SCENE SETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO AUSTRALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001682

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR MCCALLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OTRA AS
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO AUSTRALIA


Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 a, b, d.

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C/NF) Your visit comes on the heels of Australia's
November 24 federal election in which voters decisively
rejected John Howard and his Liberal/National coalition
government after more than eleven years in office, and
embraced opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) leader Kevin
Rudd. Rudd, a former diplomat and longtime Shadow Foreign
Minister, campaigned on a platform of new leadership with a
focus on such domestic issues as labor laws, climate change,
education and health. Rudd will not announce his cabinet
until later this week, on the eve of your visit, but the
general outlines of his foreign policy are known.


2. (C/NF) We expect a Rudd government to exhibit strong
continuity with the Howard government in many foreign policy
issues of strategic interest to us, and to reflect close
parallels in the U.S. approach and thinking to major global
challenges. Rudd and the ALP are committed to the alliance
with the United States, including a continued close defense
and intelligence relationship, but have signaled that
Australia will adopt a more independent stance towards us
than John Howard. Issues on which Rudd's policies are likely
to diverge from those of his predecessor and the United
States include Iraq, climate change and China. He is likely
to be strongly supportive on tough arms control and
nonproliferation issues, including denuclearization of North
Korea and Iran, but he has flagged his opposition to the
U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement because India has not
signed the NPT. We can expect Australia's continued
contributions to military operations targeting the Taliban
and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. End Sum
mary.

U.S. Alliance
--------------

3. (C/NF) The Australian Labor Party (ALP) takes credit for
establishing the alliance with the United States during World
War II, which ultimately led to the 1951 Australia-New
Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty, and the ALP continues
to include support for the U.S. alliance as one of the three
pillars of the party platform. Rudd, a former diplomat, has
made clear his personal commitment to the alliance, and was
quick to reach out to the United States in his election
victory speech - the only foreign country he mentioned. Rudd
stressed in his campaign that he would be more independent
from the United States than his predecessor, however, and has
already flagged some key policy differences. You should
reciprocate expected expressions of strong support for the
alliance and commitments to strengthening it, and should urge
that the new foreign and defense ministers commit to
U.S.-Australia Ministerial (AUSMIN) consultations early in

2008.

Iraq
--------------

4. (C/NF) The first test of the Rudd government's handling of
the alliance will be on Iraq. Rudd has pledged to withdraw
approximately 550 combat troops comprising the Overwatch
Battle Group from southern Iraq, while leaving in place a
100-man security detachment for its diplomatic mission in
Q100-man security detachment for its diplomatic mission in
Baghdad, an Army training team of similar size, and naval and
air patrol assets based in neighboring countries that support
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While the
Australian combat troops have a passive, back-up role to
Iraqi security forces, rather than an active combat role,
they have served as an important symbol of Coalition unity
and of Australia's support of the U.S. in the Global War on
Terror. Rudd has nuanced his withdrawal pledge, promising to
consult in advance with the Iraqis, the United States and
other allies. Beyond the issue of the combat troops, the
Australians are keenly interested to work with the U.S. and
Iraqis as the Iraq UN mandate lapses to ensure their forces
in Iraq remain under a legitimate authorization, whether it
is a follow-on UN mandate, or some other agreement the U.S.
negotiates with Iraq.


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5. (C/NF) In your discussions with Rudd, you will have an
opportunity to elicit greater details of his plan, to hold
him to his promise to consult with us before withdrawing any
troops, and urge that any withdrawal only be done in
conjunction with the reduction of our surge troops. Rudd
realizes that an unstable and insecure Iraq is not in the
world's interest or Australia's. We believe that Rudd will
be sensitive to the potential adverse consequences to
Coalition unity and will be willing to consider alternatives
that allow him to keep his campaign promise while minimizing
the potential harm of any Australian action. For instance,
Rudd has indicated he is open to increasing the training
contribution in Iraq, even as he withdraws combat elements,
so we need to press him to follow through on that.


6. (C/NF) You should encourage Rudd and his senior ministers
to visit Iraq as early as possible to see for themselves the
positive developments, especially on the security front.
Such a visit will allow them to understand better the
dimensions of the tasks that remain. We can then argue more
effectively for the assumption by Australia of other
supporting roles, such as the expansion of its Army Training
Team or the creation of an Australian Provincial
Reconstruction Team.

