Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO2683
2007-08-30 12:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN

Tags:  PGOV KISL KDEM PHUM EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHEG #2683/01 2421253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301253Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6727
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002683 

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NSC FOR SINGH AND WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN
CONTINUES, PARTY PLATFORM STILL IN DRAFT

REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 7171

B. CAIRO 144

C. CAIRO 409

D. CAIRO 1128

E. CAIRO 1276

F. CAIRO 1641

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart, for reason 1.4 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002683

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SINGH AND WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN
CONTINUES, PARTY PLATFORM STILL IN DRAFT

REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 7171

B. CAIRO 144

C. CAIRO 409

D. CAIRO 1128

E. CAIRO 1276

F. CAIRO 1641

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart, for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Egyptian government's campaign against
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is continuing, with the recent
arrests of a prominent moderate official, two MB
parliamentarians, and other senior officials, upping the
ante. The latest detentions occur against the backdrop of
the ongoing military trials of 40 MB members, and the MB's
continued development of a political party platform, which
the organization expects to formally release in September.
Regardless of the specific reasons behind the ongoing
campaign against the MB, it appears to be having the
unintended consequence of increasing public sympathy for the
Islamist organization. Notably, in the face of this intense
governmental pressure, the MB has maintained a moderate
public stance, continuing to work on developing its party
platform, and advocating non-violence and compliance with
Egyptian law. End summary.

--------------
UNRELENTING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MB
--------------


2. (U) The GOE's months-long campaign of arrests against the
MB shows no sign of letting up, with an estimated 53 MB
members detained in the past four weeks alone. (Note:
According to public statements made by Mohamed Habib, the
MB's Deputy Supreme Guide, there are currently 600 MB members
in detention. End note). Notable among the arrests is the
August 17 detention of prominent MB leader and reputed
torchbearer of the organization's moderate wing, Essam El
Erian, who was arrested at a private home, together with
Mahmoud Hussein (an aged MB Guidance Council member allegedly
in poor health) and 15 other "leading members." Erian and
his cohort, detained under the auspices of Egypt's Emergency
Law, are reportedly accused of belonging to a banned
organization, possession of illegal documents, and plotting

to overthrow the government. Government newspapers have
quoted sources in State Security and the Public Prosecutor's
office as saying that the arrestees were meeting to plan for
internal MB elections. MB Deputy Supreme Guide Mohamed Habib
denied this in several media interviews, stating, "we well
understand how (badly) the regime would view a meeting of the
Majlis Al Shura Al Gamaa (for internal elections),and we
would not even think of taking that step."


3. (U) On August 22, the security services briefly detained
two MB parliamentarians, Ragab Abu Zeid and Sabri Amer. The
pair had been briefly arrested in April, after which their
parliamentary immunity was lifted, and they were subsequently
released (ref E). On August 23, Abu Zeid and Amer were
released on bail of 10,000 LE (approximately 1,750 USD) each.
It is unclear when, or if, their trial will commence. The
MB's parliamentary bloc denounced the "illegal detention," in
a formal statement issued by bloc leader Saad Al Katatni,
viewing it as "part of the ongoing security escalation of the
regime against the MB ... The message is to humiliate MP's
and ... settle scores with the opposition." Other recent
arrestees reportedly include the key staffers of several MB
parliamentarians.


4. (U) The latest arrests occur against the backdrop of the
ongoing military trials of 40 MB members, including Khairat
Al Shatir, the third-most senior official in the MB (refs C
and D). Family members, several members of the defense team,
journalists, and representatives of human rights
organizations have reportedly not been allowed into the
courtroom where the tribunal is being held. Shatir's
daughter told journalists that her father's health is
deteriorating in prison, and that he is suffering from high
blood pressure, diabetes, and "tumors" in his feet. She
alleged that Shatir's doctor was denied access to the
military prison.

--------------
U.S. APPROVES OF THE ARRESTS?
--------------


5. (C) In an August 22 interview with Al Jazeera, MB Supreme
Guide Mehdi Akef insinuated that lack of USG pressure on the
Egyptian regime is partly to blame for the continued

CAIRO 00002683 002 OF 003


detentions of MB members. Akef asserted that U.S. pressure
had at one time improved political freedom for Egyptian
opposition groups, and that, "we enjoyed that freedom when
there were American pressures on the Egyptian government.
Even the government's term of describing us a banned group
disappeared. The semi-official Al Ahram newspaper
interviewed me. I couldn't believe that I would feature on
the first page of this government newspaper. But, after (the
MB won) 88 seats in parliament, the bone crushing started."
Deputy Supreme Guide Habib has also publicly implied that the
USG is somehow complicit or tacitly approving of the
detentions. Several of our civil society contacts have
pointedly asked why the USG publicly criticizes the detention
of imprisoned Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour, or that of
imprisoned blogger Abdel Karim Soliman, but has been silent
regarding the arrests of hundreds of MB members and the
ongoing military tribunals.

--------------
PARTY PLATFORM NOT DONE YET,
BUT COMING SOON
--------------


6. (U) Amidst the arrests and military tribunals, the MB
reportedly continues to slowly move forward with plans to
develop a political party platform (refs B and D). The
independent newspaper Al Masry Al Yom recently published a
detailed text alleged to be the platform itself. However,
several MB officials, including Supreme Guide Akef, have
stated that the text was a preliminary draft of the platform,
and not the final product. In an August 21 interview with new
independent newspaper Al Badeel, Deputy Supreme Guide Habib
stated that the platform will be completed and released "in
September," after the Guidance Council has completed its
review and then "sent it to a set of intellectuals for final
feedback." In an August 26 interview in the Nasserite
newspaper Al Arabi, Akef is quoted as saying "We sent the
draft to our offices, so that they can comment, which they
already did. Now that we have received comments and
suggestions on the draft, we will refer the program back to
the Guidance Office to give their views on the gray areas
that are yet to be settled. (Those gray areas) pertain to
the ruling system, transition of power, and the presidential
term of office. We also need to further clarify our position
on women and Copts, as well as our stance regarding tourism."



