AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH TEODORO PETKOFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000231

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2027
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH TEODORO PETKOFF


CARACAS 00000231 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) In a lunch with the Ambassador January 30, long-time
leftist and opposition figure Teodoro Petkoff shared his view
of the post-election period. While he believed that Chavez
would be in power for some time, Petkoff thought the
Venezuelan President's aggressive political agenda was
planting the seeds for his eventual downfall. On the
opposition front, Petkoff heralded 2006 consensus
presidential candidate Manuel Rosales as the only opposition
leader with national name recognition and a plan to rebuild a
viable, long-term alternative to Chavez. He recommended the
USG make Rosales its prime interlocutor on opposition issues,
but cautioned against cooperating too closely on projects in
Zulia. End Summary.

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Chavez' Vulnerabilities
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2. (C) The Ambassador had lunch January 30 with Teodoro
Petkoff, editor of Tal Cual, old line leftist, virulent
anti-Chavista, and most recently, Manuel Rosales' confidante
and political manager of his presidential campaign as the
opposition consensus candidate in 2006. Petkoff opened with
his assessment of Chavez' strength. He said the President
had made some political and economic decisions in the past
month that would make him vulnerable over the long term. He
thought Chavez had decided to roll out his aggressive
political agenda in January (nationalizations, unified
Socialist party, Emergency Decree Law, constitutional reform)
because he realized he would never be in a stronger political
position than right now. But in so doing, he has angered his
non-Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) supporters, lost
international support, and frightened foreign and domestic
investors. Moreover, there is no one left in the BRV who
will tell Chavez anything he does not want to hear. On the
economic front, Petkoff said an international price of oil
around $50 puts great stress on PDVSA and the BRV, given the
number and dimension of the commitments made by Chavez since

2004. Despite these vulnerabilities, Petkoff did not predict
the imminent collapse of the Chavez government. On the
contrary, he thought the Chavez phenomenon would last for
years. But he thought Chavez had planted the seeds that
would eventually destroy his model.

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Rosales as Opposition Leader
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3. (C) Petkoff thought Rosales was the only truly national
opposition leader in Venezuela, as he enjoyed support and
name recognition throughout the country. He urged that the
USG treat him as such and make him its prime interlocutor on
opposition issues. Rosales had a long term plan for building
a viable, permanent opposition. The greatest gift that
Rosales gave to the opposition in the presidential election
was to bring them back from the "ruinous" abstention policy
of 2004 and 2005. Rosales made it clear to the world that
40% of the Venezuelan population opposed Chavez, and they had
to enjoy some political rights and voice. Petkoff revealed
that some in Rosales, campaign headquarters on election
night wanted to fight (again) the electoral fraud issue. He
said Rosales showed great judgment and courage in ignoring
them and recognizing Chavez, victory.

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Support for Zulia
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4. (C) Petkoff understood Rosales had given the green light
for USG cooperation with Zulia state government institutions.
He did not completely agree with that decision, and
counseled that we not provide so much and so visible
assistance as to put Rosales in a politically vulnerable
position. He and Rosales had been hammering Chavez in public
for intervening in Nicaraguan internal affairs by providing
subsidized oil to specific Sandanista-run municipalities for
political purposes. It would be a shame were we to open
Rosales to the same criticism for accepting direct assistance
from the USG, he said.


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Opposition Organization
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5. (C) Petkoff said the major opposition institutions --
Rosales, Primero Justicia, Accion Democratica, Christian
Democratic party (COPEI),himself and the anti-Chavez left --
were coordinating messages and strategy. For now, they all
acknowledged Rosales as primus inter pares. The Ambassador
asked if we should expect some sort of declaration of common
principles, as was done by the Venezuelan opposition at the
end of the military dictatorship in 1958. Petkoff said that
was not in the cards. He said the parties would agree on a
general strategy, issue common statements on specific issues,
and coordinate international travel and meetings. However,
he predicted that they would not link up into a single
organization, share financial resources, nor even necessarily
run unified candidates in future municipal and parliamentary
elections.

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Prosecution of Petkoff and Tal Cual Newspaper
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the state of play of BRV
prosecution of Petkoff and his paper, Tal Cual, for their
satirical letter to Chavez, minor daughter in 2005. He said
the process continued. In fact, the latest hearing had been
held the previous week. He did not think the prosecutors and
judge believed they had a case that would withstand
international scrutiny, so he predicted they would drag out
the process. Their hope was to bleed resources from Petkoff
and the newspaper, intimidate him from further attacks on
Chavez, and impose a chilling effect on the rest of the
media. Petkoff was confident that Tal Cual would keep
attacking, but thought the intimidation was working better
with other media representatives.


7. (C) Comment: Petkoff is Venezuela's most prominent
anti-Chavez leftist. He is generally an ally. He wants to
visit the U.S. to participate in some academic and public
affairs events. He is ineligible due to leftist guerrilla
activity in the 1960's and 1970's. We will need to make a
political decision to allow him a waiver to visit.
BROWNFIELD