Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CANBERRA1783
2007-12-20 03:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN

Tags:  PREL AS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0265
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001783 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PREL AS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER YABUNAKA


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Clune for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001783

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PREL AS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER YABUNAKA


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Clune for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) Summary: In a December 4, 2007 meeting in Canberra,
Australia with Under Secretary Burns, Deputy Foreign Minister
Mitoji Yabunaka outlined Japan's goals to improve the
relevance of multilateral fora in Asia and its desire for
greater United States engagement in the region. The two also
addressed the necessity to engage China to be a more
responsible actor in world affairs, UNSC Reform, and next
steps in combating Iran's nuclear program following release
of the unclassified NIE. Under Secretary Burns expressed
confidence that India would meet the requirements to conclude
the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative and emphasized
Japan's support would be helpful.
End summary.



--------------
Stronger U.S. Commitment to Asia Needed
--------------


2. (C) While expressing pleasure at the success of the recent
meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Fukuda in
Washington, DFM Yabunaka's extended opening statement
conveyed GOJ concern that a change in the U.S. administration
in 2009 would also bring about significant shift in U.S.
priorities in Asia. In particular, the Japanese feared a
downgrade in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in
favor of China. Japan desired the United States to display
much stronger engagement and commitment to regional
architecture in East Asia in the light of China's rise,
noting that the success of Japan's regional strategy depended
upon improving the effectiveness and relevance of
multilateral fora such as the Asian Regional Forum (ARF),and
APEC. A more robust U.S. commitment to multilateral fora,
Yabunaka said, was central to their success. Yabunaka also
said that a broadening of the mandate of the Six Party Talks,
after the immediate issue of the DPRK's nuclear program was
resolved by measurable actions
by North Korea, of course, would be an effective method of
advancing interests in the region. There were some bilateral
issues requiring resolution, including Host Nation Support,
renewal of the counterterrorism bill allowing refueling

operations in the Indian Ocean, and beef.


3. (C) In reply, U/S Burns said that he believed strongly
that the U.S.-Japan alliance was a fundamental pillar of
American diplomacy. He assured Yabunaka that the U.S.-Japan
alliance enjoyed strong bipartisan support and that Japan
would continue to be a great ally regardless of who was in
the White House in 2009. Stating that in the twenty-first
century many of America's most vital interests resided in
Asia, compared to Europe in the 20th century, U/S Burns said
the United States would be happy to discuss regional
architecture with Japan and noted that 2008 would see many
high level visits by USG officials to Japan, host of the G8
process. He also assured Yabunaka that North Korea must
achieve a verifiable disablement of its nuclear program.

China: Warming Relations with Japan, a Responsible
Stakeholder?
-------------- --------------


4. (C) DFM Yabunaka noted that PM Fukuda's diplomacy with
China was already yielding dividends. As proof, Yabunaka
QChina was already yielding dividends. As proof, Yabunaka
listed successful recent meetings in Singapore between
Japanese and Chinese officials, the advent of the High Level
Economic Consultations (HEC),a resumption of military
exchanges, and a genuine change in tone by the Chinese. He
noted that PM Fukuda would visit China in either late
December or early January and that China's President Hu
Jintao would visit Japan in the spring of 2008. Even serious
irritants, such as the boundary dispute in the East China
Sea, were not insurmountable in this new era of improved
relations, Yabunaka observed, as there seemed to be some

CANBERRA 00001783 002 OF 003


bilateral desire to reach an accord on that issue before PM
Fukuda visited, although specific proposals had yet to
emerge. Yabunaka also said Japan wanted to increase
cooperation with China on environmental protection, but
China's lax observance of IPR hindered greater technology
transfer.


5. (C) U/S Burns reiterated that the United States sought
engagement with, not containment of China. While we
disagreed on human rights, religious rights, intellectual
property rights, and other issues, we saw China as an
emerging stakeholder on key foreign policy issues. In
particular, China had been extremely responsible in its role
in the Six Party Talks since the DPRK 2006 nuclear test,
though they had been less helpful on Sudan and Burma, with a
mixed record on Iran.

UNSC Reform
--------------


6. (C) U/S Burns said that the President's UNGA speech was
an opening; he had told Indian Foreign Secretary Menon in
Madrid that India should seriously engage Japan and Brazil to
design a package that could receive the necessary 128 votes
in support. The U.S. saw two basic options: increase the
permanent members by a small amount; or look into a ten-year
arrangement, open to renewal. The U.S. would not agree to
any formulation without Japan as a new member. We were ready
to negotiate seriously with Japan, Brazil, and India to
create plans that had a good chance of capturing the 128
votes necessary to succeed in the General Assembly, although
we thought the barriers to a successful resolution were
considerable. Yabunaka expressed hope that such proposals
stand a better chance of success with improving Sino-Japanese
ties; he later passed U/S Burns the latest Japanese UNSC
reform proposal.

--------------
Greater Engagement by Japan on Iran
--------------


7. (C) U/S Burns said that by virtue of Japan's G8 Presidency
in 2008, the GOJ could play a major role in resolving the
Iranian issue by promoting the effectiveness of sanctions.
U/S Burns emphasized that the recently released unclassified
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),which stated that Iran
had abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003, showed
that Iran was both a rational actor and susceptible to
strong, coordinated, international pressure, especially
financial. Significantly, uranium enrichment and its
ballistic missile program continued; further sanctions would
strengthen diplomatic efforts. DFM Yabunaka said that Japan
would continue to apply pressure.


8. (C) U/S Burns said that his December 1 meeting in Paris
and subsequent phone calls with Chinese Assistant Foreign
Minister He Yafei represented significant strides in
cooperation in creating a united front in opposition to
Iran's nuclear program. The Under Secretary said he was
reasonably confident that China would support a third UNSC
resolution sanctioning Iran.

9.(C) Stating that effective pressure on Iran would encompass
tiered travel bans, an expanded asset freeze, inspections of
cargo bound to Iran from certain nations, arms restrictions,
a reduction in export credits, and sanctioning the Qods
Force, U/S Burns said he hoped to convince China to agree to
most of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the
Qmost of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the
questions of export credits. While pleased with China's
progress on the Iranian issue, U/S Burns noted that China and
Russia - and most certainly Iran - might point to the NIE
conclusion as a reason for lessening sanctions or delaying
action.

India: Progress on Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
-------------- --------------


10. (C) The United States hoped India would be able to reach
an acceptable and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency by the end of December,
after which the deal would need to be reviewed by the Nuclear

CANBERRA 00001783 003 OF 003


Suppliers' Group, noted U/S Burns. DFM Yabunaka said that
Japan understood and agreed with the basis of the plan,
although the government did face some domestic political
pressure due to very strong non-proliferation sentiments
among the Japanese public. U/S Burns replied that the United
States had been very clear with India that any nuclear tests
would have extremely adverse consequences for the agreement.
He suggested that the Japanese representative should be in
touch with the U.S. lead, Dick Stratford.


11. (C) Turning briefly to Pakistan and Afghanistan, U/S
Burns noted that a stable Pakistani border region was
essential to successful operations in Afghanistan. DFM
Yabunaka said Japan was ready to double aid to Pakistan, but
needed to monitor the situation very closely. He also said
that Japan intended to complete the ring road in Afghanistan
by the end of 2009.

CLUNE