CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PLAYERS AND THEIR POSITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 002195

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2022
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SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PLAYERS AND THEIR POSITIONS

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. The December 2 constitutional referendum is
a highly polarized political battle between President Chavez
and his extensive base on one side and opposition parties,
university demonstrators, Catholic bishops, and important
sectors of civil society on the other. President Chavez's
continuing high approval ratings are his greatest asset as he
tries to frame the referendum as a plebiscite on his
leadership. His supporters can also tap enormous state
resources in support of the "Yes" campaign. Reform opponents
are still badly divided on tactics and a significant
percentage of potential "No" voters appear likely to abstain.
University demonstrators, as well as the opposition of
pro-Chavez party Podemos and former Defense Minister Baduel,
may have given referendum opponents more credibility within
Chavismo. The Catholic Church, pro-democracy NGOs, and
prominent civil society associations are also injecting some
new energy in the tired and splintered opposition parties.
Nevertheless, Chavez still enjoys considerable electoral
advantages over his late-arriving, diverse, and poorly
organized opponents. End Summary.

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The "Yes" Camp
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2. (C) Sixteen political parties formally registered with the
National Electoral Council (CNE) to advocate for approval of
Chavez's proposed sweeping constitutional changes to 69
articles of the 350-article 1999 Constitution. The groups
range from Socialist Battalions for The Constitutional Reform
to the Communist Party to Patria Para Todos. In reality, the
"Yes" camp is personally directed by President Chavez and his
inner circle, coordinated by a committee of close supporters
and senior officials, and bolstered by government personnel
and resources. The "Yes" camp is working for a decisive
electoral victory. Local conventional wisdom assumes that
Chavez will postpone the referendum if he believes he could
potentially lose the vote, as was the case in the recall
referendum.

Chavez: With Me or Agin' Me
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3. (C) Chavez is the protagonist of the December 2
constitutional referendum. He is the person most responsible
for the proposed, sweeping changes to 69 articles of the
350-article 1999 Constitution. His continued popularity,
with job approval ratings still hovering above 60%, is the
"Yes" camp's greatest electoral asset in the run-up to the
referendum. An experienced and effective campaigner, Chavez
is already framing the referendum as a vote for or against
his leadership, instead of on the substance of his
constitutional package. Tellingly, nobody from the "Yes"
camp attended the CNE's meeting to organize three televised
debates on the actual reform proposal, so the CNE scrubbed
the debates. Chavez kicked off the "Yes" campaign with a
mass rally November 3 in downtown Caracas, held similar
rallies in the states of Maracay, Lara, and Anzoategui, and
is slated to travel to other states to mobilize "Yes" votes.


4. (C) The Venezuelan president sometimes takes his domestic
political strength for granted and focuses disproportionate
time and energy on his enormous foreign policy ambitions.
Chavez attended the Ibero-American Summit November 8-10 and
is traveling to Saudi Arabia this week to attend an OPEC
Summit. He also plans to visit Iran, France, and Portugal on
the same trip.


5. (C) Chavez can also be his own worst enemy. He often
overreacts when he feels domestic political pressure. He is
lashing out, for example, at university students
demonstrating for a postponement of the constitutional
referendum, openly questioning the issuance of demonstration
permits and urging state security forces to apply a "firm
hand" against students. An intemperate reaction to the
vigorous "No" challenge could play a role in determining
turn-out on December 2. It remains to be seen what that
reaction would be.

The Zamora Command: Machine Politics
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6. (SBU) President Chavez selected a number of senior BRV
leaders to lead his Zamora Command "Yes" election campaign,

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named after 19th century Venezuelan land reform proponent and
general Ezequial Zamora. Vice President Jorge Rodriguez,
Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro, Miranda State Governor
Diosdado Cabello, Telesur President Andres Izarra,
Information Minister William Lara, Information Vice Minister
Helena Salcedeo, and National Assembly Deputies Dario Vivas,
Gabriela Ramirez, and Carlos Escarra make up the Zamora
Command's leadership. Escarra has been one of the BRV's
principal intellectual proponents and defenders of the
proposed constitutional reform. This central "Yes" campaign
committee will direct the efforts of similar state and local
"Yes" campaign committees.


