AMIA UPDATE: ARGENTINA LIKELY TO REQUEST QUIET USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000205

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, AND DMCCARTHY
WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, FRIEDMAN, AND BLAKENEY
NEA/IR FOR HWOOSTER
P FOR HEIDI BRONKE
S/CT FOR VIRGINIA PALMER AND ARNOLD SIERRA
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE AND JOSE CARDENAS
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS AR FBI
SUBJECT: AMIA UPDATE: ARGENTINA LIKELY TO REQUEST QUIET USG
SUPPORT IN LEAD-UP TO INTERPOL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

REF: 1. BUENOS AIRES 182 2. BUENOS AIRES 93 3. BUENOS
AIRES 43

Classified By: DCM Michael Matera for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. DCM met February 1 with MFA Ambassador
Guillermo Gonzalez (who has the lead on the AMIA case) to
discuss GOA strategy to prepare for the March Interpol
Executive Committee meeting that will likely decide whether
Red Notices will be issued for the arrest of the nine
suspects in the July 1994 AMIA bombing. Gonzalez
communicated his shock at the GOI threats delivered at the
January 22 meeting in Lyon (Ref 1) and noted that the GOA
would need and appreciate the quiet, closely coordinated
support of the USG as it prepares for the March 13-15
meeting. GOA strategy and plans for the March meeting remain
undetermined but are being discussed already with the Foreign
Minister; however, Gonzalez mentioned that U.S. support in
lobbying Executive Committee members prior to the meeting
would be important given very weak links between Argentina
and a number of the countries represented on the Executive
Committee. He asked however that we await an official
communication from the MFA on this, as the final GOA position
has not been decided. DCM was non-committal on USG
willingness to play an active role with Interpol Executive
Committee members but suggested that the visit of Attorney
General Gonzales and Under Secretary Burns and Assistant
Secretary Shannon to Buenos Aires next week was the perfect

SIPDIS
opportunity to discuss these issues. Embassy expects that
the GOA will take advantage of these visits for this purpose.
END SUMMARY.

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Revisiting the Lyon Encounter
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2. (C) On February 1, DCM and POLOFF met with MFA Ambassador
Guillermo Gonzalez, leader of the GOA delegation to the
January 22 Interpol meeting in Lyon, France (Refs 1, 2) and
lead official at the MFA on the AMIA issue. Gonzalez relayed
his impression that the Interpol
meeting was "complicated" and "difficult". He stated that he
was "astonished" by the GOI reaction to the GOA's
presentation, which included personal threats against the
Argentine special prosecutors. Gonzalez characterized the
Iranian response as "undiplomatic" and conveyed that he was
taken aback by the actions of the otherwise formal and
well-structured GOI delegation. It was surprising to him, he
said, that the Iranian delegation made the threats not once,
but three times.

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GOA to Provide Supplemental Information to Interpol
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3. (C) According to Ambassador Gonzalez, Argentine special
prosecutor Nisman had presented an 8-9 page written memo to
Interpol during the January 22 presentation in Lyon, and he
indicated that amplifying details would be provided to
Interpol on February 2, upon completion of their translation
into English. This supplemental information will serve to
bolster the GOA's initial submission to Interpol in November
2006 that was judged to be very weak by Interpol authorities.
The details include arguments against each of the 9 AMIA
suspects and will be transmitted directly from Interpol
Buenos Aires to Interpol Lyon. Upon evaluating this and the
information presented on January 22, Interpol's legal affairs
office will craft and present a recommendation to its
Executive Committee on whether to issue Red Notices for the
arrest of each of the AMIA bombing suspects.

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Interpol Executive Committee Meeting Scheduled
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Gonzalez confirmed that the Interpol
Executive Committee meeting has been firmly scheduled for
March 13-15. However, no decision has yet been made

regarding where the AMIA Red Notice issue will fall on the
agenda. In addition to the Interpol Executive Committee
members, delegations from the GOA and GOI are expected to
attend. Gonzalez noted that the GOA has not yet decided as
to the make-up of the delegation for the March meeting;
however, the political importance of the meeting and the need
for a positive outcome for the GOA are clearly recognized by
the MFA and the GOA.

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Argentina Formulating Strategy, Expects a Positive Outcome
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5. (C) MFA Ambassador Gonzalez conveyed to DCM that while
several proposals on how the GOA will prepare for the
Interpol Executive Committee meeting have been forwarded to
Foreign Minister Taiana, Gonzalez has not yet received
instructions on how to proceed. However, Gonzalez expressed
cautious optimism that six of the nine Red Notice requests
would likely be approved by the Interpol Executive Committee.
However, he said he doubts whether Interpol will approve
those for former Iranian President Rafsanjani and former
Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Velayati. Gonzalez also
noted that because Argentina's previous efforts in 2005 to
extradite former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Soleimanpour
had been unsuccessful, Interpol will likely handle the Red
Notice request on Soleimanpour very carefully this time
around and that this is the third request that may not be
finally approved by the Executive Committee.

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GOA Likely to Request "Quiet," Coordinated Assistance
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6. (C) Ambassador Gonzalez expressed the need for Argentina
to remain out in front of this issue, and requested the
"subtle, quiet, coordinated support" of the United States.
He asked that we await an official request from the GOA,
since the final GOA strategy had not yet been blessed by the
Foreign Minister and other senior GOA officials. While the
GOA continues to formulate its strategy for moving forward,
and it does not expect to have any specific requests of the
USG prior to next Monday, Gonzalez did express concerns that
it does not have any mechanism to reach out to several
members of the Interpol Executive
Committee prior to the March 13-15 meeting. Gonzalez
suggested to DCM that the GOA would very likely need and soon
request assistance in reaching out to "hard-to-reach"
members, including the representatives of Russia, Korea,
India, Italy, and the South African President of the
Executive Committee. The GOA has very limited relations with
Korea and India and with others (Italy, South Africa, Russia)
its relations in law enforcement are not deep. Gonzalez also
indicated that the GOA would likely want to meet in
Washington with Tom Fuentes, USG representative to the
Interpol Executive Committee and Special Agent in Charge of
the FBI's Office of International Relations. DCM was
non-committal as to the ultimate willingness of the USG to
actively engage with other Executive Committee members but
noted that next week's visits by Attorney General Gonzales
and U/S Burns and A/S Shannon would be opportune times for
the GOA to engage senior USG officials in discussion on these
matters.
WAYNE