Afghanistan
--------------

7. (C/NF) With respect to the War on Terror, there has been
bipartisan support in Australia up to now for its troop
commitment in Afghanistan. The Labor distinction between
Iraq and Afghanistan is supposedly based upon the training of
the Bali bombers in Afghanistan and the impact of the Afghan
drug trade on Australia, as well as on the lack of a UN
mandate for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We can expect Rudd to
reaffirm Australia's commitment to its mission there,
although Australian public opinion may begin to turn against
Afghanistan, too. Three Australian soldiers have been killed
in Afghanistan over the past two months. There is a
possibility that, if Rudd withdraws combat troops from Iraq,
some could be redeployed to augment the Australian force in
Afghanistan. As with Iraq, you should press for Rudd and his
senior ministers to make an early visit to Afghanistan to
assess conditions on the ground, and to urge him to consider
a larger security role and additional reconstruction
assistance.

Climate Change
--------------

8. (C/NF) The second area of major disagreement by Labor with
U.S. policy is climate change, a topic that resonates
strongly in Australia where many see a direct causal link
with a series of recent, very severe droughts. Rudd may want
to distance himself publicly from the United States on this
issue, as we are widely - and mistakenly - viewed in
Australia as being opposed to meaningful greenhouse gas
reductions, but a Rudd Government will almost certainly want
to continue close cooperation with us on effective ways for
meaningful progress in the future. Beyond a pragmatic desire
to find the least costly way to address climate change,
Australia should continue to be a valuable partner in
QAustralia should continue to be a valuable partner in
international fora because of its dependence on coal for
domestic electricity production, significant coal exports,
and desire to continue its remarkable economic growth.


9. (C/NF) A new Labor government is committed to immediate
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Ratification is
relatively cost-free because Australia will come very close
to meeting its Kyoto targets. Rudd has announced that he
will personally head up Australia's climate policy and will
attend the Bali meeting in early December to begin the
process of hammering out a post-2012 climate change
framework. Rudd has pledged that Australia would not sign a
post-Kyoto framework that does not include commitments to
reduction targets by developing countries such as China and
India. GOA climate change negotiators do not expect to see a
significant departure under the new Rudd government from the
Howard government's key positions at Bali, and believe that
close cooperation between the U.S. and Australia would
continue in that process.

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10. (C/NF) We recommend a low-key public posture on
Australia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (as it is
mostly symbolic for domestic political consumption),while
making clear our desire to work closely with Australia to
develop viable and effective ways to address climate change
post-2012 without sacrificing economic development.

China
--------------

11. (C/NF) A third dynamic in the U.S. relationship with a
new Labor government is China. Rudd will almost certainly
bring the issue of China's role in the region and beyond into
his early discussions with us. He, as most Australians,
views the Chinese export market as a critical component of
Australia's growth now and well into the future. In
addition, Rudd is a Mandarin-speaking former diplomat who
served in Beijing. He is thought likely to be more sensitive
to Chinese concerns on issues ranging from regional security
to human rights. He objected to the Howard-Abe March 2007
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Japan and to
quadrilateral discussions between the U.S., Australia, Japan
and India because of sensitivities toward China. However,
Rudd shares our position that China needs to be encouraged to
be a responsible stakeholder in the international system, and
Rudd has previously expressed support for the U.S. in any
conflict over Taiwan. Judging by his public statements and
private assertions, Australia's relationship with China is
unlikely to change with Rudd in power.

Other Issues
--------------

13. (C/NF) Finally, Australia under Rudd will likely continue
to be a strong ally of the United States on
counterproliferation and arms control issues. He is likely
to continue Australia's support for our position on the North
Korea and Iran nuclear issues. However, he has signaled his
opposition to the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement and to
Howard's policy decision to sell uranium to India. Rudd
argues that the policy undermines the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, which India has not signed. Of
particular concern to us is that the Rudd government may
block consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to the 123
Agreement, a precondition for the civil-nuclear deal.

MCCALLUM