BURUNDI CEASE FIRE AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUJUMBURA 000241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/S; PRETORIA FOR T. TRENKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PINR BY SF
SUBJECT: BURUNDI CEASE FIRE AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE

REF: PRETORIA 1077

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Ann Breiter for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D.)


1. (C) Summary: Burundi's cease fire agreement with the
rebel PALIPEHUTU-FNL has stalled. Visiting South African
analyst Jan van Eck (protect) warned that the accord could
collapse because the South African facilitators had assured
the FNL that certain outstanding issues could be discussed in
Bujumbura following the September signing. Van Eck claimed,
however, that the facilitators never obtained the Government
of Burundi's (GOB's) assent to this plan. Van Eck feared
that this revelation might prompt the FNL to leave the
negotiating table. South Africa's Ambassador to Burundi
(protect) disputed thisQim, but he acknowledged that on
March 26, the FNL categorically refused to continue
discussions until the GOB met its concerns. Clearly annoyed,
the Ambassador implied that Van Eck's discussions with the
FNL may have prompted the party to take a harder line. For
his part, Van Eck plans to travel to Dar es Salaam on March
31 to meet with FNL leaders there and return to Burundi early
in the week. Van Eck also expressed concern that FNL chief
Agathon Rwasa's personal credibility within his party could
be at stake. End Summary.

Two Conflicting Stories
--------------


2. (C) Burundi's fragile cease fire agreement with the rebel
PALIPEHUTU-FNL may be on the verge of failure, warned South
African analyst Jan van Eck (protect) on March 29. The FNL
signed the September cease fire agreement after intense
pressure from the facilitators, said Van Eck, because the
facilitators assured the FNL that they would be able to
negotiate certain key points, including terms of political
participation, after the signing. However, newly-elected
CNDD-FDD party President Jeremie Ngendakumana, who
participated in the peace talks in Dar es Salaam for a time,
told Van Eck on March 29 that the Government of Burundi (GOB)
never agreed to continue talks, and that the facilitators
never broached the possibility of such an arrangement with
the GOB. Burundi's government has steadfastly maintained
that it will not reconsider the terms of the September 8,
2006, agreement.


3. (C) According to Van Eck, Ngendakumana expressed shock at
Van Eck's report that the FNL had agreed to sign only on
condition that the two sides would continue to negotiate
certain key points. In Van Eck's presence, Ngendakumana
immediately telephoned South African Ambassador to Burundi
Mdu Lembede to seek confirmation of the report. Ambassador
Lembede apparently tacitly confirmed Van Eck's version of
events, according to Van Eck. Van Eck surmised that, in the
runup to the agreement, the facilitators may have "forgotten"
to advise the Government of Burundi of the proposal. He
feared that, once FNL leaders learned of the apparent
disconnect, they could question the good faith not only of
the GOB, but also of the facilitators themselves.


4. (C) Ambassador Lembede hotly contested this version of
events, telling Charge on March 30 that when the FNL signed
the cease fire agreement in Dar in September, they continued
to insist upon additional discussions on four outstanding
issues: the rewriting of Burundi's history; the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission; the identification and location of
assembly areas for former combatants; and FNL participation
in the government. The parties discussed these concerns in
Dar for over six hours before agreeing that they would be
more appropriately discussed in Bujumbura. Lembede reminded
Charge that he had personally participated in the talks in
Dar and thus knew what was said.


5. (C) Ambassador Lembede continued that when President
Nkurunziza met with FNL leader Agathon Rwasa in Dar es Salaam
in September, Nkurunziza plainly stated that given the
provisions of Burundi's Constitution, he could not guarantee
that FNL members could obtain specific positions in the
government. Once FNL leaders are demobilized, the goQment
could advise the party of those government positions which
were available, and FNL members could compete for those jobs
based on their skills and merit.


6. (C) Lembede acknowledged, however, that the
implementation process has come to a standstill. Certain of
the FNL's most recent demands, he said, would be very
difficult to meet. For example, continued the Ambassador,
the FNL has asked the government to release all political
prisoners before they continue discussions; however, the
government could not simply open the doors of all Burundi's
prisons. Instead, the release would require a defined
process.