7. (C) Chavez's "Yes" campaign team will almost certainly
rely heavily on Chavez's proposed United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV),much as previous Chavez campaigns relied on
his Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party. PSUV formation
leaders claim the party signed up 5.6 million members and
retains the active participation of 1.2 million members (out
of an electorate of over 16 million registered voters).
While those numbers are probably inflated, and the PSUV has
been plagued by poor organization and intra-party rivalries,
PSUV battalions offer a far bigger, functional party base
than the collective bases of opposition parties combined.
Moreover, Chavez's blurring of the distinction between state
and party will likely provide PSUV "Yes" campaign workers
with significant resources and free air time on government
stations. PPT leaders tell us the BRV is already putting
pressure on government employees (over two million voters) to
vote "Yes" or risk losing their jobs.

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The "No" Camps
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8. (C) Nineteen political parties formally registered with
the CNE to oppose Chavez' proposed constitutional reforms.
They include former consensus opposition presidential
candidate Manuel Rosales' Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) party,
Primero Justicia (PJ),Movement Toward Socialism (MAS),La
Causa R, the two parties that dominated Venezuelan politics
before Chavez was elected in 1999 -- Accion Democratica (AD)
and the Christian Democrats (COPEI),and the small pro-Chavez
party Podemos. In addition, important sectors of civil
society, university students, the Catholic Church,
professional and trade associations, and NGOs are actively
opposing Chavez' proposed constitutional package. Opposition
from former Defense Minister Raul Isias Baduel has given "No"
voters a boost. Unlike Chavez's "Yes" campaign, however,
constitutional reform opponents present a divided message
ranging from seeking postponement, voting "No", to forcing
the cancellation of the referendum through a campaign of
"civic resistance."

University Students: Postpone Until February
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9. (C) University students opposed to Chavez' constitutional
reforms represent the freshest and probably most important
factor working against the Venezuelan government. Local
polls show that the student movement enjoys a high degree of
credibility among the Venezuelan electorate across the social
spectrum. Opposition students have organized three large and
generally peaceful marches in recent weeks to the National
Assembly, CNE, and the Supreme Court. Overreaction from
state security forces and goon violence from Chavez
supporters has played to the students' advantage and the
BRV's disadvantage so far. A PSUV-organized student march on
the Supreme Court November 14 failed to generate a large
crowd. At the same time, opposition students are a
politically diverse group, and in the interest of fostering
unity, have merely sought postponement of the referendum
until February. The inter-university student parliament next
meets November 17. Student leader Stalin Gonzalez told the
media November 16 that he will press the student movement
shift its position to endorse voting "No."

Mainstream Opposition Parties: Vote No
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10. (C) Mainstream opposition parties like UNT, Primero
Justicia, MAS, La Causa R, and COPEI form a loose coalition
of parties trying to mobilize "No" voters. However, few
Venezuelans actually identify with opposition parties. They
lack defined political platforms, and they have only recently
made efforts to rebuild their party bases and reach out to
Venezuela's poor. They are also resource strapped following

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repeated electoral setbacks. These parties organized a
November 10 Caracas rally that failed to generate a
significant show of support, despite some student
participation. Leaders from the aforementioned parties tell
us privately that they are having trouble energizing many of
their rank-and-file members to work for the "No" campaign.

Hard-line Opposition Parties: Stop the Referendum
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11. (C) Hard-line opposition parties like AD, Alianza Bravo
Pueblo (ABP),and the National Resistance Command (CNR) are
leading what they call a "civic resistance" campaign to try
to force the BRV to cancel the December 2 referendum. These
parties advocated abstention in the last two national
elections to avoid "legitimizing" the Chavez government and
have so far refrained from urging their supporters to vote
"No" rather than stay at home. These groups organized a
sizable Caracas rally November 3 and are planning a November
26 rally in Caracas provocatively called "The March of No
Return." Despite their bravado, these groups do not appear
to have the street power to force the BRV to suspend or
cancel the constitutional referendum, but they may help
persuade a sizable percentage of potential "No" voters to
abstain. Constitutional lawyer Hermann Escarra (brother of
"Yes" campaign leader Carlos Escarra) has emerged as a
popular, media-savvy spokesman for this group.

The Podemos/Baduel Factors: Credibility Within Chavismo
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12. (C) The pro-Chavez party Podemos formally registered with
the "No" bloc and is working to mobilize pro-Chavez "No"
voters. Podemos governors in two states (Aragua and Sucre)
are in a position to be particularly helpful to the "No"
cause. In addition, former Defense Minister Baduel held a
dramatic November 5 press conference to urge Venezuelans to
vote "No." Since then, he has reiterated his position in the
media and attended constitution reform fora. The opposition
from Podemos and Baduel carries credibility within Chavismo
in a way that opposition from the traditional political
parties does not. They could potentially influence some
pro-Chavez voters to stay home or even vote "No."

