Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO258
2007-01-30 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON RELEASE OF NIGHT VISION

Tags:  PREL MARR MASS MCAP EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0121
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0258/01 0301449
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301449Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3398
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000258 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA AND PM
NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSASAC ALEXANDRIA VA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MCAP EG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON RELEASE OF NIGHT VISION
DEVICES

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000258

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA AND PM
NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSASAC ALEXANDRIA VA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MCAP EG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON RELEASE OF NIGHT VISION
DEVICES

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Description: The USG has offered the GOE two excess
defense article OSPREY Class Mine Hunter Craft under the
Naval Vessels Transfer Act of 2005. The US Navy transferred
these ships to the Egyptian Navy (EN) in January 2007. The
following Night Vision Devices (NVDs) are routinely included
with such ships:

Nomenclature Model Amount
Night Vision Sight AN/TVS-5 4
Night Vision Sight, Long Range AN/PVS-8 4
Night Vision Goggle, Single Tube AN/PVS-7C 8
Night Vision Goggle AN/PVS-12A 4
Pocketscope AN/PVS-11 1
Pocketscope AN/PVS-18 1
Gyroscopic Binoculars AN/PVS-16 1


2. (SBU) NVDs are used by the U.S. Navy crew to execute
night and low light operations safely and effectively. To
counter the threat of mines effectively, the crew of a mine
hunting ship must be able to operate safely in a suspected
maritime minefield at night. NVDs would give the crews that
capability.


3. (C) The EN requested that all releasable equipage
onboard these ships (including the NVDs) be transferred with
the vessels to support the modernization of the Egyptian
Naval Forces, including their anti-terrorism forces,
specifically in the field of mine detection and
neutralization. Because the U.S. Navy decided to retain the
NVDs described in para one in the US inventory, it has
recommended procuring commercial-equivalent NVDs to ensure
the ships' safety during night and low light operations. The
Program Executive Office, Ships (US Navy) has determined that
the following equipment is the correct releasable generation
of night vision equipment for the vessels:
Nomenclature Equiv Model Total Quantity
ATN Mars6-HPTN AN/TVS-5 4

ATN NOS10-HPTN AN/PVS-8 4

ATN NVG7-HPTN AN/PVS-7C 8


ATN NVM14-HPTN AN/PVS-18 6

ATN Mars6-HPTN AN/PVS-4 4


4. (C) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or
services: The EN needs modern NVDs to operate effectively
and safely at night. NVD capability would provide EN an
organic capability to conduct night and low-light
marina/facility surveillance, coastal surveillance, low
visibility navigation, collision avoidance, and search and
rescue (man overboard) operations, as well as provide limited
support to coalition operations/exercises and improved
Egyptian security capability for U.S. vessels transiting the
Suez Canal. Because the ships will operate primarily in a
near land environment around numerous unlit civilian vessels,
NVDs will assist in ensuring the safety of the ships and
civilian crews. Egypt has procured night vision technology
in the past and has met all previous requirements for
security.


5. (C) How the articles or services would contribute to
both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals:
These NVDs will give the EN enhanced capabilities to conduct
night operations safely and improved detection in low light
environments, especially when operating in a suspected
maritime minefield. Egypt is a key regional ally and has
received significant economic and military support from the
U.S.


6. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles
or services requested: The EN requests the above NVDs to
give each mine hunting ship the same night vision capability
they had while the ships were in U.S. Navy service.


7. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the
introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation
or region: Combatant Commander's assessment to follow
separately, if required.


8. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations:
Transfer of these NVDs would not impact the regional balance
of power and should not cause negative reactions from


neighboring nations, except possibly Israel. As best as we
can remember, Israel has never supported a U.S. weapons sale
to Egypt; however, this sale would not reduce Israel's
significant qualitative military edge.


9. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for,
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The
GOE has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended
period, including over 13 years of experience with the M1A1
tank program. Egypt signed a general security of information
agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and
consistently protected the sensitive technology of other U.S.
weapons systems.


10. (C) Training required: No training is required.


11. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence
that might be required as a result of providing the article:
We do not expect to increase the U.S. presence as a result of
the proposed transfer.


12. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the
proposed acquisition: The sale, if ultimately requested by
Egypt and approved by the United States, would be financed
from Egyptian Foreign Military Financing-Grant (FMF-G) and
would not have a significant impact on Egypt's private
economy.


13. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the
proposed acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history
of human rights abuses and it supports civilian control of
the military. There are no human rights considerations that
preclude the release of these systems to the Egyptian
military.


14. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring (EUM) and plan for
compliance verification: OMC Egypt has a robust Golden
Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working
in close cooperation with the security assistance program
officer, will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's
physical security and accountability control plan, maintain a
serial number list of all NVDs and image intensifier tubes
that may be purchased, and stands ready to assist with or
conduct inventories and inspections as required.
Additionally, OMC Egypt is prepared to provide a written
report to the U.S. Central Command, Defense Technology
Security Administration, Policy Division (DTSA/PD),Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, Policy, Plans and Programs
Directorate (DSCA/P3),Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for
Strategic Plans and Policy (JCS/J5/WOT) and Department of
State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls (DOS/PM/DDTC/C) within 15 calendar
days of any reported loss, theft, or unauthorized access of
any Night Vision Devices listed in this offer.


15. (C) The operational plan for use and specific end-users
to include: The EN requests permission to purchase these
NVDs in support of the transfer of the mine hunters because
they conduct night mine hunting, coastal patrol, and maritime
security operations (including anti-terrorism and
anti-smuggling operations).


16. (C) Description of the primary mission for the units to
receive NVDs: Mine hunting, identification, and
neutralization; maritime security (including anti-terrorism,
anti-smuggling, security of the Suez Canal and its
approaches); coalition operations; and force protection.


17. (C) Extent of anti-terrorist missions for the units to
receive the NVDs: The Egyptian Navy has a maritime security
mission.


18. (C) Assessment of the purchaser's capacity to afford
substantially the same degree of security and accountability
protection as given by the United States and willingness to
accept the NVD physical security and accountability:
Numerous security audits by the U.S. Government have
repeatedly verified Egypt's capability to safeguard sensitive
technology and materiel as well as classified military
information.


19. (C) Additional information in support of the transfer
request:

-- In December 2004, DSCA approved, under Foreign Military


Sales (FMS) Case EG-B-UUH, a GOE request for NVDs, including
106 AN/PVS-7 NVDs and ten spare image intensifier tubes.
This approval followed an exception to the DOD NVD policy
granted by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology
Security Policy and Counter-proliferation (DUSD/TSP&CP),
which was granted in November 2004.

--In October 2003 and July 2004, OMC Egypt hosted EUM Tiger
Teams led by DSCA/P3. They inspected multiple locations and
weapons systems within Egypt. These visits were very
successful, and the team did not identify EUM violations.

--In December 2004, Egypt received its first shipment of
Stinger missiles in conjunction with its purchase of the
Avenger system. U.S. personnel have made multiple
inspections of the Stinger storage facility and have not
found problems. U.S. personnel have not found any
discrepancies in the two missile inventories accomplished by
U.S. personnel to date.

--In early 2006, DTSA approved the transfer of 12 4000C
(Generation II) commercial NVDs as part of FMS Case EG-P-SBO
(Egyptian Border Guard Fast Patrol Craft). Although this
equipment has not yet been shipped, the GOE has provided the
proper assurances to ensure security of this equipment.


21. (C) Country Team Recommendation: The country team
recommends the U.S. Government allow the GOE to purchase the
above listed NVDs in support of the transfer of the two mine
hunting ships to Egypt. This is a coordinated mission
position.
RICCIARDONE