Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS2284
2007-12-04 20:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

WHY CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM FAILED

Tags:  PGOV KDEM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002284 

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TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: WHY CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM FAILED

REF: CARACAS 2274

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002284

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TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: WHY CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM FAILED

REF: CARACAS 2274

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: Chavez's defeat in the December 2
constitutional referendum is a rejection of the aggressive,
radical agenda which he tried to impose this year. Chavez's
sweeping proposals kept many of his supporters from voting,
and lead many to vote against him. They also energized new
sources of opposition--notably university students, former
governing partner Podemos, and former Defense Minister
Baduel--sowing more doubt within his base. Chavez's
overreach galvanized the traditional opposition parties,
enabling them to field "No" bloc witnesses at most of the
polls to prevent electoral fraud. While the defeat will
almost certainly give the opposition a springboard for
rebuilding, slow Chavez's revolution," and may widen existing
cracks in his movement, the vote is probably a temporary
setback for Chavez. The enabling law allowing him to rule by
decree will permit him to implement much of his agenda. His
acceptance of the loss also boosts his democratic credentials
with the international community (septel). End summary.

--------------
Too Much, Too Fast, Too Hard
--------------


2. (C) Fresh from his overwhelming win in the 2006
presidential election, Chavez started 2007 by announcing an
ambitious agenda for deepening his Bolivarian Revolution that
included proposing constitutional reform, forming a single
pro-government United Socialist Party (PSUV),launching a
"Morality and Enlightenment" public education campaign,
expropriating strategic sectors (energy and
telecommunications),energizing community councils, and
designing a territorial re-districting plan ("New Geometry of
Power"). He quickly tried to implement this agenda--
bullying pro-Chavez parties and government employees into
joining the PSUV, ramming his reform package through the
National Assembly, and securing broad decree powers from the
legislature which he used to nationalize the oil fields and
telecommunications company CANTV. In addition, Chavez
ignored domestic and foreign entreaties when he shut down

independent free-to-air television station Radio Caracas
Television (RCTV),which he accused of fomenting the
short-lived 2002 coup. These actions created friction among
his own supporters and other groups, such as the university
students, and contributed to his defeat in the December 2
constitutional referendum.


3. (C) However, the Chavez electoral machine's failure to
turn out voters to the polls (reftel) was the primary factor
in the "Yes" camp's defeat. Despite Chavez's attempts to
frame the referendum as a plebiscite on his leadership, his
controversial proposals and his aggressive push to enact the
reform alienated many supporters. Polls consistently showed
voter's disagreement with the elimination of term limits and
restriction of private property. As a result, many Chavez
supporters decided to stay home or to vote against the
proposals. With their political influence and futures
threatened by Chavez's proposal to name regional vice
presidents, transfer resources to the community councils, and
eliminate presidential term limits, many of the governors and
mayors that Chavez relies on to activate his political
machine apparently did not mobilize Chavez's base. Likewise,
Chavez's radicalization and earlier efforts to force
supporters to join the PSUV alienated coalition partners,
such as Patria Para Todos (PPT),who provided only lukewarm
support.


4. (C) Chavez's international forays and conflicts may have
hurt him as well. Chavez spent several days of the last
month of the campaign abroad, just as the "No" bloc ramped up
its campaign. Chavez tried to regain momentum when he
returned from France, appearing on television almost every
night during the last week of the campaign to explain why the
changes were needed and to urge voters to the polls. He also
trotted out the well-worn accusations of Washington backing
the opposition and trying to undermine him, but that old
message did not elicit greater voter participation.
Additionally, some speculate that his spat with Colombian
President Uribe following the latter's termination of
Chavez's mediation with the FARC also may have caused a
significant number of naturalized Colombian supporters to
stay home in protest.

--------------

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Students
--------------


5. (C) While Chavez is largely responsible for his own
defeat, a number of factors on the opposition side also
contributed to the referendum results. University students,
for example, provided new energy, credibility, and manpower
to the "No" campaign. Their initial strategy of holding
their own anti-reform marches successfully circumvented
Chavez's attempts to paint them as "traditional opposition"
or U.S. stooges. Their formal switch to the "No" camp during
the final week provided the momentum the bloc needed, and may
have even helped convince abstentionist political parties,
such as Accion Democratica, to advocate participation. The
students' participation also enabled the opposition to supply
electoral witnesses for most polling sites, an important
factor in deterring potential fraud and allowing the "No"
bloc to independently track the referendum results.

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Podemos and Baduel
--------------


6. (C) Like the students, former BRV coalition partner
Podemos provided badly needed logistical support for the "No"
camp. Podemos is the second largest pro-Chavez political
party and it controls Aragua State, one of Venezuela's most
populous electoral districts. Their participation in the
"No" campaign--along with the students--enhanced the
opposition's ability to cover the polls and potentially swung
the vote in the "No" camp's favor. In addition, Podemos and
former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel's carefully
targeted criticism of the reform package, as opposed to the
traditional opposition's blanket Chavez bashing, sowed doubt
among Chavez supporters that may have persuaded some
ultimately not to vote. One unsubstantiated rumor also
posits that Baduel would have gone on the air to appeal to
the military had Chavez attempted to steal the vote or not
recognize the results, possibly influencing Chavez's decision
to accept the vote. (Comment: Though he still appears to be
highly regarded within the military, it is unclear whether
Baduel's intervention would have carried any weight.)

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Role of Civil Society
--------------


7. (C) Civil society groups, including human rights NGOs,
the Catholic Church, and business associations like
Fedecamaras, ran effective voter education programs and
get-out-the-vote campaigns that also raised voter doubts and
helped shore up opposition. The NGOs bombarded low income
voters with pamphlets, media advertisements, and open fora
based on focus group findings that many voters were not aware
of the changes, but usually opposed the changes once
informed. The Catholic Church's strong declarations against
the reform and the even stronger Chavista reaction it
engendered seems to have caught the attention of some poor
voters, Chavez's traditional base. (Note: Although most
Venezuelan are only nominally Catholic, the Church is still
held in high regard and it sponsors social programs in many
poor, pro-Chavez neighborhoods.) Finally, criticism from the
private sector, which had been reluctant to openly challenge
Chavez since 2004, may have encouraged many middle class
voters to participate, increasing the chances for opposition
turnout.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) The referendum results appear to represent a
rejection of Chavez's more radical project rather than a show
of support for the opposition or a rejection of Chavez
himself. In fact Chavez himself, during his concession
speech, provided the most likely reason for his defeat,
citing preliminary CNE results showing the opposition
received only slightly more votes than it received in the
2006 presidential election, while Chavez' vote total was
almost 3 million less. Chavez's defeat will almost certainly
breathe new life into the opposition as it prepares for the
2008 regional elections. While the defeat may promote some
defections within Chavismo, it is likely only a temporary
setback for Chavez. He still controls the National Assembly,
the courts, and a majority of states. He still also retains
broad decree authority for the next eight months, which he
can use to implement parts of his socialist agenda.

CARACAS 00002284 003.2 OF 003


Additionally, his quick acceptance of the defeat bolsters his
democratic credentials internationally and removes pressure
on regional leaders to tag him as the authoritarian leader he
is.


FRENCH