Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO2627
2007-08-23 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

EGYPT MONTHLY MILITARY WRAP-UP

Tags:  PREL PTER EAID EG IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0021
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #2627/01 2351430
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231430Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6646
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002627 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPT MONTHLY MILITARY WRAP-UP

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002627

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPT MONTHLY MILITARY WRAP-UP

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Emboffs discussed border security, prospects for a
secure communications agreement, plans for the 2007 Military
Cooperation Committee (MCC) meetings, political release of
defense systems, and BRIGHT STAR (BS) with Assistant Minister
of Defense for Policy MG Al Assar, Assistant Minister of
Defense for Armament MG Fouad Abd el Halim, Policy Advisor to
the Director of Military Intelligence MG Fouad Arafa, Chief
of the Liaison Agency with International Organizations
(LAWIO) MG Nagy Kamal, and U.S. Relations Branch Chief MG
Ahmed Mo'taz. The Egyptian Generals said: (1) the "only
way" to improve security on the Gaza border is through
additional Border Guard Forces (BGF); (2) Egypt has not
determined who will participate in the BS Senior Leaders'
Seminar (SLS); (3) Egypt strongly prefers to hold the MCC in
November 2007 (vice spring 2008, as the USG proposed); and
(4) Egypt will only consider a secure communications
agreement if it differs significantly from a CISMOA. During
a follow-on meeting with congressional staff members, MG
Fouad abd el Halim said that with the proposed ten-year
assistance plan (beginning in FY09),the U.S. would be
"violating the Camp David Accords" by failing to maintain the
3/2 ratio of assistance between Israel and Egypt. He also
urged Congress to "pressure the State Department" to stop
blocking the political release of new defense systems that
"have been approved by all other agencies and ready for
funding for years." End summary.

Border Security
--------------


2. (C) During an August 22 routine meeting with senior
Ministry of Defense officials, OMC-Egypt Chief Maj. Gen.
Collings, joined by poloff, stressed the need for Egypt to
take practical steps to address Congressional concerns about
border security and smuggling before the upcoming budget
debates. He urged Egypt to host a NESA Center-funded
regional border security conference to demonstrate GOE
leadership on this issue. Al Assar and Mo'taz both said that
they had already rejected the proposal, and asked why

Collings raised it again. They took exception at being asked
to reconsider, complaining that the U.S. accuses Egypt of not
doing enough to secure the Gaza border. If the U.S. wants to
propose technical or procedural solutions, Egypt will listen,
but not in the company of the Israelis and others during a
conference, MG Al Assar stressed. MG Arafa said "everyone
(the U.S.) supports Israel's views."


3. (C) When Collings pressed the conference proposal again,
noting that "every country has border problems, including the
U.S.," Al Assar suggested that the NESA Center host a
conference to help the U.S. "Be clear," Al Assar warned,
"asking Egypt to work under conditions (referring to Mr.
Obey's amendment) is impossible. You have cornered us...we
will not take actions to defend ourselves." Collings
responded that the seminar will look at border security in
general (vice Gaza),but MG Al Assar countered that Egypt's
only border problem is with Gaza. Collings stated that Egypt
needs to show cooperation and tangibly demonstrate how it
will address the Gaza border situation. Mo'taz presented the
executive summary of the white paper, urging Collings to cite
it for evidence of cooperation.


4. (C) Al Assar said that the "only way" to address the
smuggling problem is with more BGF in the applicable zone (a
proposal Israel rejected). "This is a very sensitive issue
(he repeated)." "We have explained this to you and Israel
many times and ask you to convince Israel to let us add
another 'regiment' (750 BGF) on the border." Collings said
the GOE had jumped to a conclusion on the need for increased
BGF without regards for other possible solutions and pressed
again for the seminar. MG Fouad Abd el Halim interjected
that Israel's refusal to allow the additional regiment in
Zone C (and the suggestion that BGF stage in Zone B) is
"unacceptable." DMI's MG Fouad Arafa said solving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical to improving border
security: "Palestinians make all the concessions and Israel
makes none, which leads the Palestinians to seek weapons and
ammunition." Contradicting Al Assar on the utility of a
troop increase, Arafa reiterated that adding more BGF without
progress on the peace process will not be effective. "The
sea borders are also wide open," he added. He then
complained about an IDF unit's sale of a large amount of
weapons/ammunition/explosives to Palestinians in April 2007
and accused Israel of luring Sudanese refugees to Israel to
empower the Sinai smuggling gangs and intensify the activity
in the Sinai.


