THE REFERENDUM -- AND AFTER: WHAT TO WATCH

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SUBJECT: THE REFERENDUM -- AND AFTER: WHAT TO WATCH


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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. The December 2 constitutional referendum is
proving to be President Chavez's most difficult electoral
test since the 2004 recall referendum, but the Venezuelan
president and his supporters still enjoy significant
electoral advantages. Both the "Yes" and "No" camps are
battling to persuade potential supporters to actually go to
the polls, rather than abstain, but the government has
significantly more carrots and sticks at its disposal to
influence voters. An exuberant opposition is predicting
electoral victory and warning the National Electoral Council
(CNE) to run a fair election or face violent protests. No
matter what the referendum result is, Chavez will still be
president, and the opposition has yet to establish a common
long-term strategy to counter Chavez's authoritarianism. If
his reforms are adopted, we anticipate Chavez will move
quickly to accelerate his "socialist revolution." End
Summary.

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The Opposition
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2. (C) Will "No" Voters Vote? The "No" camp has succeeded in
persuading all the noteworthy abstentionist parties to openly
advocate voting "No" on December 2. Nevertheless, leaders
from mainstream opposition parties like A New Time (UNT) and
Justice First (PJ) told us early in the referendum campaign
that they were not sure they can persuade disheartened and
election weary rank-and-file members to turn out. Over the
last few weeks, opposition party leaders appear to have
succeeded in re-energizing the sizable body of potential "No"
voters. Local pollsters predict that if overall abstention
can be reduced to 30 percent or below, the "No" camp stands a
chance of winning. However, the opposition lacks the
government's logistical capacity, as well as carrots and
sticks, to deliver voters to the polls. The official
abstention rate was 25 percent in last year's presidential
election. It was 30 percent in the 2004 Chavez recall
referendum, but 55 percent in the referendum that approved
the 1999 Constitution.


3. (C) Can the "No" Camp Cover the Polls? One of the most
important deterrents to electoral fraud is fielding electoral
monitors at the over 11,000 polling stations in Venezuela.
The "No" camp started late in recruiting and training
electoral monitors. Opposition leaders tell us that in the
2006 presidential election, the opposition did not have a
sufficient number of volunteers to cover all the polls. In
addition, many opposition election monitors did not stay
until polls closed. This year, the "No" camp is counting on
the active support of university students and the Podemos and
Democratic Action (AD) parties to fill in gaps. "No"
campaign organizers express confidence they can cover almost
all polling stations, but we believe it will be a real
challenge for them to do so, particularly in Chavista
strongholds.


4. (C) Will the "No" Camp Accept Defeat? At the opposition's
closing Caracas rally November 29, Baruta Mayor Enrique
Capriles Radonski told the crowd that the "No" block would
accept any electoral result so long as the National Electoral
Council (CNE) runs a transparent election. At the same time,
he asserted that the "No" block is the majority, implying
that the opposition may not recognize a defeat. Just as in
the 2004 recall referendum and 2006 presidential election,
there is a widespread belief among the opposition that they
will win at the polls. Unlike the 2006 presidential election
in which consensus opposition candidate Manuel Rosales
conceded defeat, there is no natural "No" block spokesperson
who can do the same. Opposition activists tell us that
hard-liners may resort to violent protests if they believe
the government "has stolen" an electoral victory.


5. (C) Can the Opposition Sustain Its Momentum?: Over the
last few weeks, the opposition has demonstrated real signs of
political life, the first such signs since student protests
after RCTV's closure in late May and Zulia Governor Manuel
Rosales' campaign for president in late 2006. The student
movement has provided the opposition with fresh and credible
voices. The opposition has demonstrated its ability to
mobilize large crowds, particularly during the "No"
campaign's November 29 Caracas rally. The opposition finally
managed to unify behind a common vote "No" policy. However,
the opposition has a long history of coming together late

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before elections only to fall apart quickly after each
electoral defeat to Chavez. To date, the disparate and
divided opposition has not articulated a unified political
strategy beyond the December 2 referendum, win or lose.


6. (C) What Will the Students Do After?: Opposition
university students continue to enjoy substantial credibility
among Venezuelans across the socioeconomic spectrum. Their
influence stems in large part by the fact that they have
maintained a public distance between themselves and
traditional opposition parties (although many student
leaders, in fact, are opposition party youth activists). In
the final days of this campaign, the university movement has,
however, increasingly joined forces with opposition parties
in the "No" campaign. They shared the stage with opposition
leaders, for example, during the November 29 massive "No"
rally. This will likely erode their image as an essentially
spontaneous and unaligned political phenomenon.

