometry of power" initiative through which
Chavez would reconfigure the country's territorial divisions
(Ref B) would likely be put to a popular vote (despite the
fact that the enabling law specifically grants Chavez
authority to issue decree-laws in this area). Ortega said
the idea was to group various (mainly rural) areas together
to create strategic centers for economic development. The
measure is supposedly aimed at trying to balance out
Venezuela's unequal distribution of population and could
possibly entail re-distributing resources and industries to
ensure more even economic and social development. Ortega
claimed there was great enthusiasm for this project when the
1999 constitution was written, particularly in the border
state of Apure. There was also considerable opposition at
the time, and the redistricting ideas were dropped.

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Focused on Mercosur, Some Calls to US Congressmen Possible
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7. (C) Ortega and Escarra, who are President and Vice
President, respectively, of the AN's Foreign Policy
Commission, said the committee would mainly focus on
Mercosur. Ortega added Venezuela's entry as a full member of
the trade bloc appeared to be moving along well, as they had
approval from the Argentine and Uruguayan legislatures, as
well as the lower house of the Paraguayan Congress. Ortega
also mentioned strong interest in passing the International
Cooperation Law, which seeks to control and restrict
international assistance to NGOs, but he said the BRV would
have to take international reaction into consideration.


8. (C) Ortega said the Venezuela-U.S. parliamentary
friendship group, of which he is also a member, will vote
soon on a new president to replace ex-deputy Rafael Isea, who
became Vice Finance Minister in January. According to
Ortega, the friendship group will seek a meeting with Speaker
Pelosi and members who belonged to the "Boston Group." They
may also seek a meeting for National Assembly President Cilia
Flores with the Speaker. Ortega asked about the status of
the bilateral counternarcotics agreement and also feigned
ignorance of our long-standing request to open a American
Presence Post in Maracaibo. Ortega also passed on complaints
he had received about Venezuelans' difficulties in obtaining
tourist visas and questioned the veracity of the 3,000 asylum
claims reported in the Miami Herald.

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One Party To Pick Up Speed Again
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9. (C) Ortega, who also sits on the MVR's National Tactical
Command, said the push to create a single revolutionary party
(Ref C) will probably resume again in February. He noted
that several smaller pro-government parties have already
agreed to dissolve and join the newly-created United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),while others with a
longer history, like the Communist Party, have been more
reluctant. (Note: Pro-government daily Diario Vea reported
January 31 that one hold-out, Patria Para Todos (PPT),the

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third largest coalition party, agreed to join the PSUV. PPT
was widely considered to be the pro-Chavez party least
interested in joining the PSUV.)


10. (C) Ortega said rank-and-file members of Chavez'
presidential campaign team are conducting a census of
potential PSUV members in preparation for the party's
registration with the CNE. They are hoping the party will
eventually comprise four to five million members, compared
with the MVR's roughly 1.5 million. Ortega said the party
will likely hold a constituent assembly this Spring to
develop the party's ideological framework, by-laws, and
organizational structure. Some members may be elected, while
others, such as AN deputies or heads of the defunct parties,
may be appointed by Chavez.

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Comment
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11. (C) The 100-percent pro-Chavez National Assembly on
January 31 eagerly and completely abdicated its
responsibility as an independent lawmaking body and as a
check and balance in Venezuelan democracy. Chavez and his
supporters have never embraced the concept of separation of
power, but with this action, even the pretense has been
stripped away. Now that the legislature has effectively
voted itself into powerless oblivion, the Chavez government
is leaking other equally undemocratic actions -- like giving
Chavez power to remove ("scratch out") non-performing elected
officials, and even including perhaps reducing the AN from
167 members to 50 by fiat from Hugo Chavez. While Ortega and
Escarra were uncharacteristically cordial and eager to show
how hard the legislature would be working, their arguments
are specious.


12. (C) Even taking into account that Chavez and his circle
can simply draft and promulgate decrees, without all the
messiness of committee work, multiple readings of bills, and
incorporating alternative views, the timeline for
implementing the constitutional changes is extremely
ambitions. The AN has already slipped in its timeline for
approving the decree law and the dates Escarra gave for
constitutional revision were earlier than those previously
announced. The BRV has never been known for its efficiency.
Chavez' aggressiveness on multiple fronts will likely lead to
more missed dealings, a more frustrated Chavez, and internal
tensions and competition within the Chavista camp.

BROWNFIELD