7. (C) The mandate of the Joint Verification Monitoring
Mechanism is to implement the cease fire, continued Lembede,
but the process could not succeed without the cooperation of
the FNL. Ambassador Lembede lamented that the FNL
representatives still remain outside the negotiating process
and are obliged to consult with their senior leaders by
telephone in order to make decisions. Lembede added that he
could not understand the FNL's continued absence; as long as
the FNL remains outside the process, there will be no
movement. Unfortunately, opined the Ambassador, Burundi's
government is no longer focusing on the cease fire agreement
because it is consumed with other, more pressing problems.
He concluded that both parties must exhibit political will in
order for the agreement to succeed. The South African
facilitators planned to meet with a technical team in Cape
Town on March 30 to review ways in which to reinvigorate the
discussions. However, Ambassador Lembede warned that
ultimately, if the two sides could not resolve their
differences sufficiently to implement the agreement, the
entire process would collapse.


8. (C) Turning again to Van Eck's statements, Lembede stated
with visible frustration that he did not know where Van Eck
received his information, nor what he was trying to achieve.
Lembede somewhat angrily commented thaQ Friday, March 23,
the FNL had not yet responded to the government's position.
He noted that Van Eck arrived in Burundi on Sunday evening,
and on Monday, the FNL flatly refused to continue
negotiations. "I don't think that's a coincidence," alleged
Ambassador Lembede.

Rwasa's Credibility Threatened?
--------------


9. (C) Van Eck, in turn, has expressed grave concern that
the revelation that Burundi never agreed to the subsequent
political talks, a stipulation which the FNL required in
order to sign the September agreement, could destroy the
South African facilitators' credibility. In the worst case,
the FNL could decide to break off talks completely and return
to the bush. In an effort to break the impasse, Van Eck
proposed to Ngendakumana that President Nkurunziza meet
personally with FNL chief Agathon Rwasa. Ngendakumana was
receptive to the proposal. Van Eck planned to meet with
African Union representatives later on March 29 to discuss
options. He also planned to travel briefly to Dar es Salaam
over the weekend of March 31 to meet with FNL spokesperson
Pasteur Habonimana and then to return to Burundi early in the
week.


10. (C) Rwasa's personal credibility and leadership within
the FNL is at stake, opined Van Eck. He characterized the
FNL as a very dogmatic, tightly run operation whose
discipline results largely from Rwasa's leadership and the
force of his personality. Were Rwasa to be discredited, the
potential for violence from rogue elements of the party would
increase dramatically.


11. (C) Van Eck also expressed fears that a continuing power
struggle within the ruling CNDD-FDD could weaken the
government. Despite Radjabu's dismissal as party head,
President Nkurunziza is still widely perceived as a weak
figure who spends little time in the office, thus leaving a
"power vacuum." According to Van Eck, party members
increasingly hope to put pressure on the President to serve a
portion of his term and then to resign in favor of another,
stronger leader who would be able to make tough decisions.


12. (C) During his meeting with Van Eck, African Union (AU)
Ambassador Mamadou Bah decried the JVMM's inability to make
substantive progress on implementation, according to another
western diplomatic source who spoke with Van Eck on the
evening of March 29. Ambassador Bah suggested that if the
two sides could at least agree on the location of assembly
areas, the underutilized AU forces could perhaps begin to
prepare assembly areas for the FNL troops. The AU's forces
include one battalion of former UN peacekeepers who remained
in Burundi following the UN's drawdown in December and were
immediately rehatted. However, both Bah and Van Eck worried
that the FNL leadership would oppose such a move, believing
that it would serve to confirm that the government never
intended to negotiate further any of the FNL's concerns.
Comment
--------------


13. (C) This is Jan Van Eck's first trip to Burundi in over
a year; he reportedly was denied a visa to return to the
country after certain government officials, notably former
CNDD-FDD head Hussein Radjabu, became concerned about his
close relations with the FNL. Following Radjabu's dismissal
as party head, Van Eck sought successfully to return to
Burundi. While clearly sympathetic to the FNL, he
nevertheless enjoys access to the highest levels of Burundian
society, in which he is a known and respected commodity. As
one of the most long-serving diplomats in Bujumbura, African
Union Ambassador Bah has an extensive knowledge of Burundi's
peace process and commands widespread admiration.


14. (C) While it is unclear what influence Van Eck may have
had, if any, on the FNL's decision to halt discussions, it is
certain that the talks have reached a critical, and possibly
perilous, juncture. The facilitators have long worried that
if the FNL walks away from the table, it would be very
difficult to draw them - and also possibly the government
itself - back into the discussions. It is also possible that
the infighting in the ruling CNDD-FDD party over the past
months has distracted the government from the process itself.
Nonetheless, with a major donor conference scheduled in
Bujumbura in late May, the government has a powerful
incentive to keep the FNL engaged.
BREITER