ARGENTINE PREPARATIONS FOR NOV. 5-8 INTERPOL

S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 001991

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR ARNOLD SIERRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2027
TAGS: PTER PREL IR AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE PREPARATIONS FOR NOV. 5-8 INTERPOL
GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE ON IRANIAN CAPTURE NOTICES

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1971

Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons
1.4(a)(b) and (d)


1. PLEASE DISREGARD BUENOS AIRES 1990 WITH THE SAME SUBJECT
LINE, SENT BY ERROR. POST WILL RECALL OOB OCTOBER 5.


2. (S) Summary: DCM and EmbOffs met October 4 with the
Foreign Ministry's Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez to discuss
the GOA's preparations for the November 5-8 Interpol General
Assembly meeting in Marrakech, Morocco. Gonzalez explained
that on October 3 the MFA sent an ALDAC to its diplomatic
missions with instructions for lobbying host countries to
support Argentina's request for the issuance of international
capture notices for the six Iranians indicted in the 1994
AMIA terrorist bombing. In Buenos Aires, the MFA is calling
in resident foreign ambassadors and charges over the next two
weeks to lobby for support. Gonzalez is traveling to Lyon
the week of October 8 to meet with Interpol Secretary Ron
Noble and Interpol's chief legal counselor to discuss the
Nov. 5-8 agenda, procedures and possible actions the Iranians
might undertake.


3. (S) Gonzalez said MFA is concerned about Iranian lobbying
activities, but has no specifics. He asked for USG
assistance in trying to determine which countries the GOI
might be lobbying. DCM noted Embassy had requested
Washington assistance in determining Iranian activities
(reftel) and also said we were open to MFA suggestions on
which governments it felt it would be useful for the USG to
lobby. Following the MFA meeting on October 4, AMIA Special
Prosecutor Alberto Nisman (protect) called the Ambassador
separately to express his concern that not enough was being
done to support Argentina's case given that Iran is actively
engaged politically in an effort to derail a positive vote
for Argentina's request for international capture notices.
He stressed the need for active U.S. support. In light of
this feedback from the critical Argentine players, we
reiterate our request in reftel for any available information
on Iranian lobbying efforts in advance of the Marrakech
meetings. End Summary


4. (C) DCM, Assistant LegAtt Frank Oliva and PolOff met
October 4 with the MFA,s Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez,
legal advisor Carlos Foradori and North America Desk Deputy
Director Jaime Ureta to discuss the GOA,s preparations for
the November 5-8 Interpol General Assembly meeting in
Marrakech, Morocco. Gonzalez said he was confident that the
General Assembly vote on the AMIA international capture
notices would go the right way, but affirmed that it was the
GOA,s "duty" to guarantee it turned out that way.


5. (S) Gonzalez said the MFA had sent out an ALDAC to its
missions with instructions to lobby host governments to
support the GOA request. The ALDAC contained a non-paper in
Spanish on the issue, which the MFA is translating into
French and English for transmission to its missions. Embassy
will get a copy of the English translation as soon as it is
in final. Gonzalez said he was experienced enough as a
diplomat to know never to underestimate the people on the
other side of the table and said he knew the Iranians were
already active, although he said he had no specifics.
Gonzalez stated that this was where the GOA could use USG
assistance, in trying to find out who the Iranians were
lobbying.


6. (S) DCM reassured Gonzalez of continued USG support and
noted that the Embassy had already asked Washington to try to
ascertain as much of that information as possible (reftel).
DCM also stated that we were open to the GOA,s suggestions
on which governments it would be useful for the USG to lobby.
Gonzalez noted that, while the ALDAC went to all their
missions (except Tehran),the GOA diplomatic coverage was
limited, particularly in places like sub-Saharan Africa,
where it has only five missions. Gonzalez said that their
mission in New York would reach out to those countries where
Argentina has no diplomatic presence. He also said the
MFA,s regional bureaus were calling in resident Ambassadors
here in Buenos Aires to lobby on this end.



7. (S) Asked about Venezuelan lobbying in the region on
behalf of Iran's position, Gonzalez said they were not aware
of BRV activity. He observed that BRV activity in Interpol
meetings has dropped off in recent years, and stated that if
the Venezuelan delegation failed to show for the Marrakech
vote, that would not be such a bad outcome. Nonetheless, he
continued, the MFA will make additional, high-level overtures
to Caracas, as well as Havana and Brazil. The DCM asked
whether the GOA wanted the USG to intervene with the GOB;
Gonzalez replied, "Give us some time." He said that initial
discussions with Itamaraty generated a somewhat bureaucratic
response about the independence of the Interpol
representative, but that Argentina's Ambassador in Brasilia
would contact the Foreign Minister directly and Gonzalez is
working the issue with Brazil's Ambassador here. A/LegAtt
noted that he had discussed the issue with the chief of
Interpol's regional office in Buenos Aires, a former director
of the Brazilian Federal Police, and impressed the importance
of being prepared to counter Iranian efforts in preparation
for Marrakech, and at the General Assembly in Marrakech.


8. (S) Gonzalez also said that he is traveling to Lyon on
October 8, and will have meetings with Interpol Secretary Ron
Noble and the organization's chief legal counselor on October
10 and 11. Gonzalez said they knew that Iran had been in
contact with the legal counselor, and said he wanted to know
what was being discussed. He said he also wanted to get the
agenda for the November 5-8 meeting, ask about the procedures
of the vote and get information on any possible developments
or surprises the Iranians might try to pull. Gonzalez said
he was concerned the Iranians might try for a "no action"
resolution or motion, if this is possible under Interpol
rules, and wanted to talk to Noble and the chief legal
counselor to head off that possibility. He asked if we had
anyone at Interpol in Lyon with whom he could meet. LegAtt
will pass on Gonzalez,s contact information to the U.S.
Interpol representative in Lyon.


9. (S) EmbOffs, will meet again with Gonzalez when he returns
from Lyon, and DCM promised to share with him any information
we might come up with on Iranian lobbying activities
(requested in reftel).


10. (C) AMIA Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman (protect)
called the Ambassador later October 4 to express his concerns
that not enough was being done on the diplomatic front to win
support for Argentina's position. He said he had been told
that the Iranians were offering to pay for African
delegations to fly to Morocco, that they were pressing others
to vote against the resolution, and that they were trying to
arrange a secret vote so countries would not have to be seen
voting for Iran. He stressed the need for active U.S.
support.


11. (S) Comment: The MFA is late getting started with its
lobbying efforts but seems to understand the need for
aggressive engagement to prevail in Marrakech. The best way
for us to support the Argentines in this effort is to obtain
and share information on pre-Marrakech GOI lobbying efforts,
as requested reftel. In our discussion with Gonzalez, we
made the point that the GOA should not allow itself to be
drawn into an "Iran vs. Argentina" debate. Rather, it should
approach this (and present it to their interlocutors) as a
more straight forward procedural issue, i.e., support for a
unanimous Executive Committee decision. The GOI will try to
impugn the Argentine investigation (i.e., raise the
problem-plagued first investigation),but Interpol's legal
office, in its analysis of the Argentine case, made clear to
the Executive Committee the differences between the two
investigations and supported Argentina's call for the
issuance of Red Notices.
WAYNE