THE CRITICS AGREE: THE GROWING CHORUS OF CRITICISM

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR HU
SUBJECT: THE CRITICS AGREE: THE GROWING CHORUS OF CRITICISM
RE HUNGARY'S FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Opposition figures, government insiders, and outside
observers are increasingly vocal in their criticism of the
substantive content and the bureaucratic process of Hungary's
foreign policy.

KICK ME


2. (C) The growing discontentment makes for strange
bedfellows. Both Alexandra Dobolyi, the MSZP MP and MEPP
recently appointed as head of the party's foreign policy
office, and FIDESZ stalwart Zsolt Nemeth, chairman of the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, tell us separately
that Hungary has "no foreign minister, no foreign ministry,
and no foreign policy." Both see a degree of opportunity in
the current policy vacuum: Dobolyi is candid in noting the
bureaucratic room for maneuver afforded to her and to the
party, and equally blunt in assessing - with grudging respect
- that "the only energy, imagination, and initiative on
foreign policy now is coming from the Foreign Affairs
Committee."


3. (C) Nemeth and Dobolyi diverge, however, on the origins
of the present malaise. Nemeth tells us that while he does
not believe that the Gyurcsany government is "against the
transatlantic relationship," nor does he see any willingness
to be "more than neutral" on key issues such as energy
security. He believes the Gyurcsany government maintains
"business interests" with Russia. FIDESZ MP Laszlo Kover is
also preparing an article detailing alleged links between the
Hungarian security services and their Russian counterparts.
Nemeth sees morale at the MFA as abyssmal, with staff "trying
desperately for assignments overseas rather than in
Budapest." He noted recent steps by the government to
improve coordination, including the recent recall of its PSC
Ambassador from Brussels to serve as Foreign Policy Advisor
to the PM, but believes the problem starts at the top.

THE WORST FOREIGN POLICY MONEY CAN BUY


4. (C) Nemeth's views are shared by Pal Dunai, Director of
Hungary's Foreign Policy Institute (FPI),whose general
sympathy for the government does not prevent him from
speaking out on the government's foreign policy malaise.
Dunai believes Gyurcsany has "no interest in security
issues," and believes he has developed an unproductive
relationship with the foreign policy bureaucracy. Only
recently returned from nearly a decade in Sweden, Dunai is
already contemplating resignation, in part to protest the
MFA's funding practices, which he believes leave the FPI
bankrupt "so that others can fly business class." (Note:
According to Dunai, the MFA has already spent 125 percent of
its 2007 travel budget. End Note.)


5. (C) For her part, Dobolyi vigorously rejects the
widespread assertion that Gyurcsany is getting exactly what
he wants: a passive MFA and personal control over foreign
policy. She lays the blame primarily with FM Goncz, hinting
at the PM's growing frustration with her tenure at the
Ministry. Dobolyi concedes that Goncz has "made the
personnel cuts she was brought in to make" but believes the
FM is now expendable, asking flatly "who would want Kinga to
be the face of their country?" Dobolyi suggests that
Gyurcsany will want to make his mark in foreign policy given
his domestic political constraints. She believes he will use
the MSZP as a vehicle to do so, capitalizing on the party's
membership in the Socialist International (SI). (Note:
Indeed, in conversation with us she made a particular point
of distinguishing the SI's policy positions from the GoH's
stand on issues such as Kosovo and China. End Note.)

BRUSSELS ON THE FRONT LINES


6. (C) As Dobolyi readily admits, the opposition is equally
active in using the European Peoples Party (EPP) to enhance
its international stature. She sees "escalating parity" as
both the MSZP and FIDESZ seek allies and attention
internationally, taking their conflict to new lengths. She
believes the ongoing debate on energy security has been a
watershed for Hungary, and that it has the potential to
become a "cross-over" issue of domestic concern.
Interestingly, Dobolyi evinced greater antipathy toward the
SZDSZ for its attempts to "blackmail" the government on
domestic policy issues than she did toward the opposition.


7. (C) Biographic Notes: At 36, Dobolyi has been linked
romantically with a series of senior MSZP party officials in
Budapest and in Brussels. Energetic, ambitious, and
opinionated, she presents herself as being all of the things

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that the current foreign policy bureaucracy is not. Her name
has surfaced as a possible successor to FM Goncz in the
context of the latest rumored cabinet reshuffle, but she is
widely disliked even in her own party. It may be too soon
for Dobolyi, as her name is still associated with her gaffe
at an event in Romania during last year's election campaign,
when she dismissed discrimination against the Hungarian
minority there.

THE APPEARANCE OF POLICY


8. (C) The effort to craft a new national Foreign Policy
Strategy has highlighted the MFA's current straits.
Announced with great fanfare and periodically highlighted by
the PM and FM, the exercise is being ridiculed even by the
bipartisan experts involved in the drafting as lacking even
elementary coordination. At the same time, the decision to
turn to outside consultants - at the reported cost of 40
million forint - has prompted resentment at the Ministry.
Observing from Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee staffers
tell us that this is "the fourth strategy in five years,"
adding that "all were fine but none were relevant because
they were never implemented. Dunai downplays the exercise as
an attempt to create "the appearance of policy," and Nemeth
dismissed the effort as proof that "those who can't do ...
study."

x. (C) Comment: Hungary has gone from consensus over foreign
policy to a consensus among opinion-makers that foreign
policy is adrift. Although Nemeth clearly sees political
advantage in shining a harsh light on the GoH's
vulnerabilities, he is doubtless genuinely concerned
regarding damage that could effect the country and not just
the Gyurcsany government. If her reputation is any guide,
Dobolyi will search for personal advantage in the political
challenge, and we expect the MSZP to develop a more active
and potentially divergent voice on foreign policy. A more
authoritative opposition and a more active party will likely
work to the MFA's further bureaucratic disadvantage. This
correlation of forces could also work to the GoH's ultimate
detriment, as foreign policy decisions are viewed
increasingly through the lens of domestic politics. End
Comment.
FOLEY