VENEZUELA: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BACK TO FRONT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001419

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
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SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BACK TO FRONT
BURNER FOR NOW

REF: A. CARACAS 243


B. 06 CARACAS 2275

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: After saying in early May that
constitutional reform was not a priority for this year,
President Chavez surprised everyone by announcing two months
later that he would present his proposed changes in the
second half of July. Around the same time, an alleged draft
of one of his constitutional reform committee's working
papers was leaked. While the committee members are denying
the draft's authenticity, constitutional lawyer Jose Vicente
Haro outlined for Poloff and Econoff July 2 parts of the
draft that, based on discussions with at least one committee
member, he believes are accurate. The following is a review
of the possible political and judicial changes, including
elimination of presidential term limits, redistricting to
weaken state and local government powers, and reduced
protection of human rights. Septel will cover economic
changes. Most of the proposals are aimed at consolidating
Chavez' control and eliminating potential rivals, but
ironically are planting more seeds for disillusionment and
opposition to his policies. End Summary.

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On Again, Off Again "Reform"
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2. (C) In early 2007, President Chavez announced plans to
change the 1999 Constitution and appointed a presidential
committee to recommend modifications. The committee was
originally expected to present its findings to Chavez by
early March. He would then submit a proposal to the National
Assembly (NA),which would discuss it during formal and
"parliament in the street" sessions, and hold three votes.
The proposal would then to be submitted to a consultative
referendum perhaps as early as August 2007. We understand
that the committee did submit a draft close to schedule
(although several updates have since been submitted).
However in early May, Chavez suddenly announced that
constitutional reform was not a priority and could "probably
wait until next year." Many contacts, including
pro-government sources and those close to them, have said
Chavez was forced to delay his plans due to discontent within
Chavismo over some proposals, such as the elimination of
presidential term limits and public backlash to the BRV's
shutdown of RCTV. In late June, Chavez changed course again
and announced that he would submit a constitutional proposal
to the NA in the second half of July.

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What Will Change?
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3. (C) Around the same time of Chavez' June announcement, an
alleged draft of one of the committee's working papers was
leaked to the local press. Rumors suggest it was either
leaked by disgruntled committee members who disagreed with
some of the president's plans, or as a trial balloon to test
public reaction. Many of its proposals are consistent with
changes proposed by Chavez and other BRV officials. We were
told the leak came from opposition party Primero Justicia,
who received it from a pro-government contact. Reform
Committee members deny the draft's authenticity, but
constitutional lawyer Jose Vicente Haro, a former NA legal
counsel and advisor to the 1999 Constitutional Assembly, has
spoken to committee member Carlos Escarra and told Poloff and
Econoff July 2 which parts of the document Escarra told him
were accurate. The following is a review of the proposed
political and judicial changes.

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"Continuous" re-election
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4. (C) Chavez has repeatedly announced his intention to
stay in office well beyond the constitutionally-set two-term
limit--either until 2021, the 200th anniversary of
Venezuela's independence or 2030, the 200th anniversary of
Simon Bolivar's death. This desire is thought to be the main
driver behind the constitutional amendment effort. In an
effort to clarify (and ease fears) regarding this proposal,
President of the NA Cilia Flores explained on July 13 the
BRV's plans to introduce the idea of "continuous," rather
than indefinite re-election. According to Flores, the change

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is merely technical and stems from the opposition's
inaccurate assumption that indefinite re-election implies
Chavez will remain in power for life. Continuous
re-election, however, Flores said, means Chavez will be
eligible to run for office as many times as he wishes, but
must still be re-elected by popular vote ever six years. She
added that the provision would only apply to the president,
while all other elected officials must abide by the term
restrictions outlined in the 1999 Constitution. Currently,
governors and mayors may serve two consecutive four-year
terms and legislators for two consecutive five-year terms.

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Territorial Redistribution
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5. (C) Billed as the "new geometry of power," it is unclear
what Chavez' re-districting plans (one of his "five motors"
of socialist transformation) will entail. Chavez has said he
plans to re-draw state boundaries and create special federal
territories and communal cities to create a more even
economic and population distribution, and facilitate economic
development. He has also mused about grouping states
together into four to eight sectors that would each be
overseen by a vice president. Many political watchers
believe that objective to be the elimination and/or
undermining of most opposition-run areas, including Zulia
State and the Greater Caracas municipalities of Chacao and
Baruta, which are led by capable administrators and popular,
charismatic political figures Manuel Rosales, Leopoldo Lopez,
and Henrique Capriles, respectively. However, others note
Chavez' long standing dislike of state and municipal
governments, which are to some extent independent
concentrations of power; this will weaken and worsen them.
Currently Venezuela is divided into 23 states, the Capital
District of Caracas, 331 municipalities, federal territories,
which include Bird Island (disputed by Dominica and Trinidad
and Tobago),La Orchilla, and other islands off of
Venezuela's coast.


