Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS1913
2007-09-27 15:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE: OPPOSITION DIVIDED

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM VE 
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DE RUEHCV #1913/01 2701536
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P 271536Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9811
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001913 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE: OPPOSITION DIVIDED
(AGAIN)


CARACAS 00001913 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001913

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE: OPPOSITION DIVIDED
(AGAIN)


CARACAS 00001913 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. Less than ten weeks before a constitutional
referendum, Venezuela's opposition parties remain splintered
as to how to oppose President Chavez' sweeping reforms.
Leading opposition parties advocate voting "no" while more
hard-line opposition parties promote abstention. Opposition
leaders privately concede that they are starting late, are
poorly organized, and lack the voter mobilization resources
Chavez has. University students are returning to campuses
but so far have not resumed street protests. The Catholic
Church is likely to release a critical analysis of Chavez'
proposals in late October. Sumate and other NGOs are trying
to elicit greater public debate. At this stage,
constitutional reform opponents are more focused on
minimizing their political losses than on defeating Chavez'
controversial package. End Summary

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To Vote or Not to Vote
--------------


2. (SBU) Opposition parties all oppose Chavez' package of
constitutional reforms and reportedly agreed September 25 to
coordinate a "no" campaign consisting of teach-ins,
pamphleteering, and demonstrations. They are badly divided,
however, on whether they should participate in the December
2007 public referendum. Party leaders from Primero Justicia
(PJ),the Christian Democrats (COPEI),and the left-wing
parties Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and La Causa R have
all publicly indicated that their parties intend to mobilize
"no" voters in the upcoming referendum. Un Nuevo Tiempo
(UNT) says it intends to go to the polls so long as electoral
conditions are acceptable. Accion Democratica (AD),the
National Resistance Command (CNR),and Alianza Bravo Pueblo
(ABP) argue that the BRV's electronic voting system is rigged
in Chavez' favor and therefore advocate abstention. The
latter two openly advocate street protests and civil
resistance.


3. (C) Since Chavez announced his proposals to change 33
articles of the 1999 Constitution on August 15, opposition

parties appeared to spend as much time criticizing each other
as Chavez' constitutional proposals. The abstentionists
accused the participating parties of "selling out" to the
government. The participating parties accused the
abstentionists of handing Chavez a guaranteed political
victory. More recently, the opposition parties reached
agreement on a "non-aggression" pact to avoid publicly
criticizing each others' positions, according to Un Nuevo
Tiempo Secretary General Gerardo Blyde. Blyde told PolCouns
September 24 that all the opposition parties meet
periodically to discuss general strategy while opposition
parties intending to vote in the referendum meet separately
to try to coordinate their electoral efforts.

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Lacking Organization
--------------


4. (C) Chacao Mayor Leopoldo Lopez of Un Nuevo Tiempo told
PolCouns September 24 that if the opposition is going to
compete against the BRV in the December referendum,
opposition parties should already be organizing election day
logistics, including training at least 70,000 election
witnesses. He suggested that if opposition parties do not
get started soon on referendum day logistics, they may later
feel compelled to join the abstentionists simply because they
will lack the ability to mobilize "no" voters during the
December 2 referendum. Blyde told PolCouns that 40% of the
opposition's trained election day witnesses left polling
stations during the 2006 presidential election before the
polls closed, many because they felt intimidated by Chavistas
and/or military personnel.


5. (C) The opposition appears to be facing even greater
organizational problems outside of the capital. PolCouns met
with opposition party leaders in the eastern state of Monagas
during his September 17-18 visit to Maturin. PJ and COPEI
leaders confirmed their parties' intention to go to the
polls, although local party leaders admitted that they were
still not convinced that participating in the referendum was
the best strategy. Accion Democratica mayors in Monagas told
PolCouns that they believe AD Secretary General Henry Ramos
Allup is "ruining the party" but nevertheless they would heed

CARACAS 00001913 002.2 OF 003


his abstentionist policy. The AD leaders also said they were
afraid to confront the Chavez government at this time.
PolCouns stopped by the local UNT headquarters, but it was
closed.

