Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO1188
2007-04-23 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL IZ IR EG 
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VZCZCXRO3431
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1188/01 1131005
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231005Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4824
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001188 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ IR EG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH
EGYPTIAN AND ARAB LEAGE OFFICIALS


Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001188

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ IR EG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH
EGYPTIAN AND ARAB LEAGE OFFICIALS


Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador Satterfield discussed security and
political developments in Iraq, as well as preparations for
the International Compact on Iraq and expanded Neighbors
conferences in separate April 19 meetings with Foreign
Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Arab League (AL) Secretary
General Amre Moussa. Satterfield updated both officials on
U.S. policy and sought commitments to engage the GOI
leadership to solidify national political reconciliation and
stabilization. Aboul Gheit shared plans for the April 22-24
visit to Cairo of PM Maliki and revealed distrust for the
Shia leader and sympathy for former PM Allawi. Moussa,
welcoming Satterfield's praise of AL efforts to advance
political reconciliation among Iraqis, agreed to do more to
work with the GOI in this regard. End summary.

Support for Maliki
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on April 19, Foreign Minister Aboul
Gheit and Ambassador Satterfield discussed Iraqi political
and security developments and planning for the May 3-4
International Compact on Iraq (ICI) and expanded Neighbors
conferences in Sharm el Sheikh. Acknowledging the competing
elements of PM Maliki's character, Satterfield stressed that
Maliki considers himself a national leader and praised Egypt
for drawing out this feature, for example by hosting Maliki
in Cairo on April 22-24. Aboul Gheit said Egypt welcomes the
visit, despite Iraqi Sunni objections and the "difficult
position" Saudi Arabia has taken, but he questioned Maliki's
ability to deliver. Satterfield described Maliki's progress
on security in recent months, but emphasized that political
reconciliation is essential to achieving lasting security and
outlined the need for more concrete progress on issues such
as finalizing hydrocarbon legislation and broad
de-Ba'athification reform. Maliki's willingness to discuss
de-Ba'athification demonstrates that his position has moved,
Satterfield said, noting that Maliki nevertheless remains
suspicious of Sunni intentions.



3. (C) On Ayad Allawi, Satterfield said the USG has told him
that his role is to help the Iraqi government succeed and
that his regional tours negatively impact Maliki and fuel
suspicion. Aboul Gheit noted Egyptian understanding of the
need for &strong men8 and countered that the USG should let
Allawi meet with regional leaders and should not discount the
possibility that if circumstances deteriorate, Allawi may be
suited to assume a greater role. Maliki must show
even-handedness on security, Aboul Gheit said, and dismantle
the militias permanently and completely. Satterfield agreed.
Aboul Gheit questioned the USG's ability to sustain its
military and political commitment in Iraq, given the upcoming
elections and pressure to withdraw troops.

Conference Preparations
--------------


4. (C) Aboul Gheit shared and sought USG input on a draft
communiqu for the expanded Neighbors Conference, noting that
he had not yet shared it with any other party, including the
Iraqis. Aboul Gheit noted the difficulty of communicating
with the Iraqis given the lack of an Ambassador in Cairo and
his uncertainty over the affiliations of Iraq's Cairo
representatives. On conference participation, Aboul Gheit
said the Iranians are encouraging the Syrians and Turks not
to attend. He noted that when he told Syrian FM Moallem that
not participating in Sharm would impact negatively Egypt's
cooperation on issues of mutual concern, Moallem reassured
him that he will join if invited to a meeting of Arab only
neighbors. To address Syrian concerns, Aboul Gheit said he
will host an Arab only Neighbors meeting on the morning of
the conference. Aboul Gheit suggested that Secretary Rice
call her counterparts to ensure attendance, and mentioned the
French, Japanese, Turkish, Chinese and Russians in
particular.


5. (C) On conference format, Aboul Gheit said Egypt proposes
to make a 3-4 minute opening statement, to be followed by
other statements, and a press conference, which Maliki is
welcome to join. MFA spokesman Alaa al-Hadidi clarified
separately that Egypt envisions only one session
(approximately 10:00-13:00),in which Maliki will offer an

CAIRO 00001188 002 OF 002


overview of developments, followed by 1-2 minute statements
by the other 22 participants. Satterfield said the U.S.
prefers to speak after the neighbors, and Hadidi suggested
the following speaking order: Iraq, neighbors (called on in
order of request to speak),Arab League, OIC, UN, U.S., EU,
non-neighbors. Hadidi proposed that the UN, Iraq and Egypt
participate in the Compact press conference and that Iraq and
Egypt handle the Neighbors' press conference.


6. (C) Ensuring that the Sharm conferences result in
follow-on progress will be key, Aboul Gheit and Satterfield
agreed. Hadidi confirmed that Egypt has publicly endorsed the
proposal for a follow-on meeting in Turkey and said the three
working groups and their leaders include: energy (Turkey),
security (Syria),refugees (Jordan). Hadidi was
non-committal on the issue of Iraqi debt forgiveness, noting
only that the issue is under consideration.

Arab League SYG Moussa on Iraq
--------------


7. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador Satterfield on
April 19, Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa likened
the situation in Iraq to a sinking or badly damaged boat that
must be saved to avoid consequences extending beyond Iraq's
immediate neighbors. Political reconciliation, he said, not
just enhanced security, is necessary because no single group
or alliance will succeed without consensus. Moussa questioned
whether Iraq is ready internally for reconciliation. Arab
countries will not send troops, so the U.S. is "condemned" to
do the job, Moussa said. But the real issue, he noted, is
how to address the Sunni-Shia rift. Moussa predicted that
concrete progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue would
eliminate 50 percent of the tension in Iraq.


8. (C) When Moussa questioned the commitment of the Iraqi
leadership to pursuing a national agenda, including on
security, Satterfield detailed Maliki's progress, noting his
actions against elements of armed groups engaged in violence.
Moussa said without political progress towards a "new Iraq,"
the militias will return. He stressed Arab League support
for Maliki, but underlined that the Shiites cannot rule alone
and must build a true coalition. Maliki must talk to his
enemies, Moussa urged, recalling that he pressed Harith al
Dhari, Jafari, and Hammoudi to talk at the 2005
League-sponsored National Accord Conference on Iraq.


9. (C) Satterfield asked Moussa to reassure Maliki of his
central role and that the goal is not to return the Sunnis to
power or restore the Ba'ath. Moussa reaffirmed his support
for the existing democratic system and ending Shia-Sunni
violence, but said the League will continue to receive
representatives of all Iraqi groups. AL Chief of Staff
Hisham Youssef complained about: the lack of a mechanism for
the AL to engage the U.S. on Iraq; the lack of clarity on the
U.S. role in the reconciliation process; and the U.S. refusal
to discuss troop withdrawal. Satterfield said that the U.S.
would welcome more consultations either in Cairo or
Washington and reiterated U.S. efforts to push Maliki
vigorously on the reconciliation agenda. As for withdrawal,
the U.S. has made clear the indications or benchmarks for
success that would allow force reductions, but will not
discuss explicit timelines or numbers.

JONES