CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY: INFLATED NUMBERS AND DEEP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY: INFLATED NUMBERS AND DEEP
DIVISIONS

REF: CARACAS 000968 AND PREVIOUS

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT RICHARD DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. President Chavez is boasting that over five
million voters have joined his new party, the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). While the PSUV is on
track to be the country's largest political party, PSUV
promoters appear to be inflating the membership rolls. The
membership drive over the last two months has been
characterized by tepid turn-out, logistical problems,
strong-arming of government employees, and blatant government
support for Chavez' single "revolutionary" party. Chavez'
uncompromising efforts to impose unity have ironically proven
particularly divisive, alienating three small, but prominent,
pro-Chavez parties. Looking ahead, some 21,000 PSUV
"socialist battalions" are supposed to elect delegates in
July to a party-forming conference slated for autumn.
Despite the PSUV's shortcomings so far, so long as Chavez
makes it a vehicle for distributing patronage and punishing
hold-outs, it is still likely to become a formidable
electoral machine. End Summary.

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Cooking the Books
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2. (SBU) During his June 10, nationwide "Alo, Presidente"
broadcast, President Chavez claimed that during the previous
six weekends (April 29 - June 3),over 5 million "aspiring
militants" had signed up for his single "revolutionary"
party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). There
are over 16 million registered voters in Venezuela.
According to preliminary statistics issued by the PSUV
Promotion Commission, the National Electoral Council (CNE)
had registered 5,395,938 registered voters into Chavez'
proposed party, 73.8 percent of Chavez' vote total in the
December 2006 presidential election. But in a June 5 op-ed
in the pro-government daily "Vea," former Vice President Jose
Vicente Rangel, a member of the PSUV organizing committee,
claimed just 4.4 million new PSUV members.


3. (C) The PSUV is easily on track to be Venezuela's largest
political party, and according to the official figures, will
be larger than Chavez' previous political party, the Fifth
Republic Movement (MVR). While Chavez is proclaiming the
"success" of the PSUV membership drive, his and the PSUV
committee's numbers do not appear to add up. PSUV organizers
claimed only 1.3 million new members at the half-way mark.
After claiming a cumulative total of over 2 million members
at the end of the May 19-20 weekend, PSUV organizers claimed
that registration doubled to over 4 million during the
weekend of May 26-27, even though CNE conducted registration
in fewer states that weekend. There were no reported signs
of a surge in PSUV registration that weekend, and certainly
not a surge that equates to one in eight registered voters
signing up over a two-day period.


4. (C) PSUV organizers set the ambitious membership goal of
registering 55 percent of the registered voters who voted for
Chavez in the December 2006 presidential. Despite a slow
start, they nevertheless "exceeded" their goals in Caracas
and in 22 of 23 states (coming up just short only in Carabobo
State). Party organizers even "exceeded" their goals by over
150 percent in five states, including Zulia, where de facto
opposition leader Manuel Rosales is governor. The PSUV is
claiming that in the states of Apure and Cojedes, more
registered voters signed up for the PSUV than voted for
Chavez last December. The Attorney General of Nueva Esparta
State told poloff that local PSUV promoters had grossly
inflated registration numbers there.

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Changing Tactics
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5. (SBU) PSUV organizers have had to adjust their tactics on
many fronts in order to boost party registration. Initially,
party registration took place at designated sites, such as
schools. But when insufficient numbers of registered voters
traveled to the centers, mobile CNE units were formed to take
party registration directly to working class neighborhoods
and at Caracas Metro stops. Party registration was also
extended by one weekend to June 9-10, to allow CNE mobile
units more time to canvass pro-Chavez areas more thoroughly

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throughout Venezuela. Party organizers are also considering
ways to allow Venezuelans residing abroad to join the party.


6. (C) After initial invitations to join the PSUV, party
organizers stepped up the BRV's machinery to force government
employees and contractors to join Chavez' single
pro-government party (Reftel). Government media outlets,
particularly Venezolana de Television (VTV),have been
actively promoting party recruitment. Beneficiaries of the
government's many social programs or "missions" have also
been targeted for recruitment efforts. According to a member
of the National Assembly, 50 percent of the persons who
joined the PSUV in Chavez' home state of Barinas belong to
one of the government's social missions. There are also
media reports of some active duty military officers joining
the party, contrary to a constitutional prohibition.

