REFERENDUM ELECTORAL CONDITIONS A POTENTIALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002273

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SUBJECT: REFERENDUM ELECTORAL CONDITIONS A POTENTIALLY
LOOMING PROBLEM

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: While not a main focus of the referendum
campaign, widespread concern over electoral conditions
remains, and could become a central issue if the opposition,
which believes it has a chance to win, refuses to accept a
result which has the no vote losing by a sizable margin. The
National Electoral Council (CNE) has tried unsuccessfully to
present itself as a neutral arbiter, but has not yet
addressed many issues raised during the 2006 presidential
election, such as the quality of the voter rolls and uneven
media coverage of the "Yes" and "No" campaigns. The lack of
international observers to hear complaints and corroborate
the "Yes" and "No" camps' versions of events may make a
difference in either group's reaction to the results. In the
end, however, it appears the opposition has decided the CNE
has met a diminimus level of acceptability, hence their
decision to urge voters to the polls. End summary.

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Conditions Not a Priority, So Far
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2. (C) Though not a central theme in the referendum
campaign, widespread concern about election conditions still
persists. During the November 29 "No" campaign's final rally
when student leader Freddy Guevara asked the crowd whether
they trusted the National Electoral Council (CNE),he
received a resounding "No." Several recent electoral polls
also show a decline in support for the CNE compared to before
the December 2006 Presidential elections. Yet, neither the
government nor the opposition have publicly focused on
electoral conditions. The short electoral period, the CNE's
willingness to maintain concessions made during the December
2006 presidential elections, and concern about scaring away
potential voters (which would harm opposition victory
prospects) likely account for much of the opposition's
minimizing of electoral issues. Despite the short lead time
in the run up to the referendum, post's opposition contacts
say they are generally satisfied with the eight audits they
have participated in. During a November 30 meeting, Baruta
Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski told PolCouns and Poloff
that the opposition was less concerned with the conditions
the CNE agreed to, as with "conventional fraud," such as
ghost voting. He and most other opposition contacts say the
key is in ensuring that electoral witnesses are present at a
majority of the voting stations.


3. (C) The CNE has tried to assure voters that the electoral
system is secure and transparent, and that the CNE is a
neutral arbiter. At the beginning of the campaign, the CNE
published a list of concessions made in 2006 that would be
maintained this year as well as some "new" features,
including televised national debates, limited financing for
both campaigns, new audits, and a guarantee that Plan
Republica electoral security participants will not be at
electoral tables. Nevertheless, some of the "new" features
are not new, do not address concerns from last year, or were
not implemented. For example, the CNE highlighted an audit
of the indelible ink used to prevent people from voting
multiple times as a new feature. In 2006, the ink was
audited, but the opposition complained that the ink used on
election day was not the one audited and easily could be
wiped off. (Note: Some informal Embassy observers noted the
same.) Additionally, the CNE still did not address
opposition concerns about massive inaccuracies in the voter
rolls and did not allow greater access to voter data. The
CNE also did not host televised debates, claiming the "No"
camp refused to participate when it fact it was the BRV that
bowed out.


4. (C) Some CNE decisions have also shown a pro-government
bias as in years past. According to the CNE's own Political
Participation and Finance Commission, approximately 104 hours
of television and radio advertisements have advocated the
"Yes" vote compared to only 39 hours for the "No" vote. An
opposition group monitoring campaign media coverage told "El
Universal" November 27 that advertisements for the "No" vote
had virtually disappeared from government run and affiliated
media networks towards the end of November. While the CNE
has publicized punitive actions taken against both campaigns,
they have yet to address the media imbalance.

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Other Issues to Watch
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5. (C) There are other factors that differ from past
elections that, while not an issue pre-referendum, could
become an issue if the opposition does not recognize defeat:

--International Observers: This year will be the first
election since 2004 in which no independent international
observer teams will participate. Although both blocs were
allowed to invite up to 20 notable personalities, as it has
done in the past, the CNE is inviting between 100-120
individual international observers from approximately 39
countries, diluting the impact of any concerns issued by
opposition invitees.

--Poll Workers: The CNE decided to use the same poll workers
from last year, due to the short preparation time for the
referendum. Normally, these poll workers are supposed to be
chosen at random. It is unclear what percentage of those
workers are pro-opposition; the opposition is claiming a
disproportionate number are from pro-government groups. In
addition, the opposition is still struggling to get their
electoral witnesses accredited by the CNE.

--CANTV: CANTV's traditional role in transmitting the results
from polling stations is further complicated now that, since
the December 2006 election, the telecommunications company
has become government owned. While trying not to sound
alarmist or conspiratorial, Sumate leader Roberto Abdul told
Poloff November 30 that the president of CANTV is the sister
of the head of the CNE's technical department. He thought
that relationship could raise new doubts about transparency.

--Other tricks: Past issues that could also arise include
selective application of rules regarding the opening and
closing of polls, delays caused by the digital fingerprint
scanners in traditionally pro-opposition areas, early
transmission of data, and voters using multiple cedulas
(identity cards) to vote.

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Comment
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6. (C) While not a major focus for the opposition right now,
electoral conditions will likely become an issue
post-referendum, particularly if it is in fact a close
contest, or if the confident opposition refuses to accept a
result claiming a substantial pro-government victory margin.
The lack of international observers to hear complaints and
corroborate the "Yes" and "No" camps' versions of electoral
events may make a difference in either group's reaction to
the results. Suspicions over electoral transparency will
also likely contribute to a re-fracturing of the opposition
after the vote, as abstentionists might blame traditional
opposition leaders for once again legitimizing what they see
as a completely fraudulent electoral system. In the end,
however, it appears the opposition has determined the CNE has
met diminimus (if far from ideal) standards, thus justifying
its decision to urge its supporters to vote on Sunday.


DUDDY