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Chavistas
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7. (C) Will pro-Chavez voters vote "Yes"? Chavez has tried
to frame the referendum debate as a plebiscite on his
leadership and has continually warned his followers against
abstaining. The "No" camp and civil society NGOs, however,
have succeeded in raising legitimate questions in the minds
of some Chavez voters regarding the constitutional reform's
impact on democratic freedoms, the protection of private
property, and the concentration of power in the central
government at the expense of state and local governments.
Moreover, former Defense Minister Baduel, the pro-government
Podemos party, and even Chavez's ex-wife, are all openly
advocating voting "No." Local pollsters tell us, however,
that only a small percentage of traditional Chavez voters
intend to vote "No'" The opposition is hoping that many
pro-Chavez voters will stay home and indeed abstention may be
more palatable than a "No" vote for Chavistas who oppose the
reforms.


8. (C) Will Chavez's Electoral Machine Be As Effective As
Before? The Venezuelan government and campaign are virtually
one and the same, so the "Yes" camp consequently should enjoy
a huge advantage in terms of mobilizing voters on election
day. Moreover, close to one-third of the electorate depends
economically on the government either through employment or
income they receive for participating in the BRV's social
programs ("misiones"),a significant factor in a country
where there is widespread doubts about the secrecy of
electronic balloting. Chavez's United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) has experienced organization problems, but
it is still Venezuela's largest political party and maintains
real grass-roots bases that can field both election monitors
and deliver voters to the polls.


9. (C) Are Chavista Governors and Mayors Working Hard for
"Yes"?: Some pro-Chavez governors and mayors appear to be
paying only lip service to the "Yes" campaign without ramping
up the traditional pro-Chavez machine in their areas. The
fact that the reform provides for the elimination of term
limits for President Chavez, but no other elected office, may
account for less than active support, and in a few cases,
opposition (usually passive) from some pro-Chavez state and
local officials. Moreover, some state and local leaders
appear to be wary of a reform that takes power and resources
away from them and concentrates authority even more in the
hands of the executive branch. On the other hand, state and
local leaders can be expected to be evaluated by Chavez on
how well they deliver the "Yes" vote. Their future prospects
in government likely depend on energizing the pro-Chavez
bases in their areas, a powerful incentive to cooperate with
the "Yes" campaign.


10. (C) Can Chavez Contain Dissent Within Chavismo? As
Chavez radicalizes his "revolution" and assumes even more
power, he is likely to experience growing internal dissent
from some of his supporters. So far, however, he has been
able to marginalize and discredit his detractors in the eyes
of most of his supporters. Nevertheless, the list of
prominent Chavez dissidents is growing and now includes
former Defense Minister Baduel, the Podemos political party,
and even radical National Assembly deputy Luis Tascon, who
was expelled from the PSUV a few weeks ago. The elimination
of presidential term limits via constitutional reform also
stymies the ambitions of any potential successors to Chavez,
who openly talks about governing for at least the next two

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decades.


11. (C) How Fast Will Chavez Accelerate the Revolution?
After winning the presidential election in 2006, Chavez
reshuffled his cabinet, announced his decision to close the
only independent free-to-air broadcast network, moved to
expropriate the largest telecommunications company, the
electricity sector, and demanded government-majority stakes
in the mixed associations with international oil companies.
He also announced five "motors" of a "socialist revolution,"
including his intention to make sweeping constitutional
changes. He has moved forward in all of these areas. Chavez
has already declared his intention to pass 100 laws in the
wake of a referendum victory and to "accelerate the
revolution." Chavez supporters have openly voiced the need
to close Globovision, the most vocal opposition network on
cable TV. The National Assembly gave Chavez the authority to
issue decree-laws in 12 broadly defined areas until the
summer of 2008, so Chavez has wide powers to legislate
changes consistent with the sweeping, constitutional changes.
We expect he will move quickly to do so.

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Comment
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12. (C) The "No" vote campaign has at least temporarily
revived opposition to President Chavez's grand plan to
transform Venezuelan society. This may have induced a
certain nervousness in the Chavista ranks, but, if the "Yes"
vote wins, it will probably not do much to inhibit Chavez's
move to consolidate his Bolivarian revolution - especially if
opposition activism fades quickly following the referendum.
In the event of a surprising "No" victory, Chavez may opt to
employ his power to rule by decree to deepen aspects of the
revolution.

DUDDY