6. (C) The proposed amendment would preserve the existing
political-administrative divisions but also allow Chavez,
with approval from a majority of the National Assembly, to
create "special and/or communal territories" within states or
municipalities. Special administrators answerable only to
the president would run these areas. The Capital District of
Caracas would become a Federal District, and according to
Haro, would encompass the upscale, opposition-run
municipalities of Baruta and Chacao. The amendment also
calls for municipalities to take into account the "nature and
necessities of the community," which could further facilitate
re-districting of these entities.


7. (Comment: These changes would essentially undo the
decentralization process that began in the early 1990s, and
ironically, opened political space for Chavez' eventual rise
to power. The proposal has rankled some of Chavez' own
governors and mayors, who are understandably reluctant to
give up their power and influence. The move is also expected
to generate backlash from the public, which has grown
accustomed to relying on or at least coping with local
officials instead of the relatively inefficient and overly
bureaucratic national government.)

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Community Councils
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8. (C) The alleged working paper establishes the community
councils, Chavez' fifth motor of socialist transformation, as
a separate branch of government called the Popular Power
Branch. Billed as the cornerstone of Chavez' "participatory
democracy," communal councils are grassroots community
organizations that the BRV has been pushing to the political
forefront. With up to USD 8 billion in direct central
government funding, the councils could theoretically plan and
execute local projects, independent of any elected local
government involvement. They are largely intended to
strengthen Chavez' direct connection to his supporters at the
expense of local leaders. (Comment: By reducing their
authority through redistricting and transferring their
funding to the community councils, Chavez would effectively
erode the autonomy of regional and local governments and
block the rise of potential rivals. It seems unlikely
however that Chavez will give real power and control of
resources to these local councils. End Comment.)

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Treatment of Human Rights
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9. (C) The alleged working paper contains a number of
changes that, if approved, would jeopardize protection for
human rights. For example, article 23 of the current
constitution gives international human rights treaties
ratified by Venezuela immediate and direct constitutional
rank, and article 31 allows all victims of human rights
violations to ask international human rights courts for
protection from the state. The revised version would
subordinate these treaties to national law and victims of
human rights violations would be required to exhaust all
appeal options in domestic courts before going to
international courts. Moreover, the new article 31 would
make Venezuelan courts responsible for implementing
international courts' sentences "within the limits of
domestic law." Currently, the state is responsible for
"adopting the necessary measures prescribed by the
international courts." These changes would essentially cut
off all avenues of redress for BRV political prisoners and
victims of human rights abuses, as Chavez' control over the
court system (Reftels) would allow the BRV to tie up their
domestic appeals for years.


10. (C) These potential changes coincide with several recent
measures the BRV has pursued to insulate itself from
international criticism of its human rights practices. Over
the past six years, the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission (IACHR) has admitted 20 cases against Venezuela.
During the last IACHR session in March, the BRV
representative blasted the Commission for its alleged
anti-Chavez bias, setting the stage for a possible withdrawal
from the Commission. In fact, Chavez threatened to pull out
of the Inter-American system in May 2007 when the IACHR
referred a 2002 request by RCTV reporters for protection from
the state to the Inter-American Human Rights Court. As with
the proposed changes regulating international economic
treaties (septel),Haro believes the BRV prefers to loosen
its compliance with human rights accords to avoid the
international stigma that pulling out of the treaties would
bring.


11. (C) Haro also highlighted proposed changes to article
337 governing Chavez' ability to declare a "state of
exception," akin to a state of emergency. If approved, the
new article would broaden the requirements for and
circumstances under which Chavez could declare a "state of
exception." Whereas the current article preserves the rights
to due process, information, and other "intangible rights,"
the new article would eliminate them. Haro was concerned
that the ease with which Chavez could call a state of
exception could permit an indefinite suspension of civil
liberties and easier round-up of political opponents.
Moreover, suspending access to information could facilitate
more BRV-sponsored human rights abuses while complicating
efforts to prosecute violators. The lack of information was
a key problem in investigating claims of human rights abuses
against the military during the response to the 1999 Vargas
floods.

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Comment
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12. (C) The reforms highlighted above coincide with many of
the themes Chavez has mentioned in the last six months and
are likely to appear in some form in the actual proposal.
Most of the changes are designed to increase Chavez' direct
control, sideline challengers, limit outside influence, but
in the long run, could ironically prove to be his undoing.
So far, Chavez has survived largely by blaming others for his
administration's shortcomings, but by increasing dependence
on the executive, he limits the number of possible scapegoats
and increases his own vulnerability to public discontent.

FRENCH