5. (C) Poloff asked about developments in Egyptian-Israeli
liaison, ways to exploit main tunnels, and the potential for
Bedouin back-lash against more vigorous counter-smuggling
efforts. On liaison, MG Nagy said field commander level
contact would likely stay in LAWIO channels (at the Lt. Col.
level) for now, but noted that Egypt and Israel would connect
a "direct phone line" between their border liaison ops
centers "within days." On exploiting main tunnels, MG Arafa
and MG Nagy said this is not possible now. (Note: Neither
General would elaborate. End note). As for a Bedouin
back-lash, MG Arafa said relations between the Bedouin and
police are "very bad." Taking further steps "such as
removing buildings close to the border" will take time and
patience to avoid problems with the Bedouin.

BRIGHT STAR
--------------


6. (C) Collings said that CENTCOM Commander ADM Fallon would
likely attend the SLS and noted the remote possibility that
ADM Mullen would visit Egypt during BS. Al Assar said Egypt
welcomes ADM Mullen's visit at any time; Egypt's
representation at the SLS is unclear. (Note: MG Mo'taz had
earlier said that neither the Minister of Defense Field
Marshal Tantawi nor Chief of Staff LTG Samy Enan would attend
the SLS; representation would be at the two-star level. End
note). Collings said CENTAF Commander LTG North will raise
the geodetic survey with Air Marshal Sharawi on August 25,
proposing that Egypt allow the International Civil Aviation
Organization to survey the airfields (as opposed to having
CENTAF do the survey -- a suggestion Egypt has rejected
repeatedly). Al Assar said the Air Marshal will handle this
directly with LTG North.

Counterpart Visit
--------------


7. (C) On scheduling a counterpart visit, Al Assar said the
Field Marshal's travel to the U.S. is uncertain because it
turns on political and military considerations; he urged ADM
Fallon to raise the issue during his BS visit. The Chief of
Staff will next visit the U.S. in 2008 in conjunction with
the next MCC.

MCC; Secure Communications Agreement
--------------


8. (C) Collings told the Generals that OSD would like to
postpone the MCC until spring 2008 to allow time for
substantive progress on agenda items and for initial
discussions on shared mutual objectives. The Generals all
responded that the symbolism of having an annual meeting was
more important than the discussion. After significant
debate, the Egyptian Generals refused to agree to take the
proposal to delay to the Field Marshal, explaining that they
will need justification to do so and that the Field Marshal
may perceive the delay negatively. Collings stressed that a
delay is not/not a negative message, but rather intended to
enhance the utility of the meeting.


9. Collings warned that without progress towards signing
some form of a secure communications memorandum of Agreement
(such as a "Communications Security Memorandum of Agreement"
(COMSEC MOA),the U.S. will remove from Egypt's list of
requested defense systems any items that require a secure
communications agreement. (Note: The Field Marshal would
view negatively a U.S. move to cut secure
communications-related systems from Egypt's wish list. End
note.). Collings said that he had been trying for a year to
have a discussion about a secure communications agreement,
but whenever OMC's representative asks to discuss it, no one
from MoD is available. Delaying the MCC would allow time to
work towards such an agreement, Collings said, offering to
have a U.S. contractor, who provides secure communications
physical security in the region, explain the requirements to
the MoD. MG Fouad asked to see a sample COMSEC MOA, noting
that "if it is similar to a CISMOA, you know our position.
If there is a major change, we will look at it."

MoD briefs Staff delegation on FMF and political release
-------------- --------------

10. (C) During a follow-up meeting with an 18-member staff
delegation on August 22, MG Fouad accused the U.S. of
"violating the Camp David Accords" by failing to maintain the
3/2 ratio of assistance between Israel and Egypt with the
newly announced ten-year assistance plan (beginning in FY09).
He said Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently
considering how to address this issue. He also urged
Congress to pressure "the State Department" to stop blocking
the political release of new defense systems that "have been
approved by all other agencies and ready for funding for
years." He explained that "State" holds up "most"
congressional notifications as well, such as with increment
ten of the M1A1 Tank program, thereby delaying Egypt's
production schedule. Delegation members did not respond.
RICCIARDONE