7. (U) In recent public discussions regarding the platform,
Akef, Habib, and Guidance Council member Abdel Moneim Aboul
Fotouh have been careful to note that the MB has no plans to
apply formally to the ruling party-dominated Political
Parties Committee (PPC) to register as a party. In his
interview with Al Badeel, Habib described the MB's plans
thusly: "The MB will neither apply to the PPC nor declare the
party unilaterally. This is not ambivalence, but political
compromise, because there is a law - which I consider unjust,
oppressive and unconstitutional - but nevertheless, I must
abide by the law. So, we will wait until the political
atmosphere changes." Akef told his Al Arabi interviewer, "We
know that the government will not approve the party. Thus,
the program is more like a plan of cooperation and accord
with the political elite, the other national powers, and
expert in the political scene .... With such a regime,
demonstrations will not change a thing. What changes it is
cohesion between all popular powers and accord in one
position."

--------------
WHY IS THE GOVERNMENT TURNING
UP THE HEAT NOW?
--------------


8. (C) The initial impetus for the current campaign against
the MB was the mid-December MB student demonstration at Al
Azhar University (ref A). However, although the government
has long since detained those associated with that incident,
the detentions of MB members continue at an accelerated pace,
and the recent arrests of Erian, Hussein, the two MB MP's,
and other fairly senior officials have upped the ante in
terms of the government continuing to target senior members
of the organization. Egyptian analysts, our contacts, and
the MB itself speculates a range of motivations are behind
the ongoing repression:

- The MB is still reaping the fallout from its success in the
2005 parliamentary elections, when it won an unprecedented 88
seats in the People's Assembly. The government, worried by
the MB's apparent strength and popular appeal, is working to
contain and weaken the group by imprisoning key leaders and

CAIRO 00002683 003 OF 003


members. Deputy Supreme Guide Habib, in an August 15 Al
Jazeera interview, said, "The reason (for recent arrests and
tensions with the government) is the 2005 parliamentary
elections."

- The GOE is likely concerned by the MB's halting steps
towards recasting itself as a legitimate, relatively moderate
political actor, as it develops what is, by preliminary
accounts, a non-extremist platform. Ibrahim Al Houdaiby, an
emerging young MB leader whose grandfather served as the
organization's Supreme Guide, recently commented to
journalists, "The arrest of Erian is a clear attempt by the
regime to crackdown on the moderate leaders of the MB who
could push the group towards more moderate stances. The
questions remains: Who does that serve?" A think tank
contact of ours believes that the recent arrests "are a
pre-emptive strike aimed at preventing the MB from further
disseminating its political platform, and tantamount to a
message to the MB to desist from political activism,"
highlighting that the "the regime is worried that the MB
party program could steal the limelight from the NDP and the
reform program it plans to present at its November party
conference."

- Another factor likely raising GOE hackles is the recent
uptick in foreign legislative outreach to the MB. As
reported ref F, the GOE reacted testily to the recent contact
between U.S. congressmen and an MB legislator. In a report
published in mid-August, the Foreign Relations Committee of
the UK House of Commons recommended that "British diplomats
should talk to moderate elements," within the MB and other
regional Islamist groups. Head of the MB's parliamentary
bloc Katatni has asserted publicly that there is a link
between the recent arrests and the increased international
interest in "dialogue" with the MB: "The government wishes to
send a message to other governments that it will not cave
into foreign pressure and will never condone the activities
of the Brotherhood."

- In the lead-up to the spring 2008 local council elections,
the GOE is likely aiming to damage the MB's organizational
infrastructure, so as to better prepare the political
landscape for the potentially challenging electoral contests,
and keep the MB from winning any further electoral victories,
which are an embarrassment for the GOE. Local analysts
speculate that the small districts of the local council
elections may play to the MB's strengths of local
name-recognition for candidates, unlike the Shura Council
races (which comprised large unwieldy districts).

- The goal of a smooth succession may be fueling some of the
recent moves against the MB, with the GOE, and particularly
supporters of Gamal Mubarak's presidential aspirations,
calculating that it is easier to hit hard against the MB now,
rather than later. Some local analysts have told us that the
MB would surely be among the loudest critics of a Gamal
succession, and so it behooves the government to encourage
organizational disarray now.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Whatever the reasons behind the ongoing campaign
against the MB, it appears to be having the unintended
consequence of increasing public sympathy for the Islamist
organization. We have heard numerous anecdotal reports from
our contacts that many Egyptians feel the government is
treating the MB too harshly, with the military tribunals in
particular being perceived as "unjust." On August 5, the Al
Wafd newspaper published an unusual public statement, signed
by numerous liberal political activists and intellectuals,
critical of the military trials. Some liberal-minded,
normally anti-MB Egyptian journalists and intellectuals have
also published op-ed pieces disparaging the tribunals.
Notably, in the face of intense pressure from the regime, the
MB has maintained a moderate public stance, continuing to
work on developing its party platform, and advocating
non-violence and compliance with Egyptian law.
RICCIARDONE