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Token Consultation
--------------


6. (C) Leaders from PJ, AD, and MAS met September 10 with
the National Assembly (NA) Commission that is managing the
legislature's three "readings" of Chavez' constitutional
proposals leading up to the December 2 public referendum.
MAS Secretary General Leopoldo Pucchi told Poloff that his
party presented its concerns to the NA with the expectation
that their presentation would be broadcast by state media.
It was not. Moreover, the parties were limited to 15 minute
presentations (although AD exceeded that time limit). UNT
and other opposition parties decided not to seek meetings
with the NA for fear of "legitimizing" what they perceive as
token public consultation. The NA approved Chavez' proposals
without changes in a second reading on September 11. The
third and final NA reading is likely to take place by
November.

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Where Are the Students?
--------------


7. (C) University students have not organized any major
street demonstrations since summer vacation started in late
June. Student demonstrators had surprised the BRV by
organizing numerous street protests in the wake of the BRV's
May 31 closure of the private, independent free-to-airwaves
RCTV broadcast network. Students have held two student
congresses to better organize themselves, but have not
reached a common position on how or if to oppose Chavez'
proposed constitutional package. Student leader Jon
Goicochea recently told Conoff that he and other student
leaders believe the BRV will win the December 2 referendum.
Consequently, Goicochea said he is advocating postponing
student protests until after the new constitutional changes
take effect. They also must take into consideration the
Defense and Interior Ministers threats to suppress any
illegal demonstrations. Political parties are urging
students to be more active sooner, and some student groups
say they expect to resume demonstrations by mid-October.

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Catholic Church Preparing A Position
--------------


8. (C) The Venezuelan Conference of Catholic Bishops (CEV) is
planning to release a formal position on Chavez'
constitutional proposals on October 20, according to CEV
official Monsignor Jorge Villasmil. The bishops already
released a July 7 pastoral letter that urged the government
to implement the existing constitution rather than seek new
amendments to it. Villasmil told Poloff September 20 that he
expects the Catholic Bishops to convey "firm criticism" of
the anti-democratic elements of the proposed changes. He was
less certain that the CEV would do more than outline their
concerns and urge parishioners to vote "no," noting the
inherent difficulty of achieving such a consensus position
among over 40 bishops. The Catholic Church's stand will be
important because the Church continues to enjoy considerable
credibility among most Venezuelans and can be influential
even in Chavez strongholds.

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Electoral NGO's Mobilizing
--------------


9. (C) Leaders of electoral NGO Sumate told PolCouns
September 20 that they are actively promoting greater public
debate of Chavez' proposed constitutional changes. While
they believe Chavez will secure passage of the changes in the
December 2 referendum, Sumate is trying to maximize the
political cost to the Venezuelan president. Sumate does not
plan to train election monitors ("testigos"),but intends to
mount a limited election observation campaign at about 400
polling stations. Leaders of the NGO Ojo Electoral recently
told DCM and PolCouns that they are also actively fostering
more public discussion of Chavez' constitutional package.
More specifically, Ojo Electoral is focusing public attention
on the anti-democratic nature of many of Chavez' proposed

CARACAS 00001913 003.2 OF 003


changes.

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Comment
--------------


10. (C) Opposition leaders lament that Chavez has boxed them
in, putting them in the difficult position of trying to
minimize their political losses. If they go to the polls,
they are likely to lose given Chavez' ability to mobilize
voters with a mixture of state resources and intimidation.
If they abstain, Chavez will boast that the larger margin of
victory is a clear mandate for his "Socialism in the 21st
Century" and accuse the opposition of being anti-democratic.
If they present their own ideas for constitutional change,
like Primero Justica has, they imply there is a need for
constitutional revisions. If they do not, as in the case of
Un Nuevo Tiempo which had originally promised to do so, the
BRV accuses the opposition of vision-less obstructionism.


11. (C) Moreover, the opposition lacks a compelling leader
who can compete with Chavez. Former consensus opposition
candidate Manuel Rosales is no longer able to pull together
opposition parties in the way that he did in late 2006.
Hard-line opposition parties openly accuse him of "selling
out" to Chavez by conceding electoral defeat hours after
presidential balloting closed on December 6, 2006.
Consequently, opposition leaders themselves concede that
President Chavez at this stage is likely to win approval for
his constitutional package, including the elimination of
presidential term limits and the imposition of greater
central control over local governments.

DUDDY