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Antagonizing Allies
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7. (C) President Chavez has lambasted and ostracized three
small, but prominent, pro-Chavez parties that declined to
dissolve and join the PSUV unconditionally. The leaders of
Patria Para Todos (PPT),Podemos, and the Communist Party
(PCV) continue to express support for Chavez' "socialist
revolution," but the BRV no longer considers the parties part
of the government. A large number of leaders and
rank-and-file members deserted all three parties to join the
PSUV, exacerbating inter-party tensions between unconditional
Chavez loyalists and the hold-outs. The three parties now
occupy a political purgatory, not enjoying the trust of
either the Venezuelan president or the opposition. The PCV
still garners some grudging respect from PSUV leaders; PPT
less so, and Podemos is very much on the out. In the wake of
Chavez' sharp criticism of the hold-out parties, Podemos
Secretary General Ismael Garcia has been particularly

SIPDIS
critical of the autocratic nature of the formation of the
PSUV. He also met recently with students demonstrating
against the government's closure of RCTV.


8. (SBU) President Chavez is also accentuating class
identification within the PSUV. He suggested some weeks ago
that while the PSUV was ostensibly open to all Venezuelans,
wealthy Venezuelans would be expected to demonstrate their
social commitment to others. During his June 10 "Alo,
Presidente" broadcast, Chavez said the PSUV needs "real
socialists" who donate their surplus goods to others.
"Whoever has a refrigerator that he does not need," Chavez
continued, "should bring it to Bolivar Square." Noting that
he does not have "riches," Chavez said he will donate USD
250,000 in prize money that he received some time ago from
Libya.

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Next Steps
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9. (SBU) Chavez was slated to address a mass rally of PSUV
members on June 9 at a Caracas arena, but the Ministry of
Popular Power for Information announced the cancellation of
the event without explanation only hours before it was
scheduled to take place. The mass rally was slated to be a
follow-on to the March 24 swearing-in of over 2,300 party
promoters at a Caracas auditorium and the April 19 swearing
in of over 16,000 PSUV promoters at a Caracas stadium.
General Alberto Muller Rojas, a leading member of the PSUV
Promotion Commission, recently told the media that the over 5
million "aspiring militants" would be organized into 21,565
"socialist battalions" of 200-plus members each.


10. (SBU) Elections for a party congress are supposed to be
completed by July 7, but the date is likely to slip.
Regional meetings of elected "militants" were penciled in for
July 31. A founding party congress of 2,200 delegates is
supposed to begin on August 15 and conclude on November 17.
Chavez has also proposed that party members participate in a
referendum on PSUV leaders and a platform on December 2, an
event designed to imbue the new party greater democratic
legitimacy.

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Comment
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11. (C) Chavez' previous political party, the Fifth Republic

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Movement (MVR),was more of an electoral machine than a
grassroots, ideologically coherent political party. With far
more experience tearing down institutions than building them,
Chavez' efforts to create a new, more disciplined and
substantive political party are off to an inauspicious start.
At the same time, Chavez has a habit of setting overly
ambitious goals in order to achieve his aims. He set an
outsized goal of 10 million votes for the December 2006, and
polled 7.3 million (62.8% of the vote). With respect to the
PSUV, however, Chavez and his closest supporters appear to
have set the bar too high, but are nevertheless claiming to
have cleared it.


12. (C) Despite the lingering problems of the PSUV and
inflated registration numbers, Chavez' single pro-government
party is easily on track to become Venezuela's largest
political party. By blurring the distinction between party
and state, Chavez and his supporters will be able to offer --
and/or threaten -- Venezuelan voters with far more carrots
and sticks than what beleaguered opposition political parties
can muster. Joining the PSUV is already widely perceived as
a way for persons who signed the recall referendum petition
against Chavez -- and later became subject to government
discrimination as a result -- to ingratiate themselves with
the BRV. Even if the PSUV fails to become a political party
with deep roots and a coherent vision, it is still likely to
be as formidable an electoral machine as the MVR.

BROWNFIELD