Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUENOSAIRES503
2007-03-15 20:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

G-8 AMBASSADORS WANT TO HANG TOUGH ON PARIS CLUB

Tags:  EFIN ECON EINV AR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000503 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR NANCY LEE, AJEWEL, WBLOCK, LTRAN
PASS NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS, ROD HUNTER
PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR RANDALL KROSZNER, PATRICE
ROBITAILLE
EXIM BANK FOR MICHELE WILKINS
OPIC FOR JOHN SIMON, GEORGE SCHULTZ, RUTH ANN NICASTRI
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/OLAC/PEACHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV AR
SUBJECT: G-8 AMBASSADORS WANT TO HANG TOUGH ON PARIS CLUB
SOLIDARITY

REF: BUENOS AIRES 140

Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000503

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR NANCY LEE, AJEWEL, WBLOCK, LTRAN
PASS NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS, ROD HUNTER
PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR RANDALL KROSZNER, PATRICE
ROBITAILLE
EXIM BANK FOR MICHELE WILKINS
OPIC FOR JOHN SIMON, GEORGE SCHULTZ, RUTH ANN NICASTRI
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/OLAC/PEACHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV AR
SUBJECT: G-8 AMBASSADORS WANT TO HANG TOUGH ON PARIS CLUB
SOLIDARITY

REF: BUENOS AIRES 140

Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The German Embassy hosted a March 13 meeting of
Ambassadors representing Argentina's top ten Paris Club
creditors. Spain justified its bilateral treatment of its
2001 loan to Argentina, but promised solidarity on other
bilateral debt. Participants generally agreed that: 1) an
IMF comfort letter was likely insufficient for a
restructuring deal, noting concerns over setting a bad
precedent; 2) progress was unlikely before the October
elections; 3) solidarity was the best leverage to keep the
GoA from attempting to pick off individual creditors or
criticizing the Paris Club to gain votes in the October
election; 4) the lack of political pressure and easy access
to financing (including from Venezuela) reduced pressure on
the GoA to reach a solution; and 5) the GoA had not
sufficiently explained its inability to pay arrears. End
Summary.

Germans host G-8 plus for Paris Club discussions
-------------- ---

2. (C) At Post's suggestion, and under the guise of the 2007
G-8 agenda, German Ambassador Rolf Schumacher hosted a March
13 lunch for G-8 Ambassadors, plus Spain and the Netherlands,
to discuss Paris Club issues. These countries represent
Argentina's top ten Paris Club creditors. (Comment: Russia's
lending to Argentina is minimal, but Germany included the
Russian Ambassador to maintain the perception -- in case of
leaks to the GoA or media -- that this was a G-8 event, and
not an attempt to fortify Paris Club solidarity against GoA
attempts to conclude one-off deals with individual creditors.
End Comment). The Spanish and French sent DCMs, but
Ambassadors represented all other missions.

Spain on-board with Paris Club solidarity
--------------


3. (C) The Spanish DCM preempted possible criticism of
Spain's bilateral debt restructuring deal with Argentina (see
reftel) by assuring Spain's support for showing and
maintaining solidarity. He said Spain had arranged for
separate treatment of its $1 billion loan, which it lent to
the GoA in 2001 in conjunction with an IMF disbursement.
However, he said the GoS would exclusively seek treatment of
its other loans (approximately $680 million) through the
Paris Club.

Ambassadors skeptical of idea of IMF comfort letter
-------------- --------------

4. (C) The Spanish DCM wondered if an IMF comfort letter
would be enough to move forward with a rescheduling deal,
although he also questioned whether even this would be
possible, given President Kirchner's frequent public
rejection of any IMF role in Paris Club negotiations. Other


participants were very skeptical that a comfort letter would
be enough to justify a restructuring, especially given
IMF-Argentine relations, and argued that the Paris Club
needed to avoid setting a bad precedent for other countries
seeking treatment in the future.

Ambassadors assure no bilat talks ongoing
--------------

5. (C) All participants assured the group that, contrary to
persistent rumors in the local media, they were not
negotiating bilaterally with the GOA. The French DCM and
German Ambassador specifically stated that there were no
separate talks underway and that, according to their
understanding, neither of their export credit agencies would
be able to act with Argentina until a Paris Club agreement
was underway. (Note: Local press reports have stated that
the GoA was attempting to complete individual deals with
Germany -- the largest creditor with over $2 billion in loans
-- and France. End Note). The participants acknowledged
that a significant part of the GOA's motivation for resolving
the Paris Club situation was to gain and announce access to
export credit agencies for big infrastructure projects (i.e.,
thermal energy plants and high speed rail),preferably prior
to the October elections.

