Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS1671
2007-08-22 17:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM VE 
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VZCZCXRO7318
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHCV #1671/01 2341719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221719Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9546
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001671 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL
PROBLEMS

REF: A. CARACAS 001145


B. CARACAS 001635

CARACAS 00001671 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001671

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL
PROBLEMS

REF: A. CARACAS 001145


B. CARACAS 001635

CARACAS 00001671 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. The organization of aspiring members of
President Chavez' United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
into neighborhood "battalions" has been plagued by confusion
and poor attendance. Scant grassroots party activity to date
raises serious doubts that the PSUV has almost six million
members, as Chavez claims. Party organizers postponed August
18 elections of battalion spokesperson indefinitely, and the
PSUV founding congress scheduled to start in early September
may be postponed until 2008. President Chavez and PSUV
organizers are urging PSUV members to prioritize getting
Chavez' proposed constitutional changes passed over the
divisive process of selecting the leadership and articulating
the platform of the PSUV. Despite ongoing organization
problems, the PSUV is still likely to be a powerhouse
electoral machine, particularly given the government
resources Chavez can put at the disposal of his party. End
Summary.

--------------
Inflated Registration
--------------


2. (SBU) President Chavez claimed on his June 10 nationwide
"Alo, Presidente" broadcast that over 5 million voters signed
up to join his proposed single pro-government party, the PSUV
(Ref A). Vice President and PSUV Coordinating Commission
Chief Jorge Rodriguez subsequently told a June 23 gathering
of PSUV promoters and "aspiring militants" that 5,669,000
voters had registered with the PSUV. The Vice President also
predicted that the final tally of PSUV members would soon
reach six million. Rodriguez discounted local press
reporting that turn-out was light during the April 29-June 3
party registration drives, calling such reports part of "the
plan of the national bourgeoisie and its imperialist masters
to try to disfigure and slow down the tremendous moral and
political push of our revolution."


3. (SBU) At the same June 23 PSUV rally, Chavez shared

statistics on PSUV registration that invite skepticism. For
example, the Venezuelan president reported that in three
states (Apure, Cojedes, and Delta Amacuro) as many or more
persons joined the PSUV as voted for Chavez in the December
2006 presidential election. He claimed that some 95 percent
of his presidential vote total in Zulia, home state of
opposition governor and former presidential candidate Manuel
Rosales, signed up for the party. Chavez also reported that
over 42,000 persons over the age of 80 as well as 745,000
professionals signed up for the PSUV.


4. (C) CNE Rector Vicente Diaz told poloff that the CNE
cannot independently corroborate the PSUV's registration
claims. Although the CNE provided logistical support,
including digital scanning devices, for the party's
registration drive, Diaz said PSUV organizers used their own
software to compile membership lists and did not transmit
that information to the CNE. Diaz noted wryly that in the
June 3 mayoral bi-election in Catatumbo Municipality in Zulia
State the opposition candidate soundly defeated the
pro-government candidate, with the pro-government candidate
polling far fewer votes that the number of voters who have
purportedly joined the PSUV.

--------------
Where's My Battalion?
--------------


5. (SBU) With considerable fanfare, PSUV organizers announced
that PSUV members would form some 25,000 "battalions" of
between 200 and 400 persons between July 21 and August 18 all
over Venezuela. The coordinating committee of the PSUV
selected ideologically trained "promoters" to organize the
initial meetings of battalions and to organize discussions on
topics such as "Revolution and Latin American Unity,"
socialism, sustainable development, social classes, "Free
Market Economy versus Socialist Economy" as well as on
President Chavez' speeches. Chavez told the June 23 PSUV
rally that aspiring PSUV members needed to attend their
battalion formation meetings because the "true revolutionary"
puts the "revolution before anything else; the revolution is
life; the revolution is the homeland."

CARACAS 00001671 002.2 OF 002




6. (SBU) Despite the presidential push to encourage big
turn-outs, the initial battalion meetings appeared to be
generally both poorly organized and attended. Vice President
Rodriguez expressed satisfaction to the media on August 10
that 1.6 million were regularly attending weekly battalion
meetings. Even if true, that represents less than a quarter
of the voters who purportedly joined the PSUV. In Aragua
State where Chavez polled 537,000 votes, for example, PSUV
organizers say only some 10,000 persons participated in
battalion meetings. National Assembly Deputies Iris Varela
and Flor Rios told the pro-government daily "Vea" that the
Coordinating Committee needed to do a better job of informing
PSUV members which battalion they belong to and where their
battalion meetings would be held.


7. (SBU) Varela and National Assembly Deputy Luis Tascon have
also criticized the selection of PSUV promoters for
incorporating well-connected opportunists over loyal
Chavistas. In addition, the PSUV suggestion that members
contribute Bs. 1000 to Bs. 50,000 (47 cents to USD 23)
monthly to party coffers is reportedly sparking further
internal party grousing. President Chavez' proposals for
constitutional change currently include public financing for
electoral campaigns. Three pro-Chavez parties, the Communist
Party, Patria Para Todos (PPT),and Podemos decided earlier
this year not to dissolve and join the PSUV unconditionally.

--------------
Constitutional Changes Take Priority
--------------


8. (SBU) Vice President Rodriguez abruptly announced August
17 that battalions would not elect spokespersons the next
day, as originally planned. Instead, Rodriguez encouraged
"aspiring militants" in the PSUV to discuss Chavez' proposals
to change 33 articles of the 1999 Constitution (Ref B).
Rodriguez also said the PSUV coordination committee is also
reviewing the dates for the party's founding congress.
Noting that party organizers are not trying to "hurry" the
party formation process, Rodriguez hinted that the September
8-December 15 party congress would be postponed. Earlier the
same week, National Assembly Deputy Francisco Ameliach told
the media that the PSUV party congress would likely be
postponed until early 2008, after a public referendum on
constitutional changes.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Chavez' efforts to forge a monolithic pro-government
party have been plagued by delays, division, and
disorganization from the beginning. The lack of significant
popular participation in forming PSUV battalions may also
indicate that Chavez enjoys far more breadth than depth of
political support. The Venezuelan president himself admits
publicly that he is still a long way from establishing a
"great revolutionary machine." Chavez told the mass July 23
PSUV rally that Fidel Castro was right when he told him that
the Cuban revolution will survive Fidel's death because of
the Cuban Communist Party, but Chavez' revolution could not
outlast Chavez. The Venezuelan president's strategic
decision to focus on securing public approval for his
constitutional changes appears to be a recognition that the
PSUV formation process so far has been more a divisive than a
mobilizing force within Chavismo. Although still very much a
work-in-progress, the PSUV is likely to be a formidable
electoral machine. The BRV's propensity to blur the
distinction between government and political party and the
lack of any significant, grassroots competition from
opposition parties play to the PSUV's advantage.

FRENCH