The Catholic Church: The Reform Is "Morally Unacceptable"
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13. (C) The Venezuelan Conference of Catholic Bishops (CEV)
issued an October 19 exhortation that sharply criticized
Chavez's proposed constitutional changes, calling them
"morally unacceptable." They stopped short, however, of
explicitly urging parishioners to vote "No". CEV First Vice
President Archbishop Roberto Luckert began publicly urging
Venezuelans to vote "No" on November 14, however. We
understand many parish priests are echoing the bishops'
position in their Sunday homilies in parishes nationwide, but
regular Mass attendance in Venezuela is not high.
Datanalysis Director Luis Vicente Leon told poloffs that, "in
the same way young Venezuelan men love their mothers and
girlfriends, but do not expect them to get along," he
believes many Venezuelan voters simply tune out the
Church/state divide while maintaining respect for both Chavez
and Church leaders.

NGOs: Education Campaigns
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14. (C) A number of prominent civil society NGOs, such as
Sumate, Ciudadania Activa, and Sinergia, are engaged in
extensive public education efforts to promote broader debate
of the potential anti-democratic consequences of Chavez's
constitutional package. These NGOs are organizing fora,
distributing easy-to-read pamphlets, and raising public
awareness through media advertising. Their efforts are
particularly focused on Venezuela's low income voters,
Chavez's traditional electoral majority. These public
education efforts generally sidestep the issue of whether
Venezuelans should vote "No" or not, although they implicitly
activate the "No" position by reinforcing informed democratic
participation.

Professional Associations: Impede the Reform
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15. (C) Numerous professional and trade associations have
issued public declarations against the constitutional
referendum, but have generally sidestepped the opposition

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debate of whether to vote "No" or abstain. Leaders of
Fedecamaras, Venezuela's premier umbrella business
association, outlined the organization's opposition to
Chavez's reform package in a November 2 press conference and
called on Venezuelans to "come out against the reform,
rejecting it, denying it, and impeding its approval." A
coalition of local bar associations is seeking a postponement
of the referendum at the Supreme Court. Venezuela's largest,
but relatively weak, opposition trade federation, the
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, called on Venezuelan
workers to help "stop" Chavez's proposed reforms. Such
efforts give reform opponents the appearance of some
momentum, but it is not likely that their declarations will
have much influence on Chavez's political base.

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The Fifth Estate
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16. (C) Government-run media outlets are affording the "Yes"
camp plenty of free air time. Chavez may also make use of
mandatory "cadena" broadcasts on all free TV and radio
airwaves in the coming weeks as he has done before previous
elections. The few remaining important independent media
outlets are hewing closely to CNE regulations and avoiding
openly coming out in opposition to Chavez's constitutional
reform package. Venevision, which after the government
closure of RCTV, enjoys a 40% television market share, has
been particularly circumspect, giving minimal coverage to
student protests. Cable TV news station Globovision has been
the noteworthy exception, giving ample coverage to "No"
rallies, demonstrations, and campaign leaders.

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Comment
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17. (C) Despite intense political polarization in Venezuela
and increased media attention on the December 2
constitutional referendum, the "Yes" and "No" camps are both
fighting flank battles against voter apathy. Activists on
both sides concede that unlike last year's presidential
campaign or the 2004 recall referendum, they are having a
difficult time motivating potential voters. Many voters
still tell local pollsters that they are not familiar with
Chavez's proposed constitutional package, and many opposition
voters do not trust the CNE to run a clean election and
prefer to stay home. Against that backdrop, the Chavez
well-oiled electoral machine enjoys a distinct advantage over
less well-organized, divided, and disparate opposition groups.


18. (C) In addition, Chavez's persona plays much better in
Venezuela than outside. For example, while the Spanish
king's "Why don't you shut up?" rebuke of Chavez during the
recent Ibero-American Summit would appear to pose a sharp
setback for the Venezuelan president, it may not prove so
among lower income Venezuelan voters. Indeed, Chavez appears
to be deliberately extending the public spat in an effort to
galvanize his base. Many Chavez supporters are attracted to
the Venezuelan president's "outsider" reputation and may
respond positively to his "standing up" to a monarch from a
wealthy European country and former colonial power.

DUDDY