Notable lack of progress, and elections looming
-------------- --

6. (C) Participants also agreed that no progress was evident,
and the GoA was not making serious offers. Several
Ambassadors were skeptical that a deal would be reached
before October elections in Argentina, and the UK and the
Dutch thought that chances were not great even afterwards.
Most thought that the President had authorized Economy
Minister Miceli to explore a deal in late 2006, but on the
condition that the IMF would impose no/no conditionality nor
play any overt supervisory role in a rescheduling. Miceli
saw the advantages of reaching a deal, particularly in
opening access to export credit agencies. She then moved to
cut a deal under these conditions, and has also been testing
individual countries' openness to bilateral negotiations.
"They are going fishing," as the UK Ambassador put it. All
participants concluded that the GoA was trying to divide the
Paris Club and that the strongest leverage creditors had was
to hang tough and stay united.

Why can't Argentina just pay?
--------------

7. (C) Participants also agreed that the GOA had not
demonstrated sufficiently why it could not just start paying
its arrears to Paris Club creditors. The UK Ambassador said
GoA officials had told him they preferred to use their
resources for investment in Argentina, and he wondered why
the GoA could not also pay its debts. There was discussion
that the Argentines could come up with their own unilateral
plan and just start paying arrears, since they have the
money. Several thought this option might be attractive to
the GOA as it would avoid the IMF complication. (Comment:

Economic Ministry officials have expressed interest in this
option, but insist that it must allow access at least to
German and French export credit agencies, and must also come
with some kind of agreement that allows the President to
announce that he has resolved the Paris Club debts. See
septel. End Comment)

Notable lack of pressure on Argentina
--------------

8. (C) Participants felt that there was no political pressure
on the GOA to solve the Paris Club debt problem.
Furthermore, Argentina's solid financial situation and the
apparent largess of its new Venezuelan partner reduced the
financial pressure, because the GoA was not as pressed to
obtain export credit agency financing for infrastructure
investment. "A lot of people in the government think that
they can live just fine with what they have," as one European
Ambassador put it.


9. (C) The German Ambassador noted that they fact of not
solving the problem does not cost Kirchner domestically; in
fact, the Italian Ambassador wondered if Kirchner might
actually be setting up the Paris Club (as an institution) for
criticism later as an "outside force," in order to garner
votes in the election. This would be similar to Kirchner's
frequent outbursts against the IMF. The government's strange
use of press leaks might support this conclusion.
Participants expressed concern with the government's practice
in recent months of leaking details about Paris Club talks.
The press articles often quote GoA officials saying that
negotiations are moving forward, or even near completion,
despite the lack of any real movement in Paris (see septel).

Bond holdouts still a sticking point for some
--------------

10. (C) The Italian Ambassador commented that the issue of
the holdouts from Argentina's 2005 debt exchange was still
politically sensitive (with 400,000 bondholders involved),
although he said it was relegated for the most part to the
courts and the ICSID case. He said Kirchner had bluntly
refused during his September 2006 meeting with Italian Prime
Minister Prodi to consider any political solution (a big
"no"),stating that the issue had to be handled by the
lawyers. The German, Japanese and U.S. Ambassadors described
legal and other steps still being taken by their citizen bond
holders. The general consensus was that this issue would not
be addressed easily by GOA, and not quickly.

Comment
--------------

11. (C) Post initiated this meeting and worked with German
Embassy counterparts to have Ambassador Schumacher serve as
host, though the idea originally comes from the Dutch
Ambassador who was very concerned about Argentina's divide
and conquer strategy. Germany's role as G-8 and EU President
in 2007 provided cover in case the existence of the meeting
leaked to the press or GoA. Post chose to maintain a low


U.S. profile, to avoid being seen as leading the effort to
circle the PC wagons. The purpose of the meeting was to
exchange notes on the different missions' interactions with
government officials. It is heartening to learn that all the
missions seem under instructions to adhere to Paris Club
solidarity. However, the conclusion of the meeting is that
the window may have closed for an agreement prior to the
October elections. The Japanese Ambassador suggested that
the group meet again to compare notes. End